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A Theological Interpretation of the Book of Proverbs 
Abstract 
The dissertation seeks to offer a theological interpretation of Proverbs which simultaneously 
does justice to the results of historical and philological research; to the Christian theological 
tradition; and to the context of contemporary secular society. 
The opening chapter will investigate the history of Proverbs’ theological interpretation in the 
last two hundred years. For 19th century interpretation a major theological and ethical 
challenge was that Proverbs bases its motivational system on the reader’s self-interest. The 
same phenomenon has not been considered problematic in more recent scholarship because, 
it has been claimed, if Proverbs is understood in the context of ‘creation theology’ then this 
explains its apparent selfishness and also helps to clarify its relationship to other biblical texts. 
However, it will be argued that ‘creation theology’ in itself does not solve all theological 
problems in Proverbs’ interpretation. It will be also argued that Proverbs offers a plurality of 
themes among which creation is only one, and from which the interpreter can choose 
according to his or her interests and aims. 
The second chapter will describe the methodology of the dissertation. Most theological 
interpretations in the last two hundred years have reconstructed Proverbs’ theology in view to 
its historical setting. However, little attention has been paid to the hermeneutical questions 
concerning Proverbs’ recontextualisation and to the wider theological tradition of the religious 
communities that consider it as their Scripture. A canonical approach can incorporate these 
concerns, too. 
The third chapter will discuss the problem of self-interest. This will be investigated in the 
framework of Thomas Aquinas’s eudaemonistic theological ethics. 
The fourth chapter will discuss Proverb’s secular appearance. Besides sociological descriptions 
of the ‘secular,’ several strands of the wider Christian theological tradition will be utilized to 
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Sometimes it is not easy to decide who sets the research questions and where the main 
inspiration for an interpretation of a biblical text comes from. Is it the text itself? Or the 
secondary literature? Or, maybe, the interpreter’s personal interests? I would find it hard to 
prioritise between these factors in the case of this particular dissertation. 
Looking back at the history of my enquiry, I probably made the first decisive step into the 
direction of the research behind this dissertation when I was reading 19th century 
interpretations of Proverbs. I saw how much they struggled with the ethical problem that 
Proverbs’ motivational system seems to be based on self-interest. This made me realize that I 
also had had an uneasy feeling about this feature of the book. 
Discovering the problem of self-interest in 19th century scholarship and in my own reading of 
Proverbs led me to a more serious study of more recent theological interpretations of wisdom 
literature. Investigating how 20th century scholarship addressed the issue in Proverbs I had to 
realise that it was not considered as a serious problem anymore. Interpreters seldom spent 
more than a few lines on the problem, if they addressed it at all. The reason for this, they 
argued, was that ‘creation theology’ provides a good explanation for the ‘apparent’ emphasis 
on self-interest in Proverbs. I was dissatisfied with this explanation because it seemed to take 
too lightly the central role self-interest plays in Proverbs’ motivational system. The problem 
appeared significant enough to deserve more than a brief reference to creation theology. This 
dissatisfaction went hand in hand with my growing doubts that creation theology, at least if 
understood only as a description of creation-order, should be taken as the theology of wisdom 
literature. 
Besides my already existing interests in the problem of ‘self-interest’ and the status of creation 
theology, investigating the 20th century academic interpretations of Proverbs drew my 
attention to a third topic. This was the theme of the ‘secular.’ Especially between the 60s and 
the 80s many scholars discussed the ‘secular’ nature of (some parts of) Proverbs. However, 
similarly to the 19th century problem of ‘selfishness,’ the discussion of ‘secular’ has gone out of 
fashion since then. This happened because the category ‘secular’ was deemed anachronistic 
and it was said that Proverbs only appears to be secular because of certain other 
characteristics of the text but, in fact, it is not secular. Though I was basically in agreement 
with these claims, it seemed undeniable that some parts of Proverbs do appear to be secular. 
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This encouraged me to consider whether this feature of Proverbs, either apparent or real, 
could provide food for theological reflection in a secular age like ours. 
Very briefly these are the reasons why I chose two, once popular but nowadays somewhat 
neglected problems for constructing a theology of Proverbs: its apparent selfishness (19th 
century question) and its apparent secularity (20th century question). As we will see, reflecting 
on these two different themes has led to similar theological conclusions. 
Not considering creation theology as the theology of wisdom literature prompts the question 
whether this literature has such an overarching and ruling theme at all. I will argue that maybe 
there is no such a clear order of themes in Proverbs. However important the theme of creation 
is in the book, one cannot claim that ‘Proverbs is about creation.’ At least not more than 
‘Proverbs is about self-interest,’ or ‘Proverbs is about everyday life,’ or ‘Proverbs is about 
trust,’ etc. This, of course, means that my themes, the themes of self-interest and secular, are 
not privileged either. Proverbs offers several possible themes which are potentially useful for 
theological reflection. One can approach the theology of the book through the themes chosen 
by me, but some other themes can be equally chosen. Hence the more modest indefinite 
article in the title of the dissertation (‘A Theological Interpretation of the Book of Proverbs’) 
rather than the definite. 
The history of my research probably makes it clear that this dissertation is the result of a 
conversation between at least three parties: the book of Proverbs, the (academic) tradition of 
its interpretation, and myself. I hope that I have given proper respect to my conversation 
partners. The fact that I did not always arrive at conclusions where I initially wished to is 
reassuring. Maybe I was not only speaking but also listening to what Proverbs and scholars of 
wisdom literature had to say. 
The above brief history of my research also explains the structure of the dissertation. It begins 
with a relatively lengthy history of research, as the academic study of Proverbs in the last two 
hundred years contributed significantly to forming my research questions. Dissertations often 
start with a chapter, or at least some comments on methodology. Because my methodology 
was partly a response to previous attempts to interpret Proverbs, the chapter on methodology 
will follow the discussion of the history of research. These two initial chapters will take up 
about one third of the dissertation. The remaining two thirds will be devoted to the problems 
of Proverbs’ apparent emphasis on self-interest and its apparent secular nature.  
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The history of theological interpretation 
of Proverbs in the last two hundred years 
Theological interpretation of Proverbs between 1800 
and 1930 
Introduction 
Critical biblical scholarship of the 19th century has often been characterised as neglecting 
wisdom literature. However, I am going to argue that this in fact applies for a few decades of 
the 20th century, rather than the 19th. Before and after these few decades there was and has 
been a rich scholarly discussion, which is too complex and voluminous to do full justice to in 
this chapter. One has to be selective. As the dissertation will mainly deal with theological 
questions, the following introduction into the literature will focus on the same issues. 
Historical questions will be discussed only where they have a significant impact on how certain 
theological questions were handled. 
One peculiarity of the following discussion will be that as historians speak about a ‘long 19th 
century’ lasting until the First World War, I will speak about an even longer ‘19th century’ which 
lasted until the early 1930s. This is because, as it will be argued, a new phase of modern 
theological interpretation of Proverbs began in the 30s: that is when the idea of ‘creation’ 
started to gain prominence. 
Not only the ‘19th century’ itself but also the discussion of it will be somewhat longer than is 
usual in similar articles or chapters. This length is not only justified by the relative neglect of 
the period in discussions of the history of wisdom writings’ interpretation.1 19th century 
scholarship contributed to the theological interpretation of Proverbs in a way which is 
sometimes in surprising agreement and sometimes in interesting tension with the more recent 
interpretations of Proverbs. It recognized by and large the same characteristics of Proverbs 
which were recognized by later scholarship, but it used somewhat different categories to 
                                                          
1
 Two notable exceptions are the essays of Smend and Dell who pay more thorough attention to the 
19th century than usual. However, these papers concentrate mainly on historical questions. Smend 
1995; Dell 2011. 
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handle them theologically. As someone learns a lot about his or her own language by learning 
a foreign one, it seems to be a valuable exercise to ‘learn’ these 19th century categories, even if 
some of them have gone out of fashion and been replaced by new ones since then. This will 
help us to see some characteristics of our own theological categories. In fact, in the later 
sections of the dissertation a part of my argument will be that some categories of the 19th 
century theological interpretations (like ‘philosophy’) does not do more injustice to the 
content and nature of Proverbs than those of the 20th century (like ‘creation theology’). 
Was Proverbs neglected before the 1930s? 
James Crenshaw summarised the history of the research of biblical wisdom literature as 
follows: 
Wisdom literature can be labelled an orphan in the biblical household. Virtually ignored as 
an entity until the beginning of this century, “wisdom” suffered the indignity of judgment 
by alien standards and the embarrassment of physical similarities to non-Israelite parents. 
In addition, she had a twin (Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon) who was in some circles even 
excluded from the privileged status of canonical authority, although none could deny her 
likeness to the more favored sister… The negative assessment of wisdom arose because it 
was difficult if not impossible to fit her thought into the reigning theological system. The 
verdict of G. Ernest Wright represents the dominant position for several decades: “The 
difficulty of the wisdom movement was that its theological base and interest were too 
narrowly fixed; and in this respect Proverbs remains near the pagan source of wisdom in 
which society and the Divine work in history played no real role”… This verdict is 
substantiated by reference to an absence of (1) a covenant relationship with God, (2) any 
account of the revelation at Sinai, and (3) a concept of Israel’s special election and 
consequently of Yahweh’s saving deeds for his people. Instead, wisdom is said to be 
directed toward the individual, and consequently to break down all national limits…
2
 
Although our immediate interest in this first section is the interpretation of Proverbs before 
1930, it was necessary to quote Crenshaw at length even where he wrote about the history of 
interpretation after that time. What he writes about the more recent history also reveals how 
he understood earlier interpretation. 
First of all, it is necessary to clarify what Crenshaw actually says about the history of Proverbs’ 
interpretation before the 1930s. The very beginning of this long quotation seems to be the 
most relevant in this respect. The first statement, that wisdom literature was ‘virtually ignored’ 
until the beginning of the 20th century, is straightforward enough. Yet, what is the meaning of 
‘suffered the indignity of judgment by alien standards’ right after this statement? What does 
                                                          
2
 Crenshaw 1976b:1‒2. 
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‘alien standards’ stand for? The only alien standards explicitly mentioned in this text is that 
they wanted to measure wisdom literature as it relates to the historical acts of God (covenant, 
Sinai, election), that is, Heilsgeschichte, and wisdom literature was found wanting by this 
standard. However, Crenshaw uses this explicit reference to history only a few lines later, in 
connection with the middle of the 20th century, the biblical theology movement, and not with 
the era before the 20th century. Can it be that at the middle of the second sentence he 
suddenly moved on 50 years: in the first half of the sentence writing about the neglect of 
wisdom literature before the 20th century, then suddenly introducing the causes for neglect 
well in the 20th century? It would certainly be an awkward way of delineating the topic. 
Similarly, referring to alien standards of judgement and not giving the slightest hint at what 
these could be would also be rather unusual. As a result of these considerations, I tend to 
believe that Crenshaw sees the lack of historical and national references in wisdom literature 
as one of the causes for its neglect not only in the 20th century but also in previous times. Or at 
least that this was an alien standard which influenced the interpretation of Proverbs already in 
the beginning of the 20th century and not only at the middle of it. 
The above quotation is representative of many evaluations of the history of Proverbs’ 
interpretation in the last few decades: it gives only a passing attention to the history before 
the 20th century and lists all the characteristics of Proverbs which are supposed to explain its 
neglect in the past: no interest in Heilsgeschichte, individualism, international character, etc. 
Murphy, for example, after listing the usual set of characteristics like Proverbs’ international 
character and neglect of typical Yahwistic motives (Exodus, Sinai covenant), writes this: 
History bears out the “benign neglect” of Proverbs… one gets the impression from certain 
bench marks that it has served as little more than an “enforcer” for moral guidance… the 
tendency up into modern times has been to relegate the book somewhere behind the 
Torah as contributing to the ethical ideals of Israel.
3
 
To give another example, Whybray, in his brief description of critical discussion before 1923 
also seems to suggest that Proverbs was considered problematic in that period: 
An overriding problem for the discussions of the next half-century and more [1850-] was 
both a literary and a historical one: how the three books Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes 
which constituted the “Wisdom literature of the Hebrews”… and which differed from the 
rest of the literature of the Old Testament in their “philosophical” character and in the 
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total absence of any specific concern with Israel and the Israelites, could be found a place 
in the history of Israelite thought and religion.
4
 
However, as we will see, a more thorough look at the 19th century reveals a much more 
complex picture than the one we can find in Crenshaw’s, Murphy’s, and Whybray’s short 
descriptions.5 
To start with, it is not entirely clear that Proverbs was neglected. At least the major 
dictionaries around the turn of the century6 do not list fewer books and monographs in their 
bibliography for Proverbs than would be proportionately expected. According to these 
bibliographies it was certainly not as popular among the scholars of the 19th century as Isaiah, 
Job, or Psalms, not to mention the main interest of critical scholarship, the Pentateuch; but it 
was by no means a neglected biblical book. Cornill, in his well structured introduction7 lists 19 
works about Proverbs in his bibliography. There are 17 biblical books or book-pairs whose 
bibliography is shorter,8 and 11 whose bibliography is longer.9 However, many of these 11 
items have only 20 or 21 books in their bibliography, so practically the same number as 
Proverbs.10 The average number of books and articles listed in the Encyclopedia Biblica’s 
articles about biblical books is approximately 28.11 Proverbs however has 58 items listed in its 
bibliography. Only Deuteronomy, Job, Psalms, and Jeremiah have more. The Hastings 
Dictionary12 contains 26 works in its bibliography about Proverbs, which almost reaches the 
average (approx. 29) of similar bibliographies for biblical books in the Dictionary, thereby 
putting Proverbs somewhere in the middle of the range of biblical books in this respect. 
Of course, such statistics can be misleading. One bibliography in a dictionary can be more 
selective than the other and the significance of the cited works can vary, too. Nevertheless, it 
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is also telling that I have not come across any works from the 19th century that complained 
about how neglected Proverbs was in research. In fact, as we will see, some scholars were 
quite enthusiastic about the role Proverbs played in the history of religion of Israel. So, at first 
sight, it seems that Crenshaw’s perception about the neglect of the book of Proverbs during 
the 19th century was mistaken. 
One could however argue that although there were many commentaries and introductions 
that investigated Proverbs from a historical or linguistic point of view, it was not utilized to the 
measure it could have been in the more theological discussions. Practically all the major 
introductions to the Old Testament were interested mainly in the question of date and 
authorship.13 Cheyne’s Job and Solomon, an introduction to the wisdom literature, also focuses 
on these classical introductory questions and spends only 2-3 pages on the theological 
importance of Proverbs.14 The same is true of the introductory part of commentaries.15 These 
works only discuss theological issues briefly, in order to place the book into their alleged 
history of religion scheme, thereby supporting their theory about the date and authorship of 
the book.16 
A similar brevity can be observed in monographs on biblical theology or on the history of 
Israelite religion. At least this seems to be true for the theologies at the turn of the century and 
that of the first few decades of the 20th century. Marti explicitly mentions Proverbs only once 
in his chapter about the final phase of Israelite religion, the phase where he dates Proverbs in 
its final form.17 Similarly, Max Löhr, writing about the religiosity after the exile refers to 
Proverbs only occasionally. He rather uses Psalms, Ezekiel, Job and other biblical books even 
when he writes about the topics of individualism, universalism, and divine retribution, for 
which Proverbs would seem to be an obvious text as these topics were often discussed in 
contemporary commentaries of Proverbs, as we will see.18 Davidson mentions Proverbs only 
on 7 pages out of more than 500 pages according to the index of scripture passages in the back 
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of the volume.19 Kittel writes only a little bit more than two pages on Proverbs in his religion of 
Israel.20 Schultz, although he seems to be the most positive about the religious value of 
Proverbs among the theologians of the turn of the century, only spends eight pages with 
describing Proverbs’ theological value in his two volume theology.21 I have encountered only 
one exception: the Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments by D. A. Bertholet.22 However, 
Bertholet, just as the author of the first volume of the same Biblische Theologie, B. Stade, pays 
careful attention to every biblical book on its own right. In other words, his work is an 
exception in its form and not only in its content about Proverbs: it is a kind of combination of a 
theological introduction to the individual books and of a biblical theology. These peculiarities 
explain why he filled so much space with Proverbs in his book—he had to, since the layout of 
the book required him to spend a significant number of pages on every single book of the 
Bible. 
Should we conclude then that Proverbs was only interesting for scholars because of its 
interesting grammatical problems and complex history of the book? Can we say that although 
it was not neglected in historical and linguistic questions, it was neglected from a theological 
perspective? Maybe Crenshaw was right after all, at least in this limited sense of neglect. In 
order to be able to answer this question we have to investigate not only the number of books 
and pages written about Proverbs but also the content of these scholarly discussions. 
An inventory of theological topics 
Describing the history of 130 years’ debate about the interpretation of a biblical book and 
comparing this long story with the present state of the matter is a complicated task, especially 
if one wants to state it briefly. In order to be able to provide a clear picture, I have chosen to 
use two different methods in this and the next section respectively. 
First, I make an inventory of the main theological topics mentioned in connection with 
Proverbs in the 19th century. In this section I will pay attention to historical development and 
chronological issues only where it is unavoidable. Similarly, I am also avoiding the discussion of 
the broader intellectual atmosphere in which these topics were debated. 
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Second, in the following section I am going to give a more chronological, historical description 
of the development of theological thinking before the 1930s, concentrating on the most 
important theological topics. 
TABLE 1: TOPICS IN PROVERBS’ THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE 1930 
Topics discussed to an equal 
measure before and after 
1930 
Topics emphasised somewhat 
differently before and after 
1930 
Characteristic to the era 
before 1930 
 Proverbs’ international 
character 
 Proverbs’ universalistic 
character 
 Proverbs is not 
nationalistic 
 Lack of cult, prayer, 
Sinai covenant in 
Proverbs 
 Proverbs’ humanistic 
character 
 Proverbs’ emphasis on 
the individual 
 Proverbs’ aim is the 
education of youth 
 Proverbs has a practical 
interest 
 Figure of Wisdom in 
Proverbs 8 
 Proverbs’ relationship to 
prophets 
 Proverbs’ relationship to 
Torah 
 Proverbs’ utilitarianism 
 Retribution in Proverbs 
 
 The category of 
‘philosophy’ 
 An emphasis on 
monogamy in Proverbs 
 The lack of mention of 
the messiah in Proverbs 
 The lack of mention of 
the life after death in 
Proverbs 
 
The table lists only those topics which are directly related to the theological discussions. This is why 
topics like the etymology and meaning of mashal (a favourite topic in the early commentaries)
23
 or the 
historical questions of date and authorship are not listed here, though some of them will be mentioned 
in the following discussion where they are directly relevant to our interests. 
International; Universalistic; Not nationalistic; Lack of cult, prayer, Sinai covenant; 
Humanistic; Individualism 
Bernhard Lang gives the following sketch of the history of recognition of Proverbs’ 
international connections: since 1847 the Instruction of Ptahhotep, and as such some of the 
Egyptian literary parallels, had been known. After about 1890 it became widely accepted that 
the genre of wisdom literature has its origins in Egypt. In 1923 the Instruction of Amenemope 
was discovered, and as a result, many scholars accepted a direct foreign literary influence after 
this date. According to Lang, although the commentaries often referred to foreign (Indian, 
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Greek, Arabic, etc.) parallels already before 1890, these commentators did not claim that the 
biblical material was directly derived from or influenced by foreign sources, but rather they 
only cited those foreign parallels as interesting illustrations for the teaching of Proverbs.24 
Lang’s opinion seems to be correct from a historical-critical point of view. Yet, from a 
theological point of view it is not so relevant that before 1890 scholars used non-Israelite 
parallels ‘only’ as illustrative. It is more important that the international nature of Proverbs (if 
not the foreign literary origins) was fully known throughout the 19th century. Already the 
earliest commentaries and theologies spent a considerable effort on delineating the 
similarities between Proverbs and the wisdom of other nations. They did so because even if a 
direct influence from outside was not considered likely, they nonetheless thought that Israelite 
wisdom literature represented the same intellectual spirit as non-Israelite wisdom. This was so 
because many thought that as a society develops, it inevitably reaches a stage in which 
wisdom literature plays an important role. Wisdom writings as such were considered almost as 
inescapable results of the maturing of an oriental society, and Israel, rather than being a 
special case, was considered as a society which only followed this general rule, even if many 
considered Israel’s wisdom literature superior to that of other nations in important respects. 
So, although direct literary influences were not discussed, the similarities with foreign wisdom 
were recognised as the results of very similar intellectual developments and as such Israelite 
and foreign wisdom literature were considered to be intellectually related.25 A characteristic 
example from the second half of the century but still from before 1890 is Malan’s 
commentary. He considered it a worthwhile exercise to interpret Proverbs solely through the 
international parallels to it. In his three-volume commentary, the first part of which appeared 
in 1889 (according to his foreword the book was based on his old notes assembled in the 
decades before writing the book), he collected a lot of Indian, Greek, Persian and Arabic 
parallels.26 
Whether 19th century commentaries mentioned foreign parallels or not, the international 
character of Proverbs was obvious for every interpreter, since the book did not mention Israel 
at all. What is more, the lack of references to the cult in the Jerusalem temple and definitive 
national events, the emphasis on individuals and not on the Israelite nation were not only well 
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known but often celebrated features of Proverbs throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century.27 What is more, many Christian commentators saw in Proverbs the preliminary 
step before the New Testament, which with its humanistic, non-nationalistic and individual-
focused teaching leads directly to Jesus’ message. The following quotations are representative 
of the appreciation with which these commentators turned to the ‘humanistic and 
universalistic’ features of Proverbs: 
It [Chokma] was universalistic, or humanistic. Emanating from the fear or the religion of 
Jahve..., but seeking to comprehend the spirit in the letter, the essence in the forms of the 
national life, its effort was directed towards the general truth affecting mankind as such. 
While prophecy, which is recognised by the Chokma as a spiritual power indispensable to 
a healthful development of a people..., is of service to the historical process into which 
divine truth enters to work out its results in Israel, and from thence outward among 
mankind, the Chokma seeks to look into the very essence of this truth through the robe of 
its historical and national manifestation… From this aim towards the ideal in the historical, 
towards… the human (I intentionally use this word) in the Israelitish, the universal religion 
in the Jahve-religion, and the universal morality in the Law, all the peculiarities of the Book 
of Proverbs are explained.
28
 
The teachers of Hebrew proverbial philosophy prepare the way for the Great Teacher of 
the New Testament. Their teaching is not Jewish but human, or rather perhaps we should 
say, it is at once Jewish and human… All that is eternal and immutable in the Law of Moses 
they acknowledge and build upon; all that is transitory and evanescent they ignore. The 
substance is retained; the accidents are dispensed with... In like manner the Divine Author 
of the Sermon on the Mount, while He declares emphatically that He has “not come to 
destroy but to fulfil the law and the prophets,”… yet makes it plain in all His teaching that 
it is the substance, the spiritual, the eternal, the universal, and not the clothing, the 
material, the local, the transitory, of which He speaks. He too strips off the garment which 
conceals and cripples that the form beneath it may come to view and expand.
29
 
They [the sages] turned their attention from the rulers and powerful leaders of their race 
to the individual, to the common man of the street... Instead of race or class interest, love 
for mankind became the guiding motives for the work of the later sages… Narrow racial 
points of view and interests disappear. It is significant that Israel is not once mentioned in 
the book of Proverbs. It is to man they speak, and especially to youth, to men and women 
in the making... 
There are many indications that Jesus was a close and appreciative student of the wisdom 
literature of his race. His interest, like that of the sages, centred not in the nation, nor in 
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As a conclusion we can say that Proverbs’ international character and its ‘similarities to non-
Israelite parents,’31 to use Crenshaw’s words, were considered not so much an embarrassment 
but quite the opposite in the pre 1930s literature. 
Education of youth; Practical interest 
Some recent commentators emphasise that Proverbs has a practical focus and it was used 
particularly in the practical and religious education of youth.32 The same notion was important 
for the pre-1930s commentators, too. It is actually mentioned in almost all of the books and 
articles dealing with Proverbs, so the emphasis on the practical and educational role of 
Proverbs was, if possible, even stronger than in recent times.33 
Figure of Wisdom in Proverbs 8 
The question whether the figure of Wisdom in Prov. 8 is a person, personification, or 
hypostasis was hotly debated already before 1930 (for discussion of the 20th century debate 
see later) just like the question whether this figure developed from a foreign deity (though the 
possible Ma’at parallels were not yet recognized then). Almost all the major opinions we can 
find in recent scholarship can be found in some form already in 19th century scholarship.34 
Relationship to prophets; Relationship to Torah 
In contrast to some modern interpreters, before the 1930s almost every interpreter 
emphasised the deeply religious nature of the whole of Proverbs. As Oesterly wrote, ‘…there 
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was a Godward thought at the back of their [i. e. the sages’] minds on all that they wrote, 
which hallowed what we call worldly wisdom, and which sanctified common sense…’35  
Although some in the 19th century were of the opinion that wisdom was indifferent or hostile 
to the Torah,36 the vast majority agreed with Schultz’s words: ‘This wisdom of Israel... is based 
on the revelation of God, especially on that wonderful law which distinguishes Israel above all 
other nations.’37 The special relationship between Prov. 1‒9 and Deuteronomy was especially 
often recognised.38 
If possible, the relationship with the prophets was even more often mentioned than that with 
the Torah. Although scholars recognised the differences,39 they considered the authors and the 
compilers of Proverbs as the spiritual heirs of the prophets who continued their teaching.40 
Although with slightly different nuances, basically almost all biblical scholars before the 1930s 
concluded that the sages were devout followers of the Torah and the prophets—a view which 
was far from being mainstream throughout much of the 20th century. According to most pre-
1930s scholars the differences between the sages and the prophets were due to applying the 
teaching of the prophets to the life of individuals living in different circumstances and religious 
milieus from the prophets: 
In a sense they were the successors of the prophets, for they coined their teaching into 
current change. Neither rising to the lofty conceptions of the greatest prophets nor 
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partaking of their glorious enthusiasm, they yet kept the true balance between form and 




In dealing with the subject of the religious value of Proverbs one has to remember that 
the underlying purpose of the Wisdom writers was to apply the religion of the Law and the 
prophets, so far as this had developed, to the practical, everyday life of the individual.
42
 
Thus they were lay-teachers after the manner of the prophets of old, but in very different 
times and surroundings. Like the prophets they were independent of the cultus, and like 
the later of them their concern was rather with individuals than with the mass, but they 
lacked the prophets’ fervour of utterance and their ecstasy of soul... the high ethical 




It seems that by far the greatest ethical problem for the interpreters of Proverbs before the 
1930s was that it apparently based its counsels about right behaviour on how profitable that 
behaviour is for the individual: ‘The great motive to wise living is always personal happiness. 
There is no concern about making others happy. Even when the welfare of others is 
considered, it is always with reference to oneself.’44 
Some, like Bewer, just recognise this feature of Proverbs as a matter of fact, but the majority 
tries to defend this ‘selfish’ attitude of the book. There were different explanations available. 
First, some argued that ‘yes, selfishness is there, but there were other, more noble motives, 
too’: 
It is, further, only one side of the truth to say that right-doing is inculcated, and wrong-
doing deprecated, solely on utilitarian grounds… it is impossible to read what is said in 
Proverbs about God’s relationship to men without seeing that so far as the Sages 
themselves were concerned they implicitly assumed a Godward intention among the 
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Or, as Cheyne wrote referring to Prov. 25:20; 26:23; 27:6, 10, 14, 17, ‘we should wrong our 
‘wise men’ by treating them as pure utilitarians; they are often sympathetic observers of 
character and circumstance.’46 
Second, some argued that a certain measure of selfishness is actually practically healthy and as 
the self is also an important part of the society it is also a form of justice to care for the self. 
Toy was one of those who recognised the practical nature of Proverbs and he was the one who 
connected this practical interest maybe the most emphatically with the problem of selfishness. 
He also valued the regard for the self as a kind of justice: 
The high ethical standard of the Book is universally recognized… the supposed exceptions, 
cases of alleged selfish prudence…, are only apparent, since proper regard for self is an 
element of justice. 
The motive urged for good living is individualistic utilitarian or eudaemonistic—not the 
glory of God, or the welfare of men in general, but the well-being of the actor… it is 
unnecessary to call attention to the fundamental value of this principle in practical life.
 47
 
Third, some argued that the main aim was to educate the youth, for which aim referring to 
selfish benefits is useful, at least at an early stage.48 Furthermore, some argued in connection 
with the third point that referring to self-interest is not only useful for the education of the 
individual but it is also useful for the education of the people of God. In other words, this 
selfish motivation was an inferior but important stage in the development of God’s people. As 
Perowne wrote, ‘It is the Church in her childhood that is here being educated.’49 
The ethical problem of motivating with selfish reference to rewards and punishment was 
directly connected to the theological topic of divine retribution. 19th century scholarship 
markedly differed in this from later discussions of Proverbs. As I will discuss in more detail 
later, in a major part of the 20th century the complex problem of ‘selfishness’ and divine 
retribution was neglected as it was not considered to be a problematic issue any more. Many 
argued that Proverbs simply depicts a world-order where benefits quasi-automatically follow 
good acts.50 According to this argument the teaching is not about God’s retribution, and 
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instead of calling Proverbs ‘selfish’ one should rather see Proverbs as a simple description of 
the good order of the world. 
In contrast, before the 1930s, divine retribution was considered as one of the important 
theological teachings of Proverbs. Especially from about the middle of the 19th century many 
scholars saw it as the most important theological tenet of the book: ‘God is the guarantee of 
this absolute retribution—this is the real religious content of proverbial wisdom.’51 
Furthermore, it was not only considered important but highly problematic. It was seen as one 
of the weaknesses of legalistic Judaism that it recognised ‘only’ the truth of retribution and did 
not face the fact that retribution does not always work in this world,52 and that there are more 
noble divine truths, too. 
Remove everything political… by which Judaism is ordinarily characterised. Leave aside the 
whole experiment of coupling the state not simply to religious institutions but to religion 
itself. And forget for a moment that Judaism was a regime of sorts, a regime founded 
upon an ancient tribal history and maintained by priests. Look only at the genuinely 
religious factors within it… What you find is a consciousness of direct and universal 
retribution, isn’t it?... God is constantly interpreted in terms of this rule, so that the deity 
is everywhere represented as rewarding, punishing, disciplining particular things in 
particular persons… This whole idea is, in fact, extremely childlike.
 53 
Although not writing on Proverbs but Judaism, the above quotation by Schleiermacher is 
representative of much of the 19th century. (Let us recognize the recurring motive of 
childishness in connection with the topic of retribution.) No wonder, those scholars who 
connected Proverbs to Judaism (and not for example to the supposedly cleaner and older 
‘Hebraism’—see the discussion later) often evaluated Proverbs quite negatively. 
Nevertheless, although Proverbs’ teaching about retribution was considered clearly inferior to 
the teaching of Jesus, it was not despised by every theologian of the age but was evaluated by 
some as an important component of religion, which is superseded but not eliminated by Jesus: 
Although it [teaching of retribution] was all too often externalized in ancient Israel, with 
the result that Retribution was looked for and found to an undue extent in the outward lot 
of men, still it remains one of the most important principles of every moral religion and of 
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every higher view of the world—the belief, namely, that the natural and the moral 
government of the world, however often they seem to be at variance, are not at bottom 
mutually exclusive; that the course of events in its final purpose serves good and not evil 
ends; that it is constructive and not destructive; that retribution is a real thing. To be sure, 
Christianity knows a higher relation between God and man than that of retributive law, 
but Christianity merely shifts the thought of retribution into the second place—it by no 
means suspends it. “Be not deceived: God is not mocked.” Our children understand the 
message of retribution, for the latter can only be understood when a man has by long and 
sore experience learned his own impotence, and it is therefore wise to lead our children 
by the same path that history has trod.
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Monogamy; Messiah; Life after death; Philosophy 
There are certain topics which we cannot find in most modern commentaries. Contemporary 
authors probably think that mentioning the obvious, namely that Proverbs does not contain 
references to polygamy, the Messiah, or a life after death, is not worth the ink. However, these 
topics occur again and again in older works.55 
Almost all of the older critical commentaries agree with the more recent opinion about these 
issues. The difference is not in the opinion between the older and newer commentaries but 
the relatively big emphasis with which the older commentaries discuss these topics. However, 
not everybody followed the mainstream. Löhr, for example, quotes Prov. 2:21 as his main 
example of messianic expectations after the exile.56 These dissenting voices explain why 19th 
century commentators thought it necessary to mention that we cannot find this topic in 
Proverbs. 
The book’s relationship to philosophy is another topic which is surprisingly often discussed in 
the older commentaries. It seems that the comparison with the Greek philosophers was a 
pressing issue for Old Testament scholars. They usually agreed that Hebrew wisdom deserves 
the name ‘philosophy,’ although some of its characteristics were different from what we 
normally classify as such. From the frequency of discussing this subject in the commentaries 
and the common argument that Israelite wisdom deserves the title ‘philosophy’ one can 
suspect that this designation might have counted as an honorary title in the eyes of many. By 
applying it to Hebrew wisdom biblical scholars suggested that it was not inferior to the 
achievements of ‘heathen’ thinkers. 
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‘Philosophy’ also served to a certain extent as a category to compare Proverbs with the 
prophetic, legal, and historical writings of the Bible. One could say that 19th century scholarship 
recognised the same peculiarity of Proverbs as the 20th century one: the lack of interest in 
national history. But instead of emphasising this lack, as some later interpreters will do, or 
instead of using the category of ‘creation theology,’ as many later interpreters will do, they 
used the category of ‘philosophy’ to name the positive feature of Proverbs/wisdom with which 
it enriches the teaching of the Bible: 
The wise men are not prophets but philosophers; indeed, the Seven Wise Men of Greece 
arose at precisely the same stage of culture as the Hebrew sages. It is true, the latter 
never… attempted logic and metaphysics.
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We need not hesitate, in view of Col. 2:8, to call the Book of Proverbs a “philosophical” 
treatise… When we give the name philosophia to the tendency of mind to which the Book 
of Proverbs belongs, we do not merely use a current scientific word, but there is an actual 
internal relation of the Book of Proverbs to that which is the essence of philosophy, which 
Scripture recognizes (Acts. 17:27; Rom. 1:19f) as existing within the domain of 
heathendom, and which stamps it as a natural product of the human spirit, which never 
can be wanting where a human being or a people rises to higher self-consciousness and its 
operations in their changing relation to the phenomena of the external world… 
Staudenmaier has done the great service of having worthily estimated the rich and deep 
fullness of this biblical theologumenon of wisdom [referring to Prov. 8], and of having 
pointed out in it the foundation-stone of a sacred metaphysics and a means of protection 
against pantheism in all its forms.
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Topics not discussed before the 1930s 
There are many topics which became prominent in the 20th century, like creation theology, 
natural theology, feminism, ecology, etc., but did not get a serious consideration during the 
19th century. The reason for some of these differences between the two eras is rooted in the 
different cultural environment and sensitivities of the two centuries, as in the case of feminism 
or ecology. However, there are some topics, most notably creation and natural theology, 
which could have been treated more substantially in the 19th century. 
We can only guess why these themes were not utilized more. In the case of creation the 
reason might be that it is in fact not mentioned too often explicitly in the book of Proverbs. 
Furthermore, though 19th century scholars recognized the book’s peculiarities (i.e. not 
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mentioning history), and also that it contributes something special to the teaching of the Old 
Testament, they also emphasised the continuities with prophets and the law and did not want 
to contrast wisdom with the rest of the Bible as many scholars in the 20th century tried to do. 
This might be one of the reasons why ‘philosophy’ which continues the teaching of the 
prophets, just on a different level, suited their aims better than the later creation vs. history 
antithesis. 59 
It is also noteworthy that natural theology did not get serious consideration in connection with 
Proverbs since it was an often discussed topic in the 19th century. Yet, I have not found any 
direct and explicit utilization of Proverbs in the arguments supporting natural theology either 
in biblical commentaries and theologies or in classic works on natural theology. In the case of 
Christian advocates of natural theology60 this is probably because they considered Proverbs 
dependent on the teaching of the Law and prophets, that is, on revelation. Other advocates of 
natural theology were rather hostile to orthodox Christianity and as such to the whole of the 
Bible, so it is no wonder that they did not use Proverbs in supporting their argument for 
natural theology.61 
These and other topics will be discussed further on in the section about the 20th century 
scholarship. 
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 E.g. Paine 1852 (originally published in three parts in 1794, 1795, and 1807, it was especially popular 
in the United States). 
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Development or decline of Israelite religion? 
In the previous section I have made an inventory of the major theological ideas that pre-1930s 
critical scholarship found (or did not find) in the book of Proverbs. This inventory, however, 
only provides the building blocks they used for constructing Proverbs’ theology. The next 
question I am going to investigate is how the building itself looked and changed during the 
century: in other words how these notions were actually put together to form a coherent 
theological opinion about and utilization of Proverbs and how this opinion and utilization 
changed during our period. 
Of course, the theological utilization of Proverbs was different from author to author. Yet, the 
principle according to which they ordered the above notions was more or less the same: they 
tried to reconstruct a history of Israel’s religion and find the place of Proverbs in that religious 
development. Depending on where they positioned Proverbs in this history, they emphasised 
the (from their perspective) positive features of the book (like its universalism) or the negative 
ones (like selfishness, doctrine of retribution). 
To start with, in the beginning of the 19th century, mainly under the influence of Kant and 
Hegel, many scholars were looking for the universal world spirit in the Scriptures. From this 
perspective the more ‘Jewish’ a text was, the more it was connected to the Jewish nation or 
state, the less spiritual it was considered by biblical scholars. So, for Bauer (1801), the 
historical development of the Jewish religion was equal with the development from 
particularism to universalism. No wonder, he found the peak of this development in the 
wisdom literature; mainly in Job (usually Job and Qohelet—sometimes also some Psalms—
were the most highly valued books in the whole century, because they were considered the 
‘least Jewish’), but he valued Proverbs also very highly: 
Concerning religion and ethics, Proverbs of Salomon is one of the most important parts of 
the whole Old Testament besides the books of Job and Psalms. If the immortality of soul 
were taught in it and the shades were not descended to a dull netherworld, if ethics were 
less built on the motive of selfishness, then its ethical and religious understanding would 
leave nothing to be desired… 
God has the name of the national-god Jehovah in it and he appears as the same God who 
was revealed to the Israelites more specifically; yet he is depicted more as the creator of 
the whole world, the governor of all events, every people, and human destinies… 
That God is the most rational, highest, wise, self-subsistent cause of the world and that 
humans should understand him as the one who brought forth everything in his 
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omnipotence and arranged everything with the highest and most perfect wisdom as it is 
now, is repeated and clearly taught [in Proverbs].
62
 
It can be said that Bauer and many of his contemporaries reconstructed a developmental 
scheme of Israel’s religion at the end of which the peak is wisdom literature. As Ollenburger 
writes about Bauer’s work, ‘…in 1801 Bauer added a supplement (Beylagen), which treated the 
Old Testament books in historical (roughly canonical) order. This allowed him to show the 
development from particular to universal ideas, a development crowned by Proverbs.’63 
Ollenburger, in fact, is mistaken claiming that Bauer considered Proverbs as the ‘crown’ of the 
historical development of religion in Israel. Bauer valued the book of Job even higher than 
Proverbs64 but he certainly considered Proverbs as one of the clearest expressions of the true 
nature of God, together with Job and Psalms.65 
The claim that most critical scholars in the beginning of the 19th century envisaged a linear, 
upward development in Israel’s religion seems to be correct. However, this simple statement 
does not cover the full story. We have to make at least four further qualifications to get a more 
nuanced picture: 
1. All of the (Christian) theologians in the 19th century considered the Old Testament 
inferior to the New Testament. They thought that even the most developed parts of 
the Old Testament were only preparations for the fuller revelation of the New 
Testament. This is well illustrated by the fact that the epoch-making lecture of Gabler 
at the very beginning of the investigated time period and the no less emblematic 
biblical scholar Gunkel towards the end of it spoke with one voice about this topic. This 
doctrine of successive revelation was one of the basic theological claims of 19th 
century critical scholarship: 
Yet all the sacred writers are holy men and are armed with divine authority; but not all 
attest to the same form of religion; some are doctors of the Old Testament of the same 
elements that Paul himself designated with the name ‘basic elements’; others are of the 
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newer and better Christian Testaments. And so the sacred authors, however much we 
must cherish them with equal reverence because of the divine authority that has been 
imprinted on their writings, cannot all be considered in the same category if we are 
referring to their use in dogmatics.
 66
 
Hebrew religion, it is true, is not simply to be identified with the Christian religion. 
Indeed, in numerous details and in its profoundest thoughts it is much inferior to it; and 
the type of exposition that is still to be found in many of our schools, an exposition that 
seeks to obliterate these differences, is open to many objections and involves many 
dangers. It is just these numerous points where this inferiority of Old Testament religion 
and morality is most apparent that force the teacher [referring to Sunday school- and 
other teachers involved in the religious education of the youth], who has not 
appreciated these differences, either to resort to all sorts of artificial interpretation or to 
present to children the religion of ancient Israel as a perfect Divine revelation.
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2. Bauer (and many of his followers) did not claim that chronologically Wisdom literature 
was the last one among the books of the Old Testament. He listed several books as 
written later than Proverbs and considered many of them as less clear expressions of 
God’s character. Nevertheless, it is true, that he considered the value of revelation 
more or less (!) increasing as we followed the historical order of the Old Testament 
books.68 
3. We should also add that although the historical developmental interpretation of Old 
Testament religion was the most widespread, there were some Old Testament 
theologies which put less emphasis on the development and which basically 
understood the different phases of Israelite religion as different versions of the same 
religion, most of which are not necessarily superior to the other versions.69 
4. It was a generally accepted reconstruction of religious development that the Judaism 
Jesus met was a rather degraded type of religion: it was narrow mindedly nationalistic, 
relying on the letter and not on the spirit, emphasizing (ceremonial) law instead of 
love. As a result, it required explanation how the gradually evolving Jewish religion 
ended up in this caricature by the time of Jesus. In the first half of the 19th century 
many biblical theologians defined the time of degeneration mainly as the inter-
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testamental period, possibly detecting the signs of the approaching decline in the very 
last books of the Old Testament, for example in Chronicles.70 
Nevertheless, with these qualifications in mind, we can say that the most dominant view in the 
first half of the 19th century was that critical Old Testament theology provided a fairly 
straightforward development of Jewish religion at the end of which we find wisdom literature, 
not least the book of Proverbs. The following quotation from Vatke’s influential Old Testament 
theology expresses in a succinct way the notion that wisdom was the optimal synthesis of 
everything good in the history of Jewish religion at the end of its development: 
The prophetic exultation and activity lost its historical basis and took the form of reflective 
wisdom in which the ideal spirit reached its last accomplishment. The former opposition 
between the outward worship and the freer prophetic teaching was now changed into the 
careful adherence to the letter of the Levitical Law on the one hand, and on the other into 
a free reflectiveness, which even got rid of particularism altogether.
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Noack phrases a similar opinion around the middle of the century: 
While the prophets expressed the universalism of divine world-governance only in its 
particular reference to Israel, wisdom took a much freer and truer direction. In it the 




However, in the second half of the century a slightly different, less enthusiastic interpretation 
of Proverbs gained prominence among the majority of theologians. We can detect the roots of 
this interpretation already in the early years of the century in the influential work of de Wette. 
He divided the history of Jewish religion into two separate epochs: the so called Hebraism 
before the exile and Judaism after the exile. He evaluated the whole of Judaism quite 
negatively as a legalistic system ruled by the dogma of retribution.73 This, however, did not 
affect his evaluation of wisdom literature because he considered it as part of Hebraism, that is, 
as the product of the pre-exilic period. He considered the sages, in accordance with the 
majority of contemporary scholars, as people fighting together with some prophets against the 
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particularism and legalism of some priests. Nevertheless, it has to be added that he mainly 
wrote about Job and Ecclesiastes in this respect. He thought that, although Proverbs is the 
product of the ‘most beautiful epoch of Hebrew literature,’74 it is too practical and it does not 
have too much to offer to a theologian.75 Yet, what is more interesting for us is that he 
devalued the whole of Judaism after the exile as a mainly degenerated religion resulting from 
the trauma of the Jewish nation and some influences from other, non-Jewish (mainly Persian) 
sources. De Wette had some contemporary followers,76 but his views about the earlier 
degeneration of the Jewish religion became even more popular in the second half of the 
century. 
There was another gradual change concerning the evaluation of Proverbs, which went side by 
side with the just delineated development. It concerns the dating of Proverbs and its gradual 
shift to later dates. It was almost constantly debated throughout the century whether we 
should consider Proverbs mainly as pre-exilic or post-exilic.77 Gramberg was the first who 
suspected a post-exilic date for the final collecting and editing of the book.78 The first 
influential commentator who clearly judged Proverbs to be fairly late (5th century) was 
Vatke.79 Bertheau’s interpretation, around the middle of the century, exemplifies well how 
difficult it was for some scholars to contradict the majority of former scholars and opt for a 
later date. Although he listed several observations that would point towards a post-exilic 
dating, he was still hesitant to place the final author/redactor of the book after the exile.80 
Smend suspects that this could have been due to his respect to his teacher, Ewald.81 Yet, 
though one can hardly speak about a straight, linear development of opinion, the tendency 
that more and more scholars dated Proverbs to a later period is fairly clear. 
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We can state that as the date of (the final form of) Proverbs was pushed later during the 19th 
century, the date of the serious degeneration of the Jewish religion was brought earlier. As a 
result, the book of Proverbs became a product of a religiously defective age in the eyes of 
many scholars. 
These changes in the opinion about the dating of Proverbs and the precise reconstruction of 
Israelite religious history naturally affected the theological evaluation of Proverbs. More 
precisely, it affected how the commentators balanced the theological notions listed in the 
previous section against each other. In a somewhat over-simplistic way one could say that for 
scholars before 1930 the single most positive characteristic of Proverbs was its universalism, 
whereas its most negative characteristics were its selfishness and focus on effectiveness in 
this-worldly life. In the first half of the 19th century, although the problematic issue of 
selfishness was recognised,82 its universalism was very strongly emphasised. However, the 
emphasis on its selfishness was becoming gradually stronger and the book eventually became 
a typical example of the cold retribution-teaching of the degenerated Judaism by the latter 
part of the 19th century.83 
Nevertheless, Proverbs was seldom if ever evaluated in an exclusively negative way. The old 
enthusiasm towards Proverbs lived on in some interpreters of the second half of the 19th 
century.84 Even those who criticised it, recognised its universalism and considered it as one of 
the best religious achievements of a degenerate Judaism and as such somewhat of an 
exception to the low level literature of late biblical Judaism.85 
So, the picture one can gain about the change of scholarly opinion concerning the theological 
value of Proverbs is somewhat blurred by the fact that we can find many competing 
interpretations side by side during the 19th century. The opinions of some major theologians up 
to the middle of the century could be categorised as follows: Bauer, Vatke, Noack: Proverbs is 
at the top of the development of the Jewish religion; de Wette, Cölln: Proverbs is good, 
belongs to the best strata of the Jewish religion, but too practical to have too much theological 
importance; Baumgarten-Crusius, Umbreit: already the Torah and the prophets were great, 
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Proverbs just continued this line; Gramberg: Proverbs is selfish and in many respects 
degenerate in its theological views. From the middle of the century such a categorization 
becomes increasingly difficult since most interpreters regarded Proverbs as bearing the signs 
of a religiously inferior/degraded age but still possessing some exceptionally good 
characteristics. The comparison of such manifold interpretations is not as straightforward as 
that of the older interpretations. Still, the tendencies are clear enough: we can conclude that 
in the general opinion of scholars Proverbs lost its fame to some extent. From one of the 
favourites among the Old Testament books it became one of the favourites among the not so 
attractive later (Judaic) Old Testament books. 
Conclusions 
Was Proverbs neglected? 
I began this chapter with quotations from Crenshaw, Murphy, and Whybray in which they 
depicted early critical scholarship as somewhat neglecting the book of Proverbs. They also 
tried to find the reasons for this neglect. My investigations, however, lead to a distinctly 
different picture of 19th century scholarship: 
 Contra Crenshaw, Proverbs was not ignored before 1930. It was praised 
enthusiastically by many and there was a vibrant scholarly discussion about its 
theology throughout our period. If in some biblical theologies it was quoted less 
frequently it is probably because it was considered ‘only’ as second best after Job, 
Ecclesiastes and/or some psalms.  
 Contra Crenshaw, I have not met a single hint at the negative evaluation of Proverbs’ 
similarities to Sirach or the Wisdom of Solomon in the pre-1930s scholarly discussion. 
In fact, some of the old commentators seemed to be impressed by the deutero-
canonical wisdom books no less than by Proverbs.86 
 Contra Crenshaw, its similarity to non-Israelite wisdom (which was first considered in 
the form of literary parallels and it was only gradually recognised that direct foreign 
influence could also be detected in the book) did not cause a theological problem for 
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the early commentators. It was considered a virtue, a sign of the universal spirit rather 
than an embarrassment. 
 It is debatable whether comparing Proverbs to the Law and prophets is a ‘judgment by 
alien standards’ (Crenshaw), but the lack of historical particularities in Proverbs was 
certainly not an ‘indignity’ to it, quite the opposite. Many commentators thought that 
Proverbs actually grasped the spirit of the Law and the prophets quite well, what is 
more, many thought that it grasped the eternal spirit better than the Law or the 
prophets. 
 It is true that the emphasis on the practical and educational role of Proverbs was 
stronger before 1930 than after, however, contra Murphy, most interpreters 
considered Proverbs’ theological contribution significant as teaching about the 
universal nature of God and his works (including his providence) and applying the 
teaching of the Law and prophets creatively to new situations. 
 Contra Crenshaw and Whybray, earlier interpreters did not find it problematic to 
locate Proverbs in the Old Testament. They found it as a natural continuation of the 
prophets and the Law (either as an improvement or as a degeneration) and were not 
puzzled by its unusual nature. This seems to be a problem of the middle of the 20th 
century and we should not project it into earlier times. 
Main differences between the 19th and 20th centuries 
Although I have detected several differences between how Proverbs was discussed during the 
(long) 19th century from a theological point of view and how it has been discussed since then, I 
think these can be traced back to or at least summarised in three main points: 
 Utilitarianism, selfishness, and the doctrine of retribution were considered the most 
problematic features of Proverbs before the 1930s, but utilitarianism and selfishness 
are hardly discussed at length later. 
 Proverbs was considered to be very much in accordance with the Torah and the 
prophets, whereas later many scholars understood it as contrasted to these or at least 
forming a part of an alternative tradition. 
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 Certain theological topics that are considered to be important today were lacking from 
the discussion before the 1930s (like creation theology, feminism, etc.). Although they 
recognised many of those ‘peculiarities’ of Proverbs that have been recognised by 
more recent scholars, like the lack of historical discussion in it, they utilised other 
categories, first of all ‘philosophy,’ to handle theologically these features of the book. 
In order to see the significance of these differences between 19th and 20th century scholarship 
and to perceive their relevance for our study we have to turn now to a detailed investigation of 




Theological interpretation of Proverbs between 1930 
and today 
I have argued that most scholars until the 1930s had seen Proverbs as a practical outworking 
of the prophets’ teaching. Depending on the interpreter’s perspective, it was either seen as a 
distortion of a former, higher religion (stressing its utilitarianism and eudaemonism) or quite 
the opposite, as the high peak of ancient Jewish faith (stressing its universalism). Nonetheless, 
be it a distortion or an improvement, the majority did not think it represented a different 
paradigm from the rest of the Old Testament. This, however, started to change from the 
1930s. As a part of this process of differentiating wisdom87 from the rest of the Old Testament, 
some scholars gradually began to interpret it as an expression of the so called ‘creation 
theology’ and contrast it to Heilsgeschichte. 
I am going to tell the story of post 1930 academic research twice, from two different angles. In 
the first story I am going to explain how the ‘creation theology’ of wisdom, starting from a 
fairly humble position, has become a major player in the theological field. This will be a story of 
wisdom’s relationship to the rest of the Old Testament. The second story will be about how 
scholars have been struggling to find the precise definition, kernel, and (contemporary 
theological) significance of this ‘creation theology.’ So, to re-apply Crenshaw’s metaphor,88 first 
I am going to tell the story of how the ‘creation theology interpretation’ of Proverbs became a 
beautiful woman from an often despised little servant girl of Old Testament theology, then I 
will turn to her inner, troublesome search for her own identity. 
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The place of wisdom theology in the Old Testament 
Creation theology and wisdom as subservient to Heilsgeschichte 
In an influential essay published in 1936,89 Gerhard von Rad set the tone for academic 
discussion about wisdom’s place and role in Old Testament theology for the following 30 years. 
In this essay he connected wisdom with creation theology, a connection which will occupy 
much of my attention a little later. For my present purposes, however, it is more important to 
note what value he attributed to this creation/wisdom theology. According to him, the 
distinctive feature of Israel’s faith is her presentation of the Heilsgeschichte and the topic of 
creation only serves this presentation as an introduction, as a stock of metaphors, or as a 
secondary correction which enriches it. As he wrote, 
We have found a great deal of evidence for the doctrine that Yahweh created the world, 
but we have not found the doctrine expressed as a religious actuality, standing on its own, 
forming the main theme of a passage in its own right. It has always been related to 




The very rare passages in which creation does get an independent expression (like Pss. 19, and 
104, and the wisdom writings) usually lack a deeply Yahwistic character and they rather have 
‘an Egyptian outlook passed on to Israel by travelling teachers of wisdom.’91 This non-Yahwistic 
nature is the reason why the creation-emphasis of wisdom texts was attached to Israel’s 
testimony about God’s saving acts only later:  
The doctrine of redemption had first to be fully safeguarded, in order that the doctrine 
that nature, too, is a means of divine self-revelation might not encroach upon or distort 
the doctrine of redemption, but rather broaden and enrich it.’
92
 
As many have pointed out,93 von Rad was very probably influenced by Barth and just like 
Barth’s arguments against natural theology, his article was also polemically inspired to 
discredit the National Socialist ideological use of Creation. However, regardless of the possible 
political motivation behind the writing of the article, von Rad’s argument finds its place rather 
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naturally in the thinking of earlier and contemporary Old Testament scholars. Fichtner, for 
example, also recognised the connection between wisdom and the Creator God and that this 
connection gives a foreign, Egyptian‒Babylonian, outlook to biblical wisdom.94 Or, to mention 
an even more influential forerunner, Walther Eichrodt, even though, contra von Rad, he 
emphasised the ancient age and theological importance of the doctrine of creation,95 he 
agreed with von Rad (and Fichtner) that this doctrine can be connected to wisdom96 and very 
similarly to von Rad argued that its uniqueness was provided by the context of the covenant97 
and by its integration into history.98 So, however important a role his supposed political 
motivation played, von Rad’s article was also a genuine programmatic summary and 
improvement of the arguments of some influential Old Testament scholars of the early 30s. 
That von Rad’s article was not purely a political statement gained another confirmation more 
than 20 years later when von Rad reinforced his view of the secondary nature of creation and 
wisdom thinking. True enough, by this time there had been some changes in the details of his 
thought. For example, he did not consider all creation texts as late as in his 1936 essay,99 and 
he placed the flourishing of wisdom into a period which he called ‘Solomonic Enlightenment,’ 
when the Jerusalem royal court had an international atmosphere and when many of Israel’s 
traditions were de-sacralised.100 Nevertheless, despite its early, venerable history, wisdom had 
still an inferior position in von Rad’s thinking. He discussed wisdom at the end of his first 
volume of Old Testament Theology under the section ‘Israel’s Answer.’101 The core 
proclamation to which Israel only answered through its wisdom teaching was still about the 
saving acts of God. 
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There were many who popularised von Rad’s views before the late 60s. In the USA it was 
mainly G. Ernest Wright who argued that ‘the difficulty of the wisdom movement was that its 
theological base and interest were too narrowly fixed…’102 B. D. Napier even more than 25 
years after the publication of von Rad’s original article published a quite thorough English 
recension of it and argued for its truth: 
Certainly a belief in divine creation was known, and held; but its expression was in this 
form of cultic recitation [i.e. Deut. 26:5‒9] either deliberately avoided, presumably in 
reaction against what was seen as Canaanite abuse and distortion of that faith, or it was 
deemed quite unessential in such a terse articulation of the Yahweh faith. For the Yahwist 
himself, of course, the creation-faith (Gen. 2:4b ff.) is essential, it must be articulated; but 
here too it takes its place in a supporting role, crucial certainly, but secondary.
103
 
By this time, however, these views hardly needed a brave defence among biblical scholars. 
Reventlow lists Anderson, Bauer, Beaucamp, Bernhardt, Boman, Festorazzi, Foerster, de Haes, 
Hoguth, Humphreys, Lambert, Martin-Achard, Saebø, Vischer, and Zimmerli among others who 
followed von Rad104—and his list is still far from being comprehensive. 
However, creation theology was about to get a strong advocate soon, who quickly changed 
this virtually uniform scholarly discussion. 
Creation theology and wisdom as more substantial than 
Heilsgeschichte 
Although there had been a few dissenting voices already between 1930‒1965,105 the real 
challenge to the scholarly consensus came in the second half of the 60s and early 70s with the 
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works of Hans Heinrich Schmid.106 Schmid argued that the ancient near eastern (theological) 
thinking in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Israel was dependent on the notion of world-order. This 
order was created by the supreme god of the pantheon and penetrated the social and the 
natural worlds alike. According to the ancient peoples, it could be explored and expressed in all 
spheres of life, namely wisdom, law, nature, warfare, cult, and kingship. This creational world-
order was not only a key concept of wisdom literature, it was in fact the conceptual frame of 
the whole Old Testament theology.107 So, according to Schmid, creation theology is not a 
secondary layer in biblical thinking, quite the opposite, it is the primary layer on which all the 
other ideas depend: 
The controlling background of OT thought and faith is the view of a comprehensive world 
order and, hence, a creation faith in the broad sense of the word—a creation faith that 
Israel in many respects shared with her environment.
108
 
The ‘order-language’ was maybe the most obvious in the case of wisdom literature. The wise 
person ‘does Maat [the Egyptian expression for world-order according to Schmid], speaks 
Maat, creates Maat.’109 
Of course, besides the substantial similarities, this order-thinking had different nuances and 
modes of expressions in the different cultures of the ancient Near East. The Israelite parallel to 
Egyptian Ma’at was ‘righteousness.’ Whenever it is mentioned it refers to the world-order: 
The concepts ṣedeq, ṣĕdāqâ, and ṣaddîq—among others—play a dominant role; the 
emphasis, however, is not upon specific acts of justice but, rather, on aspects of the one, 
harmonious order of the world.
110
 
Since the publication of his works the majority of biblical scholars have accepted Schmid’s 
thoughts about the importance of ‘world-order’ in Old Testament thinking. Some have 
followed him in considering this order/creation thinking more foundational in one way or the 
other than anything else in Old Testament theology. Consider, for example, the following 
statements of Knierim: 
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Israel perceived the structure of the world as the ultimate theodicy of Yahweh. If this 
structure fails, Yahweh fails, and nothing matters any more… Therefore, creation appears 
for P as the unshakable realm of God’s presence in the world, in contrast to the shaking 
course of human history including his own history. And it appears as the ultimate 
foundation and criterion from which his conception of Israel’s new future will have to be 
devised… the “world-order” explicated what it meant for Israel to say Yahweh.
111
 
Or more recently Fretheim: 
God’s goal is a new creation, not a new redemption. There must be redemption if creation 
is to be and become what God intends it to be, but the redemption is not an end in itself; 
it has finally to do with creation, a new creation.
112
 
However, not everyone followed Schmid the whole way along to his conclusion that ‘creation 
is more substantial than history.’ Some stopped at the ‘half-way’ and considered creation and 
history as equal partners. 
Creation theology and wisdom as equal to Heilsgeschichte 
Around the time of the appearance of Schmid’s works there was another important 
contribution to the question of creation’s place in Old Testament theology. Bernhard W. 
Anderson published an important study in 1967 titled Creation versus Chaos. He argued in it 
that ‘…it is quite likely that the period before the monarchy was a time when the creation-faith 
and the Exodus-faith existed side by side without being harmonized completely,’113 but, very 
much in accordance with von Rad’s view, ‘Israel, in reaction to the prevailing nature religions, 
gave the [creation] belief a secondary place.’114 Anderson also followed von Rad when he 
suggested that wisdom found a more favourable setting in the court of the united kingdom. 
Where he diverted somewhat from von Rad is that in his understanding creation (and creation-
based wisdom) played a major role in the Davidic covenant theology of the southern kingdom. 
The everlasting Davidic covenant is based on the order established by the creator God: 
Yahweh’s power in the creation is related theologically to his covenant with David. 
Yahweh has established, and he will maintain, order, for “righteousness and justice” are 
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the foundation of his throne. The Davidic king, standing in this strength, will not be 
overpowered by any foes.
115
 
This, however, was not true for the history-based northern Mosaic covenant tradition. So, 
according to Anderson, our Bible contains two covenant traditions in one of which creation 
and the order represented by wisdom texts play a major role. He argues that the modern 
reader should pay attention to both traditions: to the contingency of human history of the 
Mosaic covenant tradition but also to the stability and grace which can be found in the Davidic, 
creation based covenant tradition.116 
Von Rad published his last book, which happens to be about wisdom, three years after 
Anderson’s Creation versus Chaos. There is no sign that he was aware of Anderson’s work (at 
least he never refers to him) but there are some similarities between their conclusions. Von 
Rad did not go into speculations about wisdom’s different relationship to different covenants, 
as (the earlier) Anderson did, but he understood wisdom as an alternative way to covenant in 
relating to God and the world. According to him there was ‘a deep gulf between the 
intellectual striving of the wise teachers on the one hand and that of the narrators, theologians 
of history, etc., on the other.’117 This echoes Anderson’s opinion about the two different 
theological traditions in the Old Testament, but in a way it emphasises wisdom’s importance 
even more as it does not serve or is attached to any kind of covenant-theology. According to 
this later von Rad, in other parts of the Bible Yahweh reveals himself to humans through 
prophets, the cult, and historical events, whereas in wisdom writings it is the world-order 
established by God which turns to people and calls them with the voice of Yahweh: 
In Egypt, the idea of a primitive order, which included both nature and human life, goes 
back to the earliest period. Can the same not be presupposed in Israel, too? 
118
 
It is not Yahweh who is speaking [in Prov. 8]. This is puzzling, for in these texts we find the 
form of divine self-revelation. Obviously the situation here is considerably different from 
what it is in the prophets, who never addressed their readers in the first person… he is 
much more than the greatest of the prophets, he is, indeed, the mystery inherent in the 
                                                          
115
 Anderson 1967:67. 
116
 Anderson 1967:75‒77. Anderson more or less maintained his theory in his later writings, too. See 
Anderson 1984:7‒8. See Dell’s critique of Anderson’s historical reconstruction of wisdom’s different 
relationship to the different covenantal traditions in Dell 2007:63‒64. In his newer work Anderson 
seems to use a more nuanced language, though he still maintains the special relationship between the 
Jerusalem cult and wisdom: ‘Wisdom has influenced all of Israel’s covenantal traditions, but it is 
especially compatible with royal (Davidic) covenant theology.’ Anderson 1999:260. 
117
 Von Rad 1972:289. 
118
 Von Rad 1972:154. 
50 
 
creation of the world. In the opinion of the teachers, Yahweh had at his service a quite 
different means, besides priests and prophets, whereby he could reach men, namely the 
voice of primeval order, a voice which came from creation.
119
 
Von Rad in this his latest work was influenced by Schmid, to whose works he referred several 
times and whose ‘order-thinking’ he put at the centre of his understanding of wisdom’s 
message. As I have already hinted at above, he did not go as far as Schmid, considering order-
thinking the most substantial layer of the whole Bible, but he went at least ‘half-way,’ and, 
changing his thoughts about the inferior position of wisdom, now he understood it as an 
alternative to the rest of the Bible on equal footing with it. 
My impression is that von Rad managed once more to show the recommended way to many 
scholars, as many who tried to clarify the theological importance of creation/wisdom theology 
in the last 40 years occupied a similar ‘middle way.’120 This tendency can be seen in the works 
of such influential scholars as Nicholson, who thought that there was an ongoing inner-Israelite 
controversy between the two ‘worldviews’ of creation theology and covenant (though he 
understood the covenant tradition as winning at the end and providing the distinctiveness for 
Israel’s theology); 121  or Brueggemann, who emphasised the different pictures of God’s actions 
in the two theological forms of discourses and tried to hold them on equal status just like the 
later von Rad. 122 
However, are creation and Heilsgeschichte two, so neatly differentiable traditions as von Rad 
or Brueggemann would let us believe? Many have disagreed as we will see shortly. 
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Creation theology, wisdom, and Heilsgeschichte as a unity 
One could contrast von Rad’s and Brueggemann’s above delineated ‘two alternative 
worldviews/forms of discourse’ approach with some statements of Roland Murphy: 
[Ancient Israelites] had only one world view, not two, in which the Lord they worshipped 
was also the God recognized in their experience of each other and the world.
123
 
Nature, as the area in which Yahweh’s will and direction... are also to be found, is not to 
be separated from history.’
124
 
Murphy has been emphasising the unity of Israelite thinking and theology consequently from 
the 1970s.125 His approach has received some encouragement from recent historical research, 
too. 
At the middle of the century, the ruling opinion about the historical origins of wisdom was 
that, first, wisdom’s origin was foreign (mainly Egyptian); second, in Israel it was inculcated by 
a well defined, separate group of people, ‘the wise;’ third, these wise people were connected 
to the royal court; and fourth, they educated prospering youth in court schools.126 All of these 
points would suggest the relative separateness of wisdom-thinking in ancient Israel. This view, 
however, has been challenged from several directions since the late ‘60s. 
In 1965 Gerstenberger argued that a significant part of wisdom (and that of law and cult, too) 
had its origin in the everyday life of early clans and not in the later royal court.127 He claimed 
that this explains the many similarities between law and wisdom.128 
About ten years later Whybray proposed a different argument with similar effects. Although 
he was more open to foreign influence,129 he also denied that wisdom should be specifically 
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connected to the royal court or any other institution. Instead he spoke about a fairly 
widespread ‘intellectual tradition.’ According to him, wisdom writings were produced and read 
by relatively well educated people who 
…belonged to a variety of circles within Israel rather than that they consciously followed 
and promoted the continuance of a narrow tradition within a small circle... These men did 
not set themselves apart from their fellow-citizens: they were familiar with, and 
participants in, the other ‘traditions’ of Israel… They constituted a separate ‘tradition’ only 
in the sense that they concerned themselves more than the majority of their 
contemporaries in an intellectual way with the problems of human life.
130
 
Since these works of Gerstenberger and Whybray many have argued that the mention of the 
king in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes does not warrant a royal setting,131 that the whole proof for a 
‘Solomonic enlightenment’ is very dubious,132 that there is little evidence for court schools if at 
all,133 and that wisdom was more embedded in all layers of Israelite society and life than it had 
been thought earlier.134 
This understanding of historical unity between ‘wisdom-tradition’ and ‘other traditions’ is also 
in line with the recognition that many ‘non-wisdom’ biblical texts possess wisdom features and 
concerns. The tide was opened up (again) by von Rad’s famous article about the wisdom-
influence on the Joseph story,135 but since then almost all of the biblical books have been 
recognised by some as influenced by ‘wisdom-thinking.’136 Crenshaw criticised the often 
careless, enthusiastic hunt of some for ‘wisdom influence’ and he was certainly right in 
warning against the methodological pitfalls of identifying ‘wisdom influence’ everywhere.137 
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Sheppard’s theory would also deserve some consideration in this respect. He argued that 
much of this ‘wisdom-influence’ might be actually fairly late, and, indeed, there might be some 
truth to his tenet that many wisdom-like texts are the results of a later ‘wisdom 
reinterpretation’ of earlier material.138 Nevertheless, these corrections do not necessarily 
prove that identifying wisdom-like texts outside the wisdom corpus is irrelevant for 
understanding wisdom’s relationship to the rest of the Bible. Later reinterpretation could 
hardly account for every ‘wisdom-like’ feature and content of canonical books,139 and if one 
speaks about a common worldview rather than ‘wisdom influence’ then Crenshaw’s objections 
also become more easily avoidable.140 As Weeks writes, 
Common ground between wisdom and other types of literature can only be explained up 
to a point by presuming special circumstances in each case. If we find a lot of common 
ground with a lot of texts, then it becomes more reasonable to explain this in terms of a 
shared cultural context, and to lower the barriers between different types of author.
141
 
If, as these investigations suggest, wisdom/creation, covenant, and cult existed so peacefully 
in the very same ancient mind, without the ancient person being aware of these ‘different 
traditions,’ then the separation of these traditions is only a modern construct, which makes it 
a less attractive theological option for Murphy and others.142  
However, if we turn from these historical investigations back to our original question, to the 
relative importance of creation/wisdom in Old Testament theology, then one has to recognise 
that the picture is not as neat and simple. Even if one suspects that creation and history were 
not differentiated in ancient minds, even if they did not comprise two separate traditions, one 
has the right to differentiate between them as two conceptually distinct components of a 
unified theology. Historical research (either pro or contra a unified creation‒history 
worldview) does not necessarily bind the hands of the Old Testament theologian. In other 
words, it is important to differentiate between the ‘history of Israelite religion’ and the 
‘theology of biblical text.’ One is free to construct an Old Testament theology that goes beyond 
the theological thinking of any individual author of the Old Testament. So, though the above 
historical arguments do encourage a unified creation‒covenant theology, they do not rule out 
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such a construction as that of Brueggemann who saw two separate strands in tension in Old 
Testament theology. 
Nonetheless, quite a few who discuss the relationship between creation and salvation in their 
presentation of Old Testament theology choose a different route from Brueggemann and 
rather echo Murphy, who emphasised the unity of creation and history. Lindsay Wilson, for 
example, suggests that in the Old Testament there is a more comprehensive and fundamental 
category than either ‘creation’ or ‘salvation,’ namely God’s active rule, or, in other words, 
God’s sovereignty. Creation (and so wisdom) and salvation are merely two expressions of this 
one basic biblical tenet and, whatever the historical background of this phenomenon might be, 
these two expressions interact and support each other in the Bible and a canonical 
interpretation should respect this close interaction.143 
Others seem to go even further and not only speak about interaction but more than that, 
interdependence. According to Rolf Rendtorff, for example, the Old Testament begins with 
creation, which shows its substantial role:144 creation is the presupposition of existence and so 
the presupposition of history. But the (Noahic) covenant with God is also needed for wisdom 
to be able to trust in the reliability of creation.145 So, neither creation, nor covenant can exist 
without the other.146 
A similarly close, interdependent relationship can be seen in Westermann’s thought, for whom 
creation theology (on which wisdom is based) is the theology of blessing. Although he 
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differentiates between blessing (creation) and deliverance (history) in his discussion, he sees 
these two as interdependent: 
The heart of the Bible in both the Old and the New Testaments is history. But this would 
not be possible if a one-dimensional salvation were involved. If the Bible were only an 
account of God’s salvation and God’s judgment, then these two would merely alternate 
without variation. When the Bible speaks of God’s contact with mankind, his blessing is 




To be sure, the history of the people of Israel begins with a divine act of salvation,… but… 
to this saving is added God’s blessing activity, which cannot be simply inserted or 
subordinated to God’s salvation acts. In the structure of the Pentateuch this is 
demonstrated by the fact that the center (Exodus to Numbers) is determined by God’s 




So, Westermann emphasises that history would not be able to exist without blessing and that, 
though history is in a sense the centre, blessing is not to be subordinated. These two strands 
are differentiated logically, rather for a heuristic reason, but, just like Murphy and others, he 
emphasises their unity and not the tension between them as Brueggemann does.149 
Indeed, if one follows Murphy (and Wilson, Rendtorff, Westermann, etc.) and sees wisdom in 
unity with the rest of the Bible, then not only is the priority of Heilsgeshichte not tenable, but 
the whole question of priority between wisdom and Heilsgeschichte might become 
obsolete.150 
Summary 
Regarding wisdom’s place in Old Testament theology, in the last 80 years the whole territory 
between the extremes of ‘theologically inferior’ and ‘theologically superior’ has been 
traversed. 
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As for the first half of the 20th century, though von Rad did not follow the judgement of the 
previous century on the supposedly degenerate later Judaism, nevertheless his devaluing of 
wisdom can be in a sense considered as taking further some of the processes that began in the 
19th century. Just as Proverbs changed its position during the 19th century from being a 
‘favourite’ Old Testament book to being a ‘favourite’ book among the ‘degenerate’ Judaistic 
parts of the Old Testament, from the 1930s, due to von Rad’s influence, wisdom had to occupy 
an even humbler position for a little while. It is one of the ironies of history that as the anti-
Judaistic climate of the 19th century might have contributed to wisdom losing its once 
prestigious theological respect, the fight against anti-Semitic national socialism which 
legitimised itself by ‘creation’ might have also contributed to pushing wisdom even further to 
the margins of theological thinking. 
However, whatever social, political, and ideological influences lead to the devaluation of 
biblical wisdom writings, this opinion was not maintained for very long. Since the 60s very few 
scholars would have agreed with such views. On the contrary, creation/wisdom has 
increasingly been seen as the most substantial theological layer of the Old Testament 
(Schmid), or as an alternative theological tradition on equal footing with the other traditions 
(later von Rad), or as a mode of approach to reality which is so much in harmony with 
covenantal/historical thinking that it is hardly differentiable from it (Murphy). 
So far, however, our focus on the relative importance of creation/wisdom has concealed 
important differences between and nuances of scholars’ detailed descriptions of its theology. 
We shall turn our attention to this question now. 
The definition of wisdom theology 
The debate between the interpretative schools of ‘anthropocentric 
independence’ and ‘cosmic order’ (1930s‒1960s) 
It was only in 1964 that Walther Zimmerli wrote down his often quoted sentence: ‘Wisdom 
thinks resolutely within the framework of a theology of creation.’151 However, as we have 
already seen, the story of contrasting wisdom literature with the rest of the Old Testament and 
the utilizing of the category of ‘creation’ for this aim started much earlier. As I see it, the 
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period between 1930‒1964 comprised a transitory phase regarding the recognition of creation 
theology’s importance for describing wisdom. At the beginning of this period Baumgartner 
could still write a brief, but influential work on wisdom, summarising the findings of the 
previous decades, without referring to creation at all.152 At the end of it, Zimmerli just stated 
explicitly what had already been granted by many implicitly. 
So, already in the ‘30s many referred to creation as something which provides a distinctive 
theological vision to wisdom literature.153 Rankin’s discussion is an early representative of this 
new emphasis on creation, which was soon to become the general trend in Old Testament 
scholarship. Arguing against Oesterley’s view that wisdom was influenced by the prophets, he 
writes that: 
Thought, of course, especially in a small nation, can never be confined as in hermetically 
sealed compartments. Doubtless the wisdom-writers were not uninfluenced by the 
prophets… But three things appear to belong to the “wise” and to their teaching, as 
possessions under their own title-deed and right, namely, the individualism…, the idea of 




But what did ‘creation theology’ mean for these scholars? Zimmerli himself contributed to the 
debate over the precise nature of this creation theology by one of his early essays, published in 
1933.155 In that essay he did not use the expression ‘creation theology,’ but in his emblematic 
1964 article he basically repeated the main claims of his 30 years earlier essay, identifying its 
reconstruction of wisdom-thinking with ‘creation theology.’ What is more, many who have 
been struggling with the meaning of wisdom- and creation-thinking since the 1930s explicitly 
or implicitly kept referring to the statements of that 1933 article, so it seems to be a good 
starting point for our story of the scholarly definitions of creation/wisdom-theology. 
Zimmerli’s main claim in 1933 was that Old Testament wisdom had an 
‘anthropocentric‒eudämonistic’156 point of departure. Wisdom describes humans as 
autonomous agents, free to make their own decisions: 
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It is autonomous man—not apprehended nor enslaved by any prior order—who wants to 
organize freely from himself outwards and to assess the world.
157
 




So, instead of focusing on God, wisdom literature is mainly interested in the happiness of 
humans, and the chief motivation to follow the counsels of the wise is God’s reward: 
One could multiply the examples which show that in exactly those places where we most 
expect some reference to a fixed order and authority by reference to Yahweh as the 
justification to an admonition, we do not find the creative, ordering God, but rather the 
God who rewards in the consequence of man’s upright conduct (conversely, punishing the 
fools and the godless).
159
 
It was Hartmut Gese who, in 1958, challenged Zimmerli’s claims most forcefully.160 Contrary to 
Zimmerli, argued Gese, the focus of wisdom is not on human beings but on the order of the 
world. In Egypt, explained Gese, the divine order of the world was called Ma’at and even the 
gods had to obey the rules of this order.161 Israelite wisdom was searching for a similar order. 
This order and wisdom’s interest in it is most explicitly expressed by the so called Tun‒Ergehen 
Zusammenhang (act‒consequence connection).162 Here Gese was referring to the theory of 
Klaus Koch, who had claimed that the Old Testament did not teach that God rewards and 
punishes humans for their deeds but that the reward and punishment are already 
incorporated into the acts themselves.163 Yahweh, like a midwife, might care for the birth of 
consequences and occasionally might speed up the process, but he does not inflict a 
punishment or reward from outside of the deed itself.164 Koch’s claim was almost immediately 
heavily contested by many, especially his more general claim about the whole Old 
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Testament,165 but most scholars working on Old Testament wisdom literature accepted his 
argument in the limited case of wisdom.166 So did Gese, too.167 
So, Gese argued, one cannot claim that the ideal of a wise person in Proverbs is the 
‘autonomous person’: 
We cannot say, that the wise is “the autonomous man—not apprehended nor enslaved by 
any prior order—who wants to organize freely from himself outwards and to assess the 
world.” It is in fact the task of the wise to “listen” to the order; he cannot organize the 
world from himself, only in submission to the established order.
168
 
Furthermore, wisdom is not eudaemonistic as it was not primarily interested in one’s 
happiness but in finding the world-order. The eudaemonistic outlook is only a misleading 
appearance, resulted from the ancient’s ‘synthetic life understanding,’169 that is, from that 
peculiarity of their worldview that they did not differentiate between deeds and their results. 
The most influential follower170 of Gese was Hans Heinrich Schmid. They disagreed in some 
details; for example Gese thought that the speciality of Israelite religion was that many 
proverbs affirmed Yahweh’s freedom from the world order,171 whereas Schmid did not see a 
difference here between Israelite and foreign thinking. But their understanding of ‘order’ was 
basically the same.172 
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As we have seen in the previous section about the place of creation/wisdom in Old Testament 
theology, Schmid went even a step further than Gese and suggested that the world-order is 
not only the key concept of Egyptian and Israelite wisdom, but that it was in fact a most 
important theological category in the whole ancient Near East and it is the most substantial 
idea of the whole Bible, not only wisdom literature. 
Not everyone was able to follow Schmid in this, but the vast majority accepted that the world-
order is the key concept of at least Old Testament wisdom. It basically became a terminus 
technicus for the theology of wisdom and creation for many. As Crenshaw wrote in 1976, ‘It is 
no longer necessary to justify the claim that the concept of order lies at the heart of wisdom 
thinking.’173 
However, Zimmerli’s original ideas about the anthropocentric nature of wisdom were not 
completely defeated. Just like Gese’s book (1958) was at least partially an answer to Zimmerli’s 
1933 article, we can understand Zimmerli’s 1964 article as an answer to Gese. In it he accepted 
that ‘order’ is a key concept for wisdom, but he questioned whether it was wisdom’s main 
interest. True enough, he argued, wisdom is interested in the order of the world and one 
cannot call it eudaemonistic. So, in these issues Zimmerli had changed his mind, no doubt 
partly because of Gese’s arguments.174 However, continued Zimmerli, Proverbs teaches about 
world order only to enable humans to act as responsible, autonomous persons: 
Egyptian Wisdom shows that Wisdom lives in the sphere of a comprehensive faith of an 
order that can be characterised by the conception of divine ma’at (truth). But having 
secured this insight we must ask what is a more precise understanding of the Wisdom 
structure. Is Wisdom to be described simply as the preaching of the worship of ma’at? 
Does Wisdom intend some kind of service of God—the God behind ma’at? If we accept 
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this understanding, do we not alter the central aim of both Egyptian and Israelite wisdom? 
Do we not confuse Wisdom’s honouring of the sphere of ma’at, in which Wisdom lives 
without doubt, with the real intention of Wisdom?
175
 
Wisdom shows man as a being who goes out, who apprehends through his knowledge, 
who establishes, who orders his world… Israel’s faith must understand the creation of man 
by God as an event in which God bestows on man a great gift… in giving His gift to man 
God empowers him with a striking independence.
176
 
We can conclude that between 1930‒1964, besides ‘creation theology’ gradually gaining the 
status of the main theological interpretative framework for wisdom literature, there was an 
ongoing debate among those who connected wisdom with creation. Some saw wisdom’s 
creation theology as a humble, pious search for God’s creation-order (Gese), others described 
it as an emphasis on human autonomy (Zimmerli). 
‘Secular’ interpretation (late ‘60s, early ‘70s) 
Zimmerli’s later article proved that it is possible to combine the above mentioned two 
understandings of creation theology, though one has to decide whether world-order or 
humans provide the main focus of the text. Zimmerli’s own solution was that world-order 
provided the general background for wisdom-thought but it was mainly interested in human 
possibilities in this order. 
The interpretation(s) which stress the notion of ‘secular’ can be seen as variations on 
Zimmerli’s theme. ‘Secular’ was one of those words which seldom got a clear definition and 
could refer to a number of things like human-centeredness; this-worldliness; lack of interest in 
cult, God, and sacred history; building on experience rather than revelation; etc. But whatever 
its often unspoken definition was, just like ‘creation theology,’ it was suitable to set wisdom-
thought in contrast with the rest of the Bible. 
Gunkel might have been the first one who used the concept ‘secular’ in an emphatic way to 
characterise wisdom. Ever since then the word has often been used, but the heyday of the 
‘secular’ interpretation was the late ‘60s and early ‘70s. Then a historical and theological 
interest in ‘secular wisdom’ went hand in hand. 
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Concerning theological approaches, it was first of all von Rad (1970) and Brueggemann (1972) 
who emphasised the ‘secular’ in wisdom. Von Rad contrasted the ‘pan-sacralism’ of pre-
monarchic Israel with the ‘secular,’ ‘enlightened’ Solomonic early wisdom: 
…the objects of this search for knowledge were of a secular kind, questions about man’s 
daily life, systematic reflection on them was held to be a secular occupation… The 
intellectual curiosity of old wisdom… stands in considerable contrast to the spirituality of 




According to von Rad, 1 Sam. 13f is a good example of this earlier, ‘pan-sacral’ thinking: 
If one follows the fairly complicated course of events, it becomes immediately clear that 
the narrator brings every decisive event, military advantages and setbacks as well as all 
human conflicts, into association with the world of the sacral and the ritual… every event 
was encompassed by rites and sacral ordinances… [However,] in the understanding of 
reality, in the whole sphere of comprehension in which men’s lives operated, some 
decisive changes must have taken place, particularly with Solomon… To the obvious 
question as to the way in which this new conception finds characteristically theological 
expression, one must unhesitatingly reply that it does so in the recognition of a relative 
determinism inherent in events and also in the recognition of a relative value inherent in 
worldly things (life, property, honour, etc.).
178
 
However, adds von Rad, we have to recognise that even in the old wisdom these secular 
sentences which refer to the inherent value and causality of worldly events are mixed with 
more obviously religious statements. The mixing of the two groups of sayings which spoke 
about the ‘experience of the world’ and the ‘experience of Yahweh’ expresses on the one hand 
that ‘Yahweh and the world were certainly not identical,’ on the other hand it also expresses 
that ‘Yahweh encountered man in the world.’179 
Walter Brueggemann, combining Zimmerli’s emphasis on anthropocentrism and von Rad’s 
emphasis on secular vs. pan-sacral thinking, built his ‘secular’ interpretation of wisdom around 
the ideas of human freedom, responsibility, and Yahweh’s ‘non-intrusive’ relationship to the 
world. 
Both Cox and Van Leeuwen find in the central biblical symbols of Torah, creation, exodus, 
and Sinai the handles by which we may understand secularization and which in part have 
been an impetus to it. But it is equally clear that these symbols (with that of creation 
excepted) really belong themselves to a sacral view of reality in which the intrusion and 
authority of the holy in the realm of human affairs causes the decisive turn… 
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I believe it is much more plausible to suggest that in the wisdom tradition of Israel we 
have a visible expression of secularization as it has been characterised in the current 
discussions. Wisdom teaching is profoundly secular in that it presents life and history as a 
human enterprise… wisdom is concerned with enabling potential leaders to manage 
responsibly, effectively, and successfully. It consistently places stress on human freedom, 
accountability, the importance of making decisions…
180
 
The theological interest in the ‘secular’ understanding of world and God represented by von 
Rad, Brueggemann, and others181 was accompanied by a historical-critical interest. When 
Gunkel wrote about the question he did not claim that the final form of wisdom literature 
could be described as ‘secular,’ but maintained that the oldest wisdom was ‘secular’ and only 
‘yahwehised’ later.182 The search for the precise steps and nature of this ‘yahwehisation’ 
occupied much of the historical-critical scholarship in the 20th century.183 The most influential 
model of this ‘theologisation’ process was that of McKane. In his commentary, published in 
1970 (the year von Rad’s book about wisdom was published in Germany), he even discussed 
the text of Proverbs not in the order of the canonical sequence of verses but in the presumed 
chronological order of his hypothetical three layers (individual-focused, community-focused, 
God-focused verses).184 Whybray also published a number of studies in the ‘60s and ‘70s in 
which he (often very tentatively) argued for a complex process of ‘theological 
reinterpretation,’ during which most of the Yahweh-sayings were inserted into the text of 
Proverbs.185 
However, the arguments against a developmental theory which counted on an original 
‘secular’ text and later religious re-interpretations have received significant critique in the last 
few decades. Such a theory is hardly tenable any more. As the critics of such theories usually 
refer only to a few of their favourite arguments, it might be worthwhile to try to collect very 
succinctly the different factors that militate against these ‘from secular to religious’ 
developmental schemes: 
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 The existence of a ‘Solomonic enlightenment’ has lost its credibility.186 
 A large number of (otherwise seemingly old) proverbs refer to God.187 Indeed, in some 
of the (probably) later sections of Proverbs (like Prov. 25‒29) there are fewer mentions 
of Yahweh than in some of the (probably) earlier ones (like Prov. 10:1‒22:16). This 
makes a gradual ‘yahwehisation’ less likely.188 
 In many sayings it is obvious that there is a religious element involved even when 
Yahweh is not explicitly mentioned (like in Prov. 28:9 where ‘abomination’ is 
mentioned but not Yahweh).189 
 The explicit mention or nonmention of Yahweh can be understood simply as ‘one of 
the variables that one can see in Proverbs (other variables being, for example, the 
mention or non-mention of the king, different types of parallelism, and the presence 
or absence of various kinds of metaphor).’190 
 There are some passages where it is far from clear what logic would have led a 
redactor when he or she inserted the Yahweh sayings as they do not really relate to 
the context, or relate to it in a way which even Whybray found difficult to explain by 
his theory of later Yahwistic insertions (like Prov. 3:1‒12; 19:18‒23; end of chapter 21 
and beginning of chapter 22).191 
 The criteria for deciding what is early and what is late is often based on the presence 
or the lack of a religious flavour in the verse—which makes the whole argument 
suspiciously circular.192 
 Some features of the style and structure of sayings in the different saying-collections 
of Proverbs differ from each other. The Yahweh sayings usually follow closely the style 
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and structural characteristics of the sayings in those sections of Proverbs in which they 
appear which makes it unlikely that they are later insertions.193 
 If there was a shift from the secular to religious in other ancient near eastern literature 
(which is debated), such a shift happened well before biblical wisdom literature was 
written—in the light of this cultural milieu it is unlikely that biblical wisdom began with 
a secular phase.194 
 Even the supposed early layers express a keen interest in ‘order,’ so it is unlikely that 
they were less religious and did not refer to Yahweh—Schmid in fact argued that there 
was rather a development in the different direction: from a more theological wisdom 
into a more human-centred one.195 
 It is only the literary convention of sentence-literature (i.e. that they are without 
context) that makes them sound secular.196 Not considering the context one could find 
numerous ‘secular looking’ verses even in Ben Sira, although no one would suspect 
that there was an original, secular proto-Ben Sira.197 
 In the case of certain saying-pairs it is just as plausible to conjecture that one of them 
presupposes the other as to suspect that one of them was a later insertion (like Prov. 
12:2 and Prov. 12:3).198 The religious elements often do not seem to be only an 
‘afterthought.’199 
 The views of McKane, Whybray and others might have been too much influenced by 
an insufficiently self-critical evolutionary/developmental thinking of the 20th 
century.200 
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 Theories of a more organic relationship between wisdom and non-wisdom have 
gained credibility. If a separation from prophets and priests is not likely then why do 
we not find a ‘secular’ layer in their works, too?201 
 The ‘wisdom-influence’ in other parts of the Bible suggests that the topic of ‘the 
interrelationship between the human and the divine was there from the beginning’ 
and the stress on the human side is not the privilege of only one age.202 
 Some, seemingly non-religious sayings might in fact be deeply religious in the light of 
ancient near eastern worldview. For example, the king in some sayings can be 
understood as God’s representative.203 
 Yahweh and wisdom often seem to be interchangeable in certain parts of Proverbs,204 
which also gives a flavour of religiosity even without using religious vocabulary. 
 If the role of Yahweh is stressed more in later texts, it often just makes more explicit 
what was already there in the earlier texts implicitly.205 
 The divide between secular and religious is anachronistic when applied to the ancient 
Near East and the lack of clarity regarding the definition of ‘secular’ makes the whole 
theory less credible.206 
 The expression ‘fear of God’ occurs in older biblical texts just as well as it occurs 
throughout the ancient Near East (though probably not as often as in biblical texts), 
which makes it unlikely that one could designate a text as ‘later’ based on the 
occurrence of this expression in it.207 
 Both wisdom and Yahweh are such key concepts in the book of Proverbs that it is hard 
to imagine that one of them is there primarily as a result of later redaction.208 
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Not all of the above points are equally persuasive and some of them even contradict each 
other. Nevertheless, because of the cumulative force of so many possible counter-arguments, 
the theory of a clear process of theologising gradually lost its popularity.209 
In parallel with the loss in confidence in finding an older ‘secular’ layer in the book, the term 
‘secular’ became less popular among those, too, who tried to fit wisdom into their (biblical) 
theologies. 210 Maybe this is a side-effect of the historical refutation of the existence of an 
earlier, ‘secular’ layer in wisdom literature. Maybe the term lost its attractiveness for 
theological interpretation of wisdom because the ‘cultural revolution’ of the ‘60s and its 
general interest in ‘secular’ world-interpretations faded away. Whatever the reason was, the 
concept of the ‘secular’ ceased occupying such a prominent role in the theological utilizations 
of wisdom as in that of the later von Rad or the earlier Brueggemann. 
The proliferation of interpretative categories and interests (from the 
‘70s) 
So far I was able to describe the post 1930s history of ‘creation theology interpretations’ of 
wisdom by referring only to three main concepts: anthropocentrism, order, secularity. Even if 
scholars discussed other ideas of the text, the major focus of the debates was the validity and 
usefulness of these three categories. However, the story becomes much more colourful from 
the ‘70s onwards. Creation theology still remains the theology of biblical wisdom for most 
interpreters, anthropocentrism and order still define for many what this creation theology is, 
the word ‘secular’ is still used occasionally—but numerous other interpretative categories gain 
special significance. Some of these are brand new, others old, but now reinvigorated. It is 
technically true for many interpreters that these new themes often just define the old 
categories of creation, order, anthropocentrism more precisely or bring out their significance 
for today. Practically, however, they represent the major interests of the given interpreter and 
the old, broader categories get regular but often only passing mention. In the following I am 
going to provide a brief inventory of these new themes. 
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Theodicy, divine justice 
James Crenshaw is one of the few who argues that creation theology is not the theology of 
wisdom. According to him, the main interest of wisdom was the justice of God (or the failure of 
that justice) and creation theology was only an aspect of this question: ‘The function of 
creation theology, in my view, is to undergird the belief in divine justice.’211 
Liberation 
Some have argued that wisdom literature stabilised the social status quo by its teaching about 
order.212 However, many emphasised that it is not inherently against liberation, people can 
legitimate their wish for another order by it and it gives a broader scope for liberation: it 
involves the nations, the rich as well as the poor, and it also emphasises that the creator God 
supports liberation by his creation power.213 
Feminism 
The female figure of Wisdom in the book of Proverbs has attracted many feminist interpreters. 
They can reach opposing conclusions about wisdom literature. Some stress the feminine 
metaphors for the divine (in general, feminist interpreters are more willing to identify Lady 
Wisdom with the divine than others)214 and the intrinsic value of everyday life;215 others 
criticise the lack of call for breaking down hierarchical systems and the typical male imagining 
of women which sees females as potentially dangerous.216 Some try to describe both the 
supposed positive and the negative sides of wisdom;217 others, while recognising the 
patriarchal setting of the book, seek to interpret it in a way which empowers women.218 
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Ecological interpretation emphasises nature’s potential to describe the divine and the complex 
interrelatedness of humans, nature, and God in wisdom texts. It also stresses the human 
responsibility in maintaining the divine order which comprises both the natural and the social 
spheres.219 
Ecofeminism 
The last two interests are often combined. Ecofeminism ‘claims that all forms of oppression 
are connected’220 and one cannot fight only one of them without fighting all of them, the 
whole ‘model of hierarchy.’221  
Unification of different modes of biblical theologies 
Terrien argued that there are two different theological modes in the Old Testament. One is 
based on listening, integrating the themes of obedience, ethics, divine name, and social justice. 
The other concentrates on seeing, comprising glory, ritual, and cult. He saw wisdom as the 
bridge between the two. It put an emphasis on listening, but the image of Wisdom playing in 
the presence of Yahweh (Prov. 8) also ‘summons a mental concreteness of visibility. The call to 
ethical obedience is integrally articulated upon a feminine personification of wisdom, 
mediatrix of communion with the transcendent Creator.’222 
Blessing 
Westermann suggested the category of blessing for describing creation/wisdom thinking: 
‘Deliverance is experienced in events that represent God’s intervention. Blessing is a 
continuing activity of God... It cannot be experienced in an event any more than can growth or 
motivation or a decline of strength.’223 
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Brueggemann, building on the picture of the non-intrusive God emphasised by Westermann, 
suggests that wisdom literature speaks about the God who is hidden from human beings.224 
Similarly Terrien: ‘Between the Mosaic theophany and the final epiphany, the God of Israel 
does not manifest himself in history. Through wisdom, however, the Deus absconditus still 
remains the Deus praesens.’225 
Bridge to other religions 
Westermann also suggested that, because of its international character, biblical wisdom 
literature could be utilised today as a bridge to other religions.226 (In fact, Hubbard’s 
suggestions were very similar already in 1966.)227 
Natural Law, Natural Theology 
Some have argued that wisdom literature is a good example of natural law. Depending on the 
precise definition of ‘natural law,’ it (and, according the the theory, wisdom, too) either 
teaches that ‘ethical principles are somehow “found written in the hearts or consciences of 
men”’ or that ethical judgments can be ‘obtained by reflecting on man’s ordinary 
experience,’228 without relying on revelation. 229 Not unrelated to this topic, interpreters also 
speak about ‘natural theology’ which claims that ‘there is disclosure of God, God’s will, and 
God’s nature’ in the natural processes of life.230 
Natural Rights 
Following others who worked on other segments of biblical literature,231 Claus Westermann 
and Peter Doll differentiated between two creation-traditions in wisdom literature: world-
creation (Prov. 1‒9) and creation of humans (Prov. 10‒31). Doll argued that the creation of 
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humans tradition (cf. Prov. 14:31; 17:5; 22:2; etc.) is a valuable source for contemporary 
discussions about international (natural) human rights.232 
God’s relationship to the world; immanence/transcendence 
Though seldom referred to in titles of articles or books about biblical wisdom,233 this topic has 
come up again and again in many interpretations of biblical wisdom. In a sense this question is 
one of the sources and also a descendant of the above discussed ‘secular interpretation,’ but it 
is also related to the themes of natural theology and blessing. As Murphy writes, ‘from a 
biblical point of view, the action of YHWH penetrates all things’234 and one of the important 
functions of wisdom-thinking is ‘finding God in experience, a wrestling with what we would call 
the “secular” to find God.’235 
An attitude 
Not wisdom’s teaching itself but the attitude behind it, that is, an openness to the world in 
front of God, is what is most important, argues Murphy: ‘Wisdom… is not to be reduced to a 
teaching… It is as much an attitude, a dialogue with the created world, as it is a set of 
admonitions or insights concerning various types of conduct… the approach of the sage turns 
out to be a model for living, a style of operation that aimed at life, the gift of the Lord.’236 
Beauty, metaphor, imagination 
Beauty, metaphor, artistry do not only provide a nice ornament in the case of wisdom 
literature, but they are inherently connected to the core of its message, argues Perdue: 
‘Sapiential imagination,... the metaphors for God, humanity, and the world... do not simply 
enhance the elegance of linguistic expression, but... stimulate the imagination by creating a 
world of beauty, justice, and meaning.’237 
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A recurring topic in interpretations of wisdom is that an obvious and important ramification of 
creation theology is the importance of the material aspects of life: faith is not ‘removed from 
human birth, suffering, and dying—bodily and communal processes in which the mystery of 
human life is lodged.’238 
Worship, meaning-providing affirmation 
Some have emphasised wisdom literature’s worshipful, joyous affirmation of the order of the 
universe and that the certainty about this order, that every little part has its own function, 
provided meaning to individual lives: ‘Creation theology, as here expressed, is a glad 
affirmation that “the thing works!”’239 
Moral formation 
William P. Brown emphasised ‘character-formation’ as a major topic in wisdom literature. This 
is more than simple education as it is aimed not only at knowledge but at human virtues.240 
Others also argued that Proverbs seems to be one of the few Old Testament texts which offers 
a vision directly comparable to that of virtue-ethics.241 
 
The majority of the above listed directions can be seen as practical outworkings of basic 
categories like ‘order,’ ‘creation,’ or ‘anthropocentrism.’ In 1994 Perdue organised the 
opinions of different scholars into four categories. Those focusing on 1. anthropocentrism (like 
Zimmerli); 2. cosmology (i.e. world-order, like Gese); 3. theodicy (like Crenshaw); 4. the tension 
between anthropology and cosmology (like von Rad or Perdue himself).242 Indeed, most, if not 
all of the above listed interpretations could be placed into one of Perdue’s groups. 
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However, the quest for wisdom-theology has become more complicated recently. Some of the 
most basic categories which used to be held as crucial for understanding wisdom-theology, 
namely ‘world-order’ and ‘creation,’ have started to be questioned, too. 
‘Creation’ and ‘Order’ as useful interpretative categories questioned 
(from the ‘90s) 
‘Order’ was never without its critics. Doll thought that it unhelpfully covers the differences 
between the theologies in wisdom.243 Murphy denied that recognising regularities could be 
described as a search for world-order244 and was suspicious of the idea that the wisdom 
writers believed in a ‘buffer zone of order [that] comes between the sage and the Lord.’245 As 
we have seen, Crenshaw thought that creation is only one of the many important topics in 
wisdom. Nevertheless, the concepts of ‘order’ and ‘creation’ were applied to wisdom literature 
by the vast majority of interpreters. 
In 1990, however, Lennart Boström published an important study about Proverbs’ concept of 
God (The God of the Sages),246 in which he challenged many of the majority opinions. He joined 
Crenshaw in warning against an over-emphasis on creation; joined Murphy in arguing against 
the usefulness of the category of ‘order’; and joined those who considered Koch’s 
Tun‒Ergehen Zusammenhang, one of the ‘pillars’ of an order-based interpretation, untenable. 
In all three areas there were others after him who went even further. 
Tun‒Ergehen Zusammenhang 
Koch’s theory about the intrinsic connection between deed and consequence was never 
unanimously accepted even among scholars writing about wisdom.247 From the ‘90s, however, 
it has received an especially strong critique. Boström argued that Proverbs does occasionally 
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express the Lord’s direct role in retribution (e.g. Prov. 23:10‒11; 24:11‒12; 29:26).248 Freuling 
in his precise study of the question also listed many verses (like 10:22; 15:9‒11; 20:22; 
24:17‒18; 25:21‒22; etc.) that seem to assign a much more active role to Yahweh than Koch 
would have let it appear.249 Hatton also claimed that the selection of verses mentioned by 
Koch provide a misleading picture.250 Van Leeuwen drew the attention to proverbial verses 
which actually claim or presuppose that right behaviour does not always lead to desirable 
results.251 Others, partly following Van Leeuwen, also claimed that the Tun‒Ergehen 
Zusammenhang language have a rhetorical function (like creating the right value system in the 
reader) which actually allows many exceptions and which presupposes Yahweh’s active 
participation.252 Janowski emphasised that some proverbs (like 24:11‒12) and also other 
passages outside of Proverbs (like Ps. 18) show that (the passive use of ) םלש and בוש are not 
termini technici for impersonal processes as Koch suggested.253 He also emphasised the social 
aspect of retribution, that is, that punishment is a result of reciprocal interaction between the 
actor and the whole society and/or God.254 As Schmid argued that a similar Tun‒Ergehen 
Zusammenhang worldview existed in Egypt in the New Kingdom period,255 it is relevant that 
Assmann showed that Koch’s argument is not valid to Egyptian literature in any time, either.256 
Furthermore, some have pointed out that the verses which do not mention who the punisher 
or reward-giver is only emphasise the certainty of the event and one should not draw the 
conclusion from this silence that the verse speaks about an impersonal process.257 
World-order 
Though the idea of world-order is not necessarily connected to an ‘automatic’ Tun‒Ergehen 
Zusammenhang, it can very easily have this connotation, as Boström warned: 
The problem with using the term “order”… lies in the connotations:… it designates a 
particular world-view… in which “order” is regarded as an impersonal principle governing 
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all things… rendering God’s continued involvement redundant. However, it should be 
noted that one could hardly find a view which was more contrary to what we know of the 
mindset of the sages or the textual material… there is reason to be hesitant in applying to 
the material a term which is not represented in wisdom’s own vocabulary and which 
usually is understood as signifying an independent entity which acts on its own.
258
 
As Gese and Schmid based their arguments for world-order on Egyptian parallels and the 
theories of their contemporary Egyptologists, it is significant that Jan Assmann, a leading 
Egyptologist, refuted the early 20th century Egyptologists’ arguments. He argued that the basic 
meaning of Ma’at is not ’order’ but ’righteousness.’259 Egyptian thinking always counted on 
the gods’ involvement in worldly affairs,260 and it was—claimed Assmann—somewhere in-
between the Greek notion of Cosmos, which was indeed an independent, timeless world-
order (à la Schmid) which even the gods obeyed, and the Israelite worldview in which God was 
able to confront the world from outside if he so wished. According to Assmann, Egyptians 
imaged gods who wanted to maintain the world and had the power to do so (contrary to 
Greeks), but who could not want otherwise as, in a sense, they were the world (contrary to 
Israelites).261 
Michael V. Fox focussed more specifically on biblical wisdom literature and its supposed 
allusions to Egyptian ‘order-thinking.’ Quoting numerous Egyptian texts he also argued that 
Egyptians never believed in a ‘mechanistic’ world-order, for the order always required gods 
and humans to create and maintain it.262 World-order was not a cause but a result of other 
processes.263 Though Fox does not refer to Schmid but to Egyptian literature when he states 
that ‘one cannot really “speak” world order or “do” world order or “make world order 
great”,’264 this sentence nicely contrasts Schmid’s statement according to which the wise 
person ‘does Maat, speaks Maat, creates Maat.’265 About Schmid’s theory Fox writes that his 
‘analogy [between הקדצ and Ma’at] is weakened by the vagueness and generality of the 
similarities it rests on and in any case cannot explain the particular character of Wisdom 
literature.’266 According to him, it would be a mistake to see a ‘search for world-order’ in 
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proverbial sentences that count on causality or predictability since ‘one could hardly imagine a 
didactic literature without the assumption of predictability.’267 
More recently Weeks has argued against the concept of world-order as a key to wisdom 
literature. According to him, concepts of divine-, human-, and natural causations might have 
peacefully lived together in the minds of wisdom writers268 and ‘it is hard to see how we are 
dealing with a concept more powerful or integrated than most commonplace human 
expectations about causation.’269 
Creation 
Boström joined Crenshaw in warning that, though they might be significant, passages about 
creation are actually few in Proverbs: ‘Creation is referred to in two poems in chapters 1‒9… 
In Proverbs 10‒31 God is referred to around seventy times. One tenth of these references are 
linked to the idea of creation.’270 It was Stuart Weeks (again), who went a step further and 
expressed a stronger critique against seeing creation theology as the framework or main 
message of biblical wisdom. He observes that the theme of creation expresses different things 
in different segments of wisdom literature, so one could hardly speak of a unified ‘creation 
theology’ or a systematic thinking which could be intended to be in contrast with the theology 
of the rest of the Bible in any way.271 Passages mentioning creation are often in fact ‘just 
employing illustrative anecdotes rather than formulating general conclusions.’272 The reason 
why the few, not obviously significant creation-texts gained such a prominent place in 
scholarly investigations is only the result of the lack of topics like law, covenant, salvation-
history, which, in turn, can be the result of a focus on the individual273 and an inclination to 
think through issues on a more abstract, non-national level.274 
The arguments of Boström, Assmann, Fox, Adams, Weeks and others do not mean that the 
scholarly consensus has changed. There are still some who straightforwardly presuppose a 
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Tun‒Ergehen Zusammenhang,275 many (the majority?) affirm the usefulness of ‘order’ for 
interpreting wisdom,276 and most scholars continue to see ‘creation’ as the theological basis 
for wisdom-thinking.277 But we can no longer speak about a communis opinio in these issues, 
as Assmann could, referring to Schmid’s views about order in 1990278 or as Perdue could state 
in 1991 that ‘no one today would take issue with Zimmerli’s claim’ that wisdom was grounded 
theologically in creation.279 
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Despite the claims of some more recent scholars, 19th century scholarship did not show the 
signs of uncertainty or lack of interpretative categories when facing the peculiarities of 
Proverbs. Yet, 20th century scholarship claimed that it found a theological category that fitted 
Proverbs even better than those applied by earlier scholarship: creation theology. Although 
this was programmatically expressed only in 1964 by Zimmerli, a wisdom‒creation connection 
had already been recognised by many scholars since the ‘30s. First, I have attempted to show 
how this creation/wisdom thinking gradually gained more significance in Old Testament 
theologies, then I have tried to follow the story of its precise definition. I have tried to 
demonstrate that, between the 30s and the 60s, some scholars emphasised the 
anthropocentrism of wisdom, others the more pious order-thinking. In the late 60s and 70, 
major biblical theologians struggled with the idea of the ‘secular’ in connection with wisdom. 
Since the 70s, though, virtually everybody agreed that creation theology comprised the 
horizon of wisdom, theological utilizations of this ‘creation theology’ and the descriptions of its 
theological kernel became more diverse and numerous. Then, from the 90s, the scholarly 
consensus has been shaken again even in the few points which had been agreed on before, as 
the ideas of ‘order’ and ‘creation’ have been questioned forcefully by some. 
It is time to evaluate some of the arguments, and to clarify briefly the direction from which the 
rest of the dissertation will attempt to contribute to scholarly discussion. 
Order 
On the one hand, I was persuaded by Boström, Assmann, Fox, Weeks, etc. that it is better to 
avoid the category of ‘order’ in one’s interpretation of Proverbs. Not only because its 
connotation can falsely give the impression that a ‘buffer zone… comes between the sage and 
the Lord’280 but also because it can become a ‘buffer zone’ between the text and the 
interpreter. What I mean is that one can deduce the idea of an abstract order from the text 
and then speculate about theological utilisations of that order, without this theological 
utilisation being any longer fully in line with the text itself. For example one can argue that 1. 
Proverbs teaches that there is a world-order, and 2. order validates natural law, so 3. Proverbs 
teaches natural law. This kind of argument can be seen, for example, in Barr’s work:  
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Brunner’s plea for a new natural theology included an emphasis on the orders… of 
creation, and Barth was correspondingly dismissive towards these structures. But to 
modern Old Testament scholarship there can be no question that the idea of a world order 
is extremely central. It is evident especially in the Wisdom literature…
281
 
However, this argument misses the point that Proverbs actually mainly encourages the reader 
to listen to instruction rather than to explore reality with an open mind;282 that, besides 
listening to the fathers’ teaching, the key of wisdom seems to be the fear of the Lord and not a 
search for natural regularities;283 that many proverbs teach ‘that human perception of a 
situation may be false unless it is informed by prior instruction, and that bad things may very 
easily seem good;’284 and that teaching in Proverbs is rarely, if ever, based on experience.285 
To do justice to Barr, he actually recognised these features of Proverbs (and other biblical 
books supposedly supporting natural theology). Yet, he found the argument from world order 
for the presence of natural theology in the Bible so strong, that he did not draw the conclusion 
from his observations that maybe there is no natural theology in the Bible or that the modern 
understanding of ‘natural theology’ should be changed in order to adjust it to a biblical 
understanding of natural theology. Instead he concluded that though the Bible advocates 
natural theology it actually cultivates it rather badly sometimes: 
Though I think there is much use of natural theology in the Bible, I am not sure that its 
natural theology is always right. It does not seem to me to be definitely or necessarily 
true. First, …it is not proved by the warrants that are offered in order to prove it; secondly, 
it is poorly informed about some of the realities of the world; thirdly, it is not really 
‘autonomous’ natural theology, but is itself derived from previous religion and is 
dependent on previous religion.
286
 
However, if one does not press the idea of ‘order’ which is not often expressed explicitly in the 
Bible anyway, then the basis for finding the equivalents of modern natural theology in the 
Bible is significantly weakened. 
To give another example, one can argue that 1. a world-order makes it possible for human 
beings to make decisions freely, so 2. Proverbs is about human autonomy.287 But this 
interpretation does not consider the numerous proverbs which actually emphasise human 
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dependence on God (see Prov. 3:5‒6; 9:10; 14:12; 16:1‒9; 28:5; etc.). So, again, the idea of 
‘order’ might lead to an interpretation which pays attention to the text only selectively. 
On the other hand, I accept much of what scholars have described by the idea of ‘order.’ For 
example, I accept that there was no such demarcation between the natural world and the 
social world in ancient Israelite thinking as in the modern one and that social rules and 
cosmological rules were paralleled;288 that wisdom described a predictable world; that to 
simply call it ‘anthropocentric’ is a misleading simplification; that God can be experienced in 
the world(-order)289 or that the order teaches one to trust in the world(-order) and God.290 
However, in such cases the term ‘world-order’ can be easily substituted by ‘God’ or ‘belief in 
God’ or ‘world’ and, I believe, that wording would be even more in harmony with the text of 
Proverbs and potentially less misleading. 
Creation 
Similarly to ‘order,’ I am going to avoid referring to ‘creation’ as the key theological concept of 
Proverbs in the following dissertation—even though, again similarly to the case of ‘order,’ I do 
agree with many statements of those who rely heavily on this concept in their interpretation. 
‘Creation’ has become an umbrella expression, which can signify many things to many people 
from liberation through ecology to material interests and moral formation. However, one can 
speak about such concepts without referring to the ‘umbrella term.’ This would also help one 
avoid creating a ‘buffer between the text and the interpreter,’ a danger I referred to in relation 
to the concept of ‘order.’ 
To use such an ‘umbrella term’ to describe wisdom can be attractive because it helps to unify 
conceptually the seemingly very diverse teachings of Old Testament wisdom and, at the same 
time, it also helps one to contrast it with and differentiate it from the rest of the Old 
Testament. However, one has to be careful here. Dell writes that ‘for too long wisdom had 
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been a casualty of the long-running quest for a theological centre in the Old Testament.’291 I 
wonder if wisdom scholars make a similar mistake when they search for the theological centre 
of wisdom literature. It does not necessarily have such a centre. 
I agree that creation is probably presupposed everywhere in wisdom, but I am not sure that 
this is different in other biblical books.292 ‘Creation faith’ is part of an ancient near eastern 
worldview.293 As Westermann writes, it often does not get mentioned precisely because it is so 
substantial: 
Why is it that in the Old Testament the words ‘creator’ and ‘creation’ are never used in 
the context of believing?...[Because] the Old Testament notion of belief presumes the 
possibility of an alternative... In the Old Testament an alternative to belief in Creation or 




To use Barton’s words, we are speaking about ‘a paradigm or set—in effect, a conceptual 
apparatus through which the world is perceived, which cannot itself become the object of 
conscious attention so long as one remains in the culture to which it belongs.’295 
Barton might go a bit too far claiming that ‘it cannot itself become the object of conscious 
attention.’ Elements of worldviews do become the objects of conscious attention occasionally, 
even on the part of their adherents. They can sometimes emerge out of the status of 
unrecognised presuppositions and become explicit teachings or consciously recognised 
vehicles of ideas. This is what probably happens in Proverbs 8 or in Genesis 1‒3 with the topic 
of creation. However, this does not mean that the theology of Proverbs is a ‘creation 
theology,’ however important ‘creation’ occasionally becomes for the authors. Creation might 
be in the background, but to take it as the centre of Proverbs’ theology runs the danger of 
mistaking presuppositions with explicit teaching, worldview with theology, form with content; 
and actually goes against the observation that it is not often mentioned explicitly in the text. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, I, in fact, do not necessarily have a problem with the term 
‘creation theology.’ However, this usage should not oppose wisdom literature with the rest of 
the Bible, or wisdom thinking with cult and history; it should not suggest the existence of an 
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independent world-order; it should not give the impression that creation is explicitly 
mentioned in many parts of Proverbs; and it should not silence the plurality of theological 
themes offered by Proverbs besides creation. Yet, as the term has been used by many to 
suggest these things, I consider it better to avoid speaking about Proverbs’ ‘creation theology.’ 
What is distinctive about wisdom literature then? 
Even if there is no obvious theological centre, there can be a common style and a common 
angle of discussion. It is an old observation that Proverbs is explicitly written from the 
perspective of the individual concentrating on everyday life and this differentiates it from 
much of the biblical literature.296  
There might be also some truth in the opinion that, for whatever reason, wisdom writers were 
interested in certain questions on a more abstract, theoretical level than national history: 
It is fair to suppose that they [the wisdom writers], like their foreign counterparts, are 
motivated by a desire to engage with the questions at this level, rather than by an 
ideological rejection, as such, of theological ideas rooted in more local or national 
concerns… We cannot really speak of wisdom thought here then, so much as of common 
ground occupied by the wisdom writers, or of a mode of discourse that they share, but 
over which they hold no strict monopoly.
297 
Wanting a better solution I tend to count on the factors of the focus on the individual and the 
(maybe not unrelated) abstract level of discussion as the explanation for the lack of clear 
historical references in the text. 
Speaking about a ‘mode of discourse’ which is on a more ‘theoretical level’ is actually not far 
away from the 19th century category of ‘philosophy.’ Though, again, it is probably a term best 
to be avoided because of its potentially misleading connotations of Greek thinking. 
Whatever categories one uses, it seems to be obvious that biblical wisdom does differ from the 
rest of the Bible in its focus on the individual and in its mode of discourse. However, does it 
differ from the rest of the ancient near eastern wisdom literature, too? One has to admit that 
there is not much among the propositions and in the information offered by Proverbs which 
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we could not find in, let us say, Egyptian or Babylonian literature. As I see it, the main 
difference is not in the book but around the book. It is its embeddedness in Old Testament 
literature, its allusions to and echoes of typical biblical topics and thoughts which make it 
characteristically different from other ancient near eastern literature. Of course, these 
features of the book can only be recognized and utilized theologically to their full potential if 
the book is consciously read in its canonical context. 
The situation is somewhat parallel with that of the nowadays popular ‘spirituality.’ Spirituality 
is not about new propositions, it is more about how one experiences his or her own 
relationship to the world and the divine. Spiritual practices can be very similar, even identical 
in different traditions. The focusing of attention, or breathing techniques, or settings of 
silence, or sentences about personal contentment can appear to be the same in the case of a 
Catholic and a Buddhist monk. Yet, the seemingly same spirituality can be experienced very 
differently and it can express different things as it is embedded in different contexts. 
A brief justification of my questions 
If creation theology and order do not provide the key to Proverbs then how shall we approach 
it? I am not persuaded that there is an ultimate answer to this question; so, more modestly, I 
am only going to provide one possible theological reading and not the theology of the book of 
Proverbs. 
I am going to interpret it through the problems of the ‘secular’ and ‘selfishness.’ The 
importance of the former topic is suggested by the fact that the relationship between the 
(human) world and God gets mentioned in the secondary literature very often. Virtually 
everybody, whether accepting the categories of ‘creation’ and ‘order’ or not, whether 
considering wisdom theologically as ‘subordinate’ to the rest of the Bible or not, spares a few 
words for this relationship. Let us consider, for example, the following quotations from a very 
diverse group of scholars: 
Wisdom literature attempts to deal with one of the major paradoxes... inherent in the 
experience of the holy God in the world: God’s transcendence and God’s immanence...
298
 
In all of Israel’s religious literature, it is the wisdom tradition that most clearly discloses… a 
meeting place of the divine and the human.
299
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Tension between the human and divine is at the centre of an understanding of wisdom... 
human experience is not divorced from the realm of God who stands behind it as the 
orderer and creator, nor is God divorced from humanity in that he reveals himself in all 
human experience and in the created world.
300
 
By living in accord with the rules of the universe established at creation, one obtains God’s 
presence. In addition, God comes to meet his creatures in Dame Wisdom. Human 
discovery and divine disclosure stand in a complementary relationship.
301
 
The world-order revealed goodness, wisdom, glory, and righteousness, it also revealed 




Wisdom literature makes yet another contribution to the roundness and wholeness of the 




Personified wisdom is immanent to creation, while distinct from the “works” of God; she 
speaks in the name of Yahweh.
304
 




One might profitably think of Proverbs in its eclectic “collage” state as part of the Jewish 
critique of idealism. One’s face is rubbed in the near, as Leo Baeck has put it—the 




The list of quotations could be continued. This unanimity of opinion makes it tempting to think 
that finally we found the central interest of wisdom literature. However, the divine‒human or 
divine‒world relationship is such a broad topic that one could probably successfully argue for 
its centrality in the case of most biblical, indeed most religious and many non-religious ancient 
writings. It could also be a matter of debate if this topic is more central in Proverbs than, let us 
say, education, character formation, success, trust, choice, or life. Nevertheless, it might be 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the issue especially if it can be converted into a slightly 
more concrete question. 
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In order to make the question somewhat more focused I am going to re-investigate the 
possibilities of an interpretation focusing on the problematic of the ‘secular.’ The question of 
‘secular’ is not only a hot topic in contemporary thinking, but it is also not unrelated to the 
broad question of world‒divine relationship. The term has been used and discussed less 
frequently in connection with Proverbs since its heyday in the 70s, but this is probably mainly 
because of the historical concerns about a reconstruction of a more secular layer in the book 
or a ‘secular to religious’ developmental scheme in its history. Yet, the book’s concentration on 
the everyday life of the individual prompts the question of what we can say about the ‘secular’ 
life from a theological point of view in the light of Proverbs, regardless of the historical 
problem of whether a ‘more secular’ wisdom ever existed. 
As for the question of ‘selfishness,’ this was maybe the main problem of pre 1930 
interpretation but since then it has faded away from the horizon of interpreters. If it gets 
attention at all it is usually dealt with by a brief comment, claiming that wisdom just describes 
the act‒consequence order of the universe and this cannot be called selfishness.307 However, 
the question might deserve some further investigation. Not only because the concepts of an 
‘order’ or the Tun‒Ergehen Zusammenhang are questionable, but also because it is not clear 
that they would solve the problem even if they were granted. Once one considers that the 
book not only recognises that right behaviour is beneficial but that it actually motivates for 
right behaviour almost exclusively through the appeal to the reader’s self-interest, a brief 
reference to the order does not seem to be enough. 
‘Selfishness’ and ‘secularity’ appear to be two distinct sets of questions. However, if one 
considers that Proverbs seems to motivate mainly through this-worldly, material gains and not 
through ‘spiritual’ rewards then it is visible that they do relate to each other. Discussing both 
of these two topics will hopefully enable us to achieve a richer, more complex theological 
reading of Proverbs. 
However, before turning to these issues, it will be necessary to clarify the methodology applied 
to the investigation of Proverbs in the rest of the dissertation.  
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Methodology: a canonical approach 
Reading about the different attempts to grasp Proverbs’ theological message and significance, 
one can observe that many of them are primarily concerned for the meaning of the texts in 
their world of origins, regardless of later understanding and uses. Besides the obvious 
exceptions of the different liberation approaches (feminist, ecological, etc.), there is little 
interest in the hermeneutics of recontextualisation, reception, appropriation, and their 
possible implications for understanding and use today. Yet equally it is apparent that at least 
some of the divergences in interpretation are the result of contemporary theological concerns 
being brought to bear (as it is the case not only in von Rad’s contrast with Heilsgeschichte, but 
in the different utilisations of the categories of ‘creation,’ ‘secular,’ ‘natural theology,’ etc.).308 
The particular approach taken in this dissertation will somewhat differ from this general 
scholarly tendency to focus primarily on the origins of the text and not on the later contexts of 
its reading. My approach can be characterised by the following list of catchwords: 
 The book as a whole—reading the book of Proverbs as one book and not as a 
collection of independent writings; 
 Literary framework—paying a special attention to the literary framework of the book, 
mainly chapters 1‒9, and to how it influences the interpretation of the rest of the 
book; 
 Synchronic reading—concentrating on the received form of a text and not on the 
history of its ‘evolution’ (though, at the same time, I am not in principle against 
diachronic readings); 
 Intertextual reading—paying attention to possible resonances with other biblical 
texts; 
 Church tradition(s)—consciously interacting with the theological traditions of religious 
groups that read Proverbs as Scripture; 
 Interdisciplinary—freely interacting with other disciplines like philosophical theology, 
historical theology, sociology, etc. whenever this interaction can enrich the 
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interpretation; yet, always trying to do justice to the academic requirements of biblical 
studies. 
This approach, or at least most of its elements, could be probably best described as ‘canonical.’ 
My understanding of ‘canonical interpretation’ 
As the term ‘canonical’ is contested and used in many ways, it calls for some explanation. 
However, it should be emphasised that the aim of this chapter is not to compare and evaluate 
the different understandings of the term, and neither is it to present a thoroughgoing analysis 
of the complex thought of Brevard Childs, the main figure who probably comes to the mind of 
most Old Testament scholars hearing the word ‘canonical.’ The aim, more modestly, is simply 
to clarify how the term ‘canonical’ is used in the dissertation and in what ways it describes the 
approach of the following discussion. 
Three interdependent reading strategies should be highlighted as a clarification to my 
canonical approach: 
1. Canonical interpretation focuses on the canonical form, that is, on the received form 
of the book of Proverbs. 
2. Canonical interpretation focuses on the canonical context, that is, on intertextual 
allusions to other canonical texts. 
3. Canonical interpretation expresses and builds on the interpreter’s church tradition. 
There is, however, a deep theological and at the same time practical question which can be 
asked about all three points: Which canonical form? Which canonical context? Which church 
tradition? 
It has to be recognised that we actually have more than one final form of the book. The LXX, 
for example, differs significantly from the MT.309 This fact, however, does not necessarily 
present a serious theoretical difficulty. I can easily accept the idea that a canonical work has 
more than one canonical (final, accepted by the church) form. Be that as it may, this question 
will be largely avoided because of pragmatic reasons. In an ideal world all of the received 
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forms of a book would require a thorough investigation, but due to space and time restrictions 
I am going to focus on the MT and will not discuss other final forms of the book on their own 
right, only use them occasionally to inform my reading of the MT. 
As for the canonical context, the same problem arises even more acutely: which canon are we 
speaking about? Are we speaking about the Jewish, the Protestant, the Catholic, or an 
Orthodox canon? Although Proverbs is not contested, and is in all of these canons, the 
question is not completely without significance for a canonical interpretation as a decision will 
influence in what corpus one searches for canonical resonances for Proverbs. The issue of the 
canon becomes even more complicated if one considers the pertinent debate about whether 
the canon should be understood as a set list of books, or as a ‘rule of faith,’ ‘the true teaching 
of Christ’ as it seems to be understood in the second century CE, or whether it is possible to 
bridge these two meanings somehow.310 In order to cut through the Gordian knot of these 
problems I do not see any other option than to switch to a more personal tone for a moment 
and to reveal the particular tradition in the context of which the present interpreter is reading 
the text: I personally have a Protestant background so when I hear the word ‘canon’ it is 
mainly a list of 66 (39+27) biblical books which comes to my mind. However, I am sympathetic 
to the understanding of canon as a rule of faith expressed through a textual corpus that has 
somewhat blurred borders, which means that I am open towards texts outside of the 
Protestant canon and part of the wider Christian tradition. 
However, the question of ‘which canonical context’ is probably less significant in the case of 
the particular canonical reading of Proverbs offered by this dissertation than it might appear at 
the first sight. Although some brief references will be made to texts outside of the 66 books of 
the Protestant canon, all the main texts that will be investigated in the followings happen to be 
part of all of the above listed ‘canons.’ At the same time I am not aware of any texts in the 
Catholic or other canons the detailed discussion of which would change significantly my 
arguments. 
The struggle with the second issue (‘which canon’) leads on to the third issue (‘which church 
tradition’). This question also has to be answered on a personal level. Despite being a 
Protestant, I found the thought of some Orthodox and many Catholic theologians most 
stimulating for my theological reflection on Proverbs. My main theological conversation 
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partners will be Catholics. So, most of what will be said can be probably easily adjusted to 
many theological persuasions even if my Protestant angle will be occasionally undeniable. 
Furthermore, although Christian categories will be used in the following interpretation, I do 
not intend to offer a Christological, or Trinitarian reading of Proverbs (even though some of 
the observations could be easily developed into that direction), so, I believe, most of my 
reading will be compatible with Jewish religious persuasions, too. 
The previous paragraph highlights that through the act of canonical reading the reader might 
be drawn to a reflexion on the traditions of his or her reading community and on the traditions 
of other communities that also take the same text as canonical. This can encourage the reader 
to connect his or her reading with interdisciplinary research which, besides biblical studies, can 
incorporate philosophical- and historical theology, sociology, anthropology, etc. 
Reasons for applying a canonical approach 
I can see six main reasons for applying the above delineated canonical interpretation to 
Proverbs. Most of these reasons are mentioned in one way or another in the following 
quotation from Childs: 
The final canonical literature reflects a long history of development in which the received 
tradition was selected, transmitted and shaped by hundreds of decisions... However, the 
various elements have been so fused as to resist easy diachronic reconstructions which 
fracture the witness of the whole... 
The canonical approach to Old Testament theology rejects a method which is unaware of 
its own time-conditioned quality and which is confident in its ability to stand outside, 
above and over against the received tradition in adjudicating the truth or lack of truth of 
the biblical material according to its own criteria... To suggest that the task of theological 
reflection takes place from within a canonical context assumes not only a received 
tradition, but a faithful disposition by hearers who await the illumination of God’s Spirit.
311
 
My first reason for a canonical reading is a practical one: due to wisdom literature’s lack of 
concrete historical references and its flourishing throughout thousands of years, dating and 
establishing the order of influence between different texts is even harder than in the case of 
other texts. This material really ‘resists easy diachronic reconstructions.’ There are some 
questions in which a near consensus exists among scholars. Most interpreters, for example, 
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regard chapters 1‒9 as later than 10:1‒22:16. Nevertheless, many of the historical debates 
provide only sand on which it would be unwise to build a house of interpretation. For example, 
it would be quite risky to base too much on reconstructed theological and chronological layers 
in the sentence literature, or on a supposed direction of relationship between 1 Kings 1‒11 
and Prov. 1‒9; or between Isa. 11 and Prov. 8, etc. 
My second reason is that the whole is (often) more than the sum of the parts. Understanding a 
text does not equal understanding its (alleged) strata on their own. The received tradition 
mirrors ‘hundreds of decisions,’ and this can not only mean distortions but also an 
accumulation of richness. 
The third reason is that interpreting a text in a canonical frame of reference is a self-revealing 
theological statement in itself. It expresses that the interpreter counts him- or herself as 
belonging to the tradition formed by and responsible for the canon, and as such it expresses 
that the interpreter tends to identify with the ‘faithful disposition’ of the particular tradition. 
This openness about one’s own stance encourages a thoroughgoing theological reflection on 
the text, one which is sometimes lacking from serious academic biblical interpretation. 
Fourthly, this openness about the particular frame of reference in which the interpreter does 
his or her interpretation can also encourage the interpreter towards constant self-reflection. 
The interpreter who works in a 21st century context and a canonical context at the same time 
is constantly confronted by the time and space-conditioned particularity of the text, his or her 
religious tradition and his or her (post)modern culture. He or she is forced to make conscious 
choices or reconciliations between particular viewpoints. It is no longer possible to hide his or 
her subjective judgements under the disguise of a neutral or universal perspective. Being 
‘unaware of one’s own time conditioned nature’ and avoiding questions like ‘do I really agree 
with every element of the tradition represented by the canon?’ or ‘does the canon faithfully 
represent my tradition and vice versa?’ becomes difficult for one who tries to do justice to his 
or her canonical tradition and 21st century context simultaneously. 
My last two reasons for a canonical reading are not mentioned in the above quotation by 
Childs. One is that the interpretation of a given proverb depends on its context. Why should 




Finally, the irrefutable justification for the approach: for whatever reasons, this is what 
happens to interest the interpreter. It is perfectly legitimate to approach the text with 
historical interests. Why should it be illegitimate to approach it with (literary and/or 
theological) canonical interests? 
A concrete example might help in elucidating these points. William McKane writes in his 
commentary on Proverbs: 
It [the strata representing Yahwistic piety and ‘moralism’] has the extreme tidiness, the 
sterility and the disengagement from reality... Instruction and sentence... are employed to 
give expression to a precious piety which left no questions open, no ends untied and 
which secured its mathematical precision by detaching itself from the messiness and 




From a canonical point of view one could criticise McKane’s confidence with which he 
identifies the different strata (see my first point above) and the little attention he pays to the 
final text in his commentary (second point). His evaluation of the different strata is also 
noteworthy. He likes the former ones and does not like the latest because they lost touch with 
reality. Of course, this is a subjective evaluation since it depends on what McKane himself 
thinks the reality is like—a rather obvious point he does not emphasise too much (see point 
four). A canonical reader, in the light of point three, would rather try to listen humbly to the 
text (a characteristic not alien from the teaching of Proverbs itself) and give the chance to it to 
form his or her perception of reality. 
At this point it might be necessary to add that as I understand the canonical approach, it does 
not mean blind, uncritical acceptance of the teaching of the canonical text. It only means 
reluctance to dismiss it too easily. However, at the minimum it requires the interpreter to try 
to become in his or her reading aware of his or her own time-conditioned prejudices and 
inclinations at least as much as those of the text. 
Neither does it mean a dogmatic rejection of diachronic interpretation or investigating 
allusions outside the canon. These are necessary not only because without them a meaningful 
conversation would be difficult in the modern scholarly community. Even if one rejects the 
possibility of certainty about the history behind most of the texts, nevertheless, intelligent 
guesses about this history can enrich our understanding of the final form of the text. The term 
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‘canonical’ simply speaks about the focus and the aim of the investigation not about what the 
interpreter is ‘not allowed’ to do. 
Specific problems concerning Proverbs’ canonical 
interpretation 
After this more general discussion of my canonical approach it is time to turn our attention to 
the specific issues concerning Proverbs. In Proverbs’ case there is a special reason for 
interpreting it in a canonical way, namely that this approach has been somewhat neglected. I 
can see two main reasons for this neglect. First, its style is so international that reading it in a 
(Jewish or Christian) canonical context might seem rather a distorting than an illuminating way 
of interpretation. Second, although the scepticism of the canonical approach towards 
reconstructing the different historic layers of the book with certainty is well applicable to the 
attempts of dividing the book into, say, religious and secular layers, or concrete and 
speculative layers, nevertheless, some parts of the book are clearly differentiated from others. 
No one could miss the dissimilarity of chapters 1‒9 from 10:1‒22:16. The headings found in 
the book make it even more obvious that it is a collection of more than one work. So, it 
appears to be a reasonable exercise to study those works on their own. In the following pages I 
am going to look at these arguments in more detail. 
International style 
As a response to the first objection against a canonical reading, we have to realise that 
‘distortion’ is a value laden word. Providing a different context for a text and thereby changing 
the atmosphere, connotation, or even the meaning of the text produces a different text. 
Whether it is a distortion or an improvement depends on the criteria of evaluation. 
Furthermore, it should also be noticed that even if one prefers a diachronic reading and 
understands every deviation from the original intention of the author as ‘misuse,’ the distorted 
nature of our text is far from certain. It is not obvious that the authors were ‘humanists’ who 
were less imbedded in Jewish culture and religion than the authors of other biblical books and 
who wanted to express a universal, ‘non-Jewish’ teaching. Many scholars, who are interested 
more in diachronic readings than in a canonical one, argue that the internationality of ‘wisdom 
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styles’ (e.g. the forms of proverbs and instructions, typical phrases, topics, etc.) can be 
misleading. As Stuart Weeks helpfully observes:  
Their [instructions’] cultural underpinnings are not always clear in individual works, 
especially those most interested in daily life: for every Amenemope, with its frequent, 
explicit references to Egyptian deities and ideas, there is an Any, which more often 
presumes them quietly. However universal an instruction may seem, in fact, we are 
unlikely to understand its original purpose if we neglect its original context... 
To take a loose analogy, if we were to try to read Proverbs 1‒9 solely in the light of the 
foreign instructions, rather than the Jewish context in which it was composed, this would 
be like reading the Aeneid solely on the basis of the Greek epic tradition while ignoring its 
context in Roman literature and thought.
313
 
Weeks, later in his book, identifies many conceptual and verbal parallels between Prov. 1‒9 
and Deuteronomy and shows that the wisdom of this first part of Proverbs can be very easily 
understood as the internalised Law.314 
Katharine Dell also realises the close affinity between wisdom and Deuteronomy.315 
Furthermore, investigating the sections of Proverbs one by one, she concludes that the 
conceptual framework we find in Proverbs is not dissimilar to other biblical literature. Even if 
some concepts are missing, they can be presupposed. Unless we start with a dogmatic 
persuasion that ‘Proverbs is different,’ nothing warrants us to give different meanings to key 
terms (like תמאו דסח) than what we can find in other biblical books.316 
Collection of separate works 
Mentioning Weeks and Dell leads us to the second concern mentioned above. Although, as it 
has just become clear, these two scholars realize the importance of the Israelite setting (contra 
the first concern), both of them are a bit reluctant to focus too much on the book as a whole 
as we will see shortly. This reluctance is understandable if we consider the strong academic 
tradition of equating understanding with knowing the social and historical background of a 
work. According to this paradigm, as Proverbs is a collection of many works stemming from 
presumably somewhat different social backgrounds, it follows that we have to analyse the 
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different parts of it separately. As Samuel L. Adams puts it, ‘Theological assertions are always 
made from a specific context, and it is incumbent upon the modern interpreter of sapiential 
literature to locate the material as precisely as possible.’317  
Indeed, theological assertions are made from a specific context, but does it necessarily follow 
that we can only understand them if we understand their particular social context? Trying to 
figure out the social background of a text is certainly a valuable exercise. However, we have to 
be precise about what it is useful for and what it is not. To extricate these questions a bit more 
I provide three brief examples by C. Camp, C. Westermann and K. Dell. 
Claudia V. Camp writes: ‘…the attempt to understand the meaning of female Wisdom within a 
socio-historical setting is important because it reminds us that all theology is done 
contextually.’318 It should be recognized that the word ‘understanding’ is used rather loosely in 
this quotation. Camp seems to mean ‘understanding the sociological and theological 
motivations of the author.’ She writes in her book that ‘Wisdom is the mediator between God 
and humankind as it is clear from the chiastic structure of 8:30b‒31.’319 Then, on the following 
pages, she explains that the ancient writer felt it necessary to introduce wisdom as a mediator 
not only because in the Persian time God felt distant but also because they could not count on 
the king any more as the mediator. This is interesting and illuminating indeed (if true), but 
surely, her claim is that she understood from the text the mediatory role of Wisdom. The 
historical background only helped to understand the motivations of the authors and not the 
text itself. Maybe knowing the social background can specify, clarify, enrich the meaning (e.g. 
‘Wisdom mediates like the king used to’) but it is not the case that without knowing the social 
background we could not understand the ‘Wisdom as mediator’ idea at all. 
Westermann explains that 
…wisdom literature emerged as a result of both these processes: the collecting and then 
recording of proverbs previously handed down orally, and their being joined together with 
didactic poems… One can neither understand nor explain the book of Proverbs, originating 
as it did in this way, without reviewing this process.
320
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Again, the main question is what he meant by ‘understanding.’ Westermann also seems to be 
too general claiming that without knowing the history of the text the book of Proverbs remains 
inexplicable. What he really seems to mean, however, is that the surprising difference 
between the style of chapters 1‒9 and 10‒31 would remain inexplicable, which is a much more 
modest claim. 
Similarly to Westermann, Dell proposes that ‘…the book of Proverbs is best understood when 
divided into different sections… Whybray argues that one should not try to posit just one social 
context for the whole book of Proverbs, because each of the sections has a different 
character…’321 Do I disagree with Dell and Whybray when they say that we should not posit 
just one social context for the whole book? Certainly not! But I am arguing that however 
helpful it is, positing the different contexts does not equate with understanding of the book. A 
book can have a coherent meaning even if it is a composite of more books stemming from 
different social contexts. True enough, some layers of the meaning of one or all of the works 
might have changed when read together with the other one, but this is not the point here. We 
also should not forget that if the final composition is the work of an editor/artist/theologian, 
then, in a sense, his or her social context becomes the social context of the whole work—even 
if we have no chance to decipher what that social context might have been.322 
So, it seems to me that knowing the social background can enrich our interpretations in many 
ways and it can also contribute significantly to the understanding of a text when it clarifies 
some obscure, culture-specific expressions or concepts, but equating it with understanding a 
text is an exaggeration. 
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The warning of Jeremy Black might be helpful here: 
It [modern research] treats ‘literary texts’ exactly as any other form of historical ‘text’, 
discarding as too subjective and unscientific any attempt to account for precisely those 
distinctive qualities that make literature ‘literary’: the meaning and effect of the 
experience of reading. The result has been that literary works have been trawled for 
evidence of social conditions or historical facts, as sources for the history of thought or 
religion, or for the history of literature itself: the history of genres, the tracing of 
influences and the development of traditions…
323
 
Black writes about the literary analyses of Sumerian poetry, but his remarks are applicable to 
the theological interpretation of the Old Testament, too. We should not confuse 
‘understanding,’ which is a broad category comprising many possible meanings, with ‘historical 
understanding,’ which is focusing more on the motivations, aims, and circumstances of the 
authors. However valid and helpful the historical and sociological analyses are, we should not 
forget that it does not equate completely with the understanding of a biblical text. 
The canonical significance of Proverbs 1‒9 
Let us focus now more closely on our specific problem. Should Prov. 1‒9 be read as a preface 
for the whole book? If yes, what significance does this have for our interpretation? 
Many scholars mention that, in a sense, these nine chapters form the preface for the whole 
book.324 Weeks, however, seems to be less enthusiastic about this possibility: 
[that Prov. 1‒9 functions as a prologue] is an attractive [idea], and it offers an explanation 
both for the lack of correspondence to the subsequent superscriptions and to the 
notoriously mysterious ‘seven pillars’ of 9:1 (taking those to be the seven sections of the 
book). If Proverbs 1‒9 does currently serve as a prologue, however, I think that this is an 
editorial rather than a compositional matter. While some links exist with material in the 
other sections, the number of these is small, and the direction of influence unclear; it 
would be difficult to maintain that Proverbs 1‒9 presupposes the presence of the other 
sections. At most, therefore, it is not so much a prologue as a free-standing, introductory 




Dell, similarly, recognizes the ‘preface quality’326 of Prov. 1‒9 but warns against ‘overstating’ it: 
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Proverbs 1‒9 is often regarded as a preface to the rest of the book of Proverbs… The 
opening verses of ch. 1 certainly have that character, but it may be overstating the 
introductory quality of the chapters to apply this role to the whole section. In fact, we find 
two major genres of material in Prov 1‒9 that do not appear extensively elsewhere in the 
book and that give the section a distinctive character of its own.
327
 
If I understand them well, Weeks’ and Dell’s concern is that even if Prov. 1‒9 serves as a 
preface today, this was not the intention of the original author(s) and, besides being 
significantly different from the rest of Proverbs, these chapters make perfect sense on their 
own. This might be so328 and the investigation of chapters 1‒9 on their own is certainly an 
interesting historical task and also valuable for the interpretation of the whole book. But why 
should the interpretation of the received text—that is, chapters 1‒9 as part of the whole book 
and as a frame of reference for understanding and appropriating the sentence literature—be 
seen as an ‘overstatement’? 
As Van Leeuwen argued, the over-emphasis on the separateness of these chapters can actually 
lead to missing some important parallels between them and the following chapters.329 
Furthermore, even if Prov. 1‒9 does not ‘presuppose’ chapters 10‒31, which, if I understand it 
correctly, means that Prov. 1‒9 makes sense on its own well, some ‘oddities’ of it become 
more explicable in the light of Prov. 10‒31. For example, both Dell and Weeks realize that 
6:1‒19 seems to be a collection of topics from Prov. 10:1‒ as if someone inserted those verses 
there to show the introductory nature of Prov. 1‒9.330 Another feature of chapters 1‒9 which 
might make better sense as introduction than as an independent work is the present form of 
chapter 9. It does not end in a summary or conclusion. Quite the contrary, the tension is not 
resolved but if possible heightens at the end of the chapter (in contrast to chapter 31, for 
example). Prov. 9 is about the ‘competition’ between woman Wisdom (תומכח) and woman Folly 
(תוליסכ תשא) to attract young men. It finishes with the words of woman Folly, with her proverb 
about the pleasures of secret food and drink (9:17), and an observation by the narrator of her 
and her followers who go to Sheol (9:18). All of these motives are nicely matched by the 
tension between the wise son (םכח ןב) and the foolish son (ליסכ ןב) of 10:1 and by verse 10:2, 
which teaches that evil treasures do not help (contra 9:17) but righteousness saves from death 
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(contra 9:18). One can even suspect that the somewhat awkward structure of chapter 9 (not 
ending with a real conclusion but with the figure of woman Folly; some ‘more summary-like’ 
verses between the speeches of woman Wisdom and woman Folly)331 might be (partly) the 
result of making it into an introduction to 10:1 onwards. 
My conclusion is that modern academic scholars should not be ashamed of interpreting Prov. 
1‒9 as the preface for the whole book. It does make sense on its own, so, in this sense, it is 
true that it does not presuppose the following chapters. However, there are parts of it which 
clearly point at the following chapters if they are read together and there are oddities in it 
which might be read more naturally in the light of the following chapters. These might be the 
results of editorial activity indeed, but this is irrelevant for the question whether we should 
read it as an introduction to the whole Proverbs. It certainly does not make less sense in this 
role than in the role of an independent essay, and this is how it is part of the received text, 
mirroring the ‘hundreds of decisions’ of the faith communities responsible for its shaping. 
But what does taking Prov. 1‒9 as introduction make to our understanding of the book? 
Claudia V. Camp famously argued332 that Prov. 1‒9 provides context for the proverbs of 10‒31. 
She referred to Mieder’s often quoted333 maxim that a proverb is dead without a context334—
they only become alive if there is a framework in which we can understand them. 
In fact, I would rather say that in a sense proverbs are too alive without a context. They can 
have many meanings, connotations, ambiances, depending on what context we are using them 
in. Many of them can be approached from a theological perspective, or from a psychological 
one, or from a historical one, etc., as the reader wishes, basically without restrictions. 
My contention is that whatever the original context of the proverbs of Prov. 10‒31 were, Prov. 
1‒9 provides a theological context, which invites the reader to a religious interpretation of 
Prov. 10‒31.335 The book of Proverbs (in its received form) is not a mere listing of proverbs 
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compiled by an anthropologist without the slightest intention of providing a context—the sort 
of collection Mieder was speaking about and criticizing.336 It offers a clear frame of reference 
for the interpretation of its proverbs. 
Does this mean that Prov. 1‒9 inseminates the proverbs of chapters 10‒31 producing new, 
unexpected meanings? Or am I arguing that Prov. 1‒9 restricts the meaning of the individual 
proverbs? Neither of these claims reflect precisely of what I am trying to say. Prov. 1‒9 does 
not really restrict or inseminate the meaning of most individual proverbs. A proverb’s warning 
against false witness (Prov. 12:17; 14:5, 25; 19:5, 9, 28; 21:28; 24:28; 25:1) does not change its 
meaning because of chapters 1‒9. Instead, the first 9 chapters ‘control’ and ‘inseminate’ the 
relationship between the reader and individual proverbs. In other words, they provide a vision, 
in the light of which the meaning of individual proverbs gains new significance for the 
interpreter. The reader brings the vivid picture of Lady Wisdom from chapter 8 (and other 
chapters) with him or her to the later chapters. As Roland Murphy puts it, 
In the book of Proverbs she [Wisdom] proclaims her birth from God, her (active?) 
presence before and during creation, and her delight to be with human beings. She 
appears to be the link between the practical, down-to-earth realities of daily living and life 
with God (Prov. viii 35). This gives a decidedly religious hue to the entire book, so different 




After the vision of Lady Wisdom in Proverbs 1‒9, listening to individual proverbs will be 
inevitably understood as listening to this Wisdom, who is so closely associated with Yahweh. 
As a result—as I will argue in the second half of the dissertation—reading the book of 
Proverbs, including its individual proverbs, will be understood in the context of the reader’s 
relationship to Yahweh. 
Summary 
Clarifying my ‘canonical approach’ I described it as concentrating on a synchronic reading of 
the received form of the book (though not hostile or neglectful to historical interests), paying 
special attention to the framework of the book (especially the first 9 chapters) and focusing 
also on possible intertextual resonances. 
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This canonical approach can lead to a cultural and theological self-awareness of the reader and 
can help to form and articulate theological and various interdisciplinary reflections on the text. 
Of course, the ultimate test of an approach is its application, so now it is time to turn to 
Proverbs itself and to address our specific questions delineated in the previous chapter, 
namely Proverbs’ relationship to ‘selfishness’ and its ‘secular’ nature. The next chapter will 





Does Proverbs promote selfishness? 
Introduction—A call for a Thomistic reading 
Proverbs—a selfish book? 
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, two well known sociologists, proposed a new theory in 
2004 for why religious practices are declining in the north Atlantic region and Australia.338 They 
claim that the data in the World Values Survey339 show a strong negative correlation between 
the existential security that a society provides for its members (i.e. social networks, education, 
life expectancy, personal income, etc.), and the popularity of religion: the higher existential 
security is in a country, the less religious the people are. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to interact with the Norris‒Inglehart theory of 
secularisation, but a look at some theological responses to their views will be relevant for our 
subject. The theologian–sociologist Jose Casanova, for example, criticised the Norris‒Inglehart 
theory in a public debate as follows: 
It is too simplistic a theory in terms of what religion is supposed to do. My response would 
be, first, that these scholars assume that people have religion precisely because they have 
existential insecurity, that religion is a response to material deprivation... My response is: 
Look at all the world religions... the great religions—Islam, Buddhism, Christianity—never 
appealed simply to the satisfaction of material needs. They have a completely different 
orientation. True, they are immersed in relatively poor, traditional agrarian societies, 
where only the elite, the literati, can practice a higher form of religion.
340
 
Casanova speaks here about a ‘higher form of religion’ which goes beyond a simple 
‘satisfaction of material needs.’ This, of course, presupposes that there is a lower form of 
religion, too.  
Charles Taylor, although not writing directly on the Norris‒Inglehart theory, expresses a similar 
critique of some theories of secularisation. He does not think that religious motives are only 
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tied to the ‘misery, suffering, and despair of the human condition.’341 He claims that although 
earlier religion often focused on human flourishing, after the axial period (mid-first millennium 
BCE), that is, after the activities of Confucius, Gautama, Socrates, and the Hebrew prophets, 
higher forms of religion appeared, which focused on higher goals, leading to a transformation 
of the believer,342 
...a transformation of human beings which takes them beyond or outside of whatever is 
normally understood as human flourishing, even in a context of reasonable mutuality (that 
is, where we work for each other’s flourishing). In the Christian case, this means our 
participating in the love (agape) of God for human beings.
343
 
If religion is shrinking because of the higher level of existential security then this can only be 
true for the ‘lower’ type of religion, suggests Taylor. 344 
Casanova’s and Taylor’s views of ‘higher’ religion are similar to that of Nicholas Lash, who sees 
(higher) religions as schools whose purpose is to purify human desire, mainly to purify love 
from egoism and to participate in the divine love.345 
Now, this differentiation between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ religion poses a serious question to the 
theological interpreter of Proverbs: if we follow those who argue that the true essence of 
(higher) religion is that it points beyond existential security and human flourishing, then how 
are we to account for the heavy emphasis of Proverbs precisely on these ‘lower’ issues? 
One of Proverbs’ main aims is to encourage right behaviour. The first nine chapters contain 
very little practical advice; rather, they contain many and long exhortations.346 In chapters 
10‒29 there are at least 171 sayings (a few of them comprising more than one verse) which 
speak about the bad or good results that follow bad or good behaviour347—often without 
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specifying the behaviour (like ‘what the wicked fears, that comes upon him, and the desire of 
the just will be granted’ Prov. 10:24).348 These verses aim to motivate the reader to behave 
well, thereby making motivation proportionately by far the most significant function of these 
chapters.349 The last two chapters do not contain any practical advice which cannot be found in 
the previous chapters, and they put a similarly strong emphasis on motivation, especially if we 
understand the last chapter as an allegory of wisdom.350 This means that, throughout Proverbs, 
the emphasis is at least as much if not more on the motivation for good behaviour than on 
actual practical advice. 
Of course, this heavy emphasis on motivation should not be a problem in itself. The 
problematic feature of the motivation is with what these verses motivate the reader. At least 
one’s first impression might be that it is not that ‘if you are wise then you will be able to love 
the Lord and your neighbour better,’ but ‘if you are wise then it will be good for you.’ Is this 
not an argument which is built on ‘egoism’—precisely that kind of ‘egoism’ which is supposed 
to be ‘cured’ by higher religion? It is not just that Proverbs puts a heavy emphasis on human 
flourishing. More than that, it seems to use it as the basis of its argument. 
In the light of the thoughts of Inglehart and Norris, can Proverbs still be relevant to a western 
believer in the 21st century, who lives in a materially secure society? In the light of the 
thoughts of Casanova, Taylor, and Lash, is it wise to read this book today in our self-interested, 
success-oriented society? Would it not strengthen the ‘lower religion’ and the materialistic 
features of our society? 
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Proverbs’ eudaemonism—a neglected problem 
These questions, of course, are not new to Proverbs’ interpreters. As we have seen, many 
scholars argued, especially in the 19th century, that Proverbs presents an individualistic 
eudaemonism, that is, it contains a moral teaching which considers happiness or personal well-
being the chief good351 for the individual human being, a teaching which has seemed to be too 
selfish to at least some Christian interpreters. 
Immanuel Kant had a devastating opinion of eudaemonism as a moral theory and, by and 
large, his opinion was the most influential one during the 19th century. Fergus Kerr summarises 
Kant’s opinion like this: 
Kant... was deeply opposed to what he dismissively called ‘happiness theory’ 
(Glückseligkeitslehre): the focus on happiness, rather than on duty, could only lead to 
‘egoism’, placing the determining principle of action in the satisfaction of the individual’s 
desire. The last thing worthy of Christians was to want to be happy.
352
 
It is no wonder that this supposed eudaemonism was a stumbling block for 19th century 
commentators of Proverbs. To summarise my earlier discussion of 19th century approaches to 
the problem, they dealt with it in two major ways: they either condemned Proverbs for it; or 
claimed that Proverbs is a product of a less developed stage of religious maturation (and as 
such useful only for people at a certain phase of their own religious/ethical maturation), which 
is superseded by other, less self-centred parts of the Bible—an argument in line with the 
above mentioned division between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ religions, except that, here, both 
categories are within the boundaries of the Bible. 
However, in some philosophical‒theological circles, partly because of the resurgence of 
Aristotelian‒Thomistic moral theory, eudaemonism is not considered so negatively 
anymore.353 Yet, there is little sign of this more favourable understanding of eudaemonism in 
biblical scholarship. Some scholars occasionally use the word ‘eudaemonistic’ as a neutral 
description of Proverbs without attaching any value judgment to it,354 but the word still seems 
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to retain its negative connotations for the majority.355 Most of these scholars argue, however, 
that Proverbs cannot be described as eudaemonistic. According to them, the appearance as if 
Proverbs was eudaemonistic is only a misunderstanding of its creation theology. In fact the 
whole problem of Proverbs’ eudaemonism has retreated into the background in more recent 
biblical scholarship, and if the ethically problematic nature of the ‘apparent’ eudaemonism of 
the book is dealt with at all, it is usually done briefly, claiming that a proper understanding of 
creation theology solves the problem. As James Crenshaw writes, 
...it is no longer possible to describe wisdom as eudaemonistic... In truth, wisdom does ask 
what is good for man, and envisions the good as health, honour, wealth, and length of 
days. But this pragmatism which sought to secure the good life must be understood in 




According to this argument, as we have seen in the chapter about the history of research, 
wisdom literature teaches that the creation is ordered in a way that good deeds automatically 
lead to beneficial effects to the doer. By acting ethically, people recognise (and, as Crenshaw 
adds, safe-guard) this order. So, beneath its happiness-centred message Proverbs has a deeper 
concern, that is, the order of creation. Proverbs’ apparent selfishness simply mirrors this 
creation-order.357 
However, this ‘world-order’/‘creation theology’ explanation of Proverbs’ ‘apparent’ 
eudaemonism requires more careful nuancing, mainly for three reasons. First, the existence of 
a systematic creation theology and a teaching about world-order as the background of wisdom 
literature is far from obvious in the light of recent scholarship, as I have argued in my 
discussion of the history of research. Second, I do not think that the force of the problem of 
Proverbs’ ‘selfishness’ is recognised in its fullness in contemporary scholarship. For, once one 
considers that the book not only recognises that right behaviour is beneficial for the actor but 
it actually motivates right behaviour through the appeal to the reader’s self-interest, a brief 
reference to the order of creation should not satisfy the Christian interpreter—even if one 
accepts the creation theology interpretation of wisdom literature. The third reason for 
reconsidering the problem of selfishness is that, interestingly enough, though the word 
‘eudaemonism’ is often used, biblical commentators have paid little attention to the so-called 
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eudaemonistic moral tradition which is customarily connected to Aristotle, but which also has 
influential Christian versions, most notably, Thomas Aquinas’ moral teaching with its 
contemporary appropriations. 
A notable exception is Michael V. Fox, who, in his major commentary on Proverbs, devotes an 
essay to comparing the ethics of Proverbs with Socratic ethics. 358 Many of his claims about the 
similarities between the two ethics are in line with much of the following discussion. However, 
he only notes the similarities between the worldviews of Proverbs and the Socratic tradition 
without trying to provide a more detailed theological interpretation of Proverbs, which will be 
my concern in the following. Also, he does not address the specific questions of eudaemonism 
and self-interest directly. 
Another exception might be the much earlier work of Harry Ranston who probably comes 
closest to my approach from the biblical scholars of whom I am aware.359 He states that 
eudaemonism is not necessarily a bad thing and, in fact, ‘even Christianity may be termed 
eudaemonistic.’360 However, he develops this point in only a few pages without going into 
much detail, barely discussing the structure of eudaemonistic thinking or mentioning 
important eudaemonistic philosophers and theologians like Aristotle or Aquinas. 
So, maybe a closer look at Proverbs in the light of Thomistic moral theology would shed some 
light on Proverbs’ ‘selfishness’ or at least would provide a theological framework in which 
Proverbs’ ‘selfishness’ becomes more easily explicable. In the following I will provide a short 
summary of Thomistic moral theology first, then give a more detailed exegetical investigation 
of self-interest (and related topics) in Proverbs, with a special emphasis on the similarities and 
dissimilarities to the Thomistic system. 
Thomistic moral theology 
First of all, an important clarification is in order. The main aim of the dissertation is not the 
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas but to use his system heuristically for the interpretation of 
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Proverbs. This means that I cannot enter the (many) debate(s) about Thomas’s thought here. 
The following interpretation of virtues, self-interest, hierarchy of human ends, and natural law 
in Thomas draws upon one strand of Thomas-studies: it is mainly influenced by the 
interpretation offered by Jean Porter. Besides that of Jean Porter I have found the works of 
Romanus Cessario and especially the writings of Fergus Kerr and Russell Hittinger most helpful 
for a theological interpretation of Thomas’s thoughts (including natural law).361 Even if the 
experts whom I am following misunderstood Aquinas, one can say that this ‘misunderstood 
theory’ is used here to help to sharpen a theological understanding of Proverbs—so the 
potential misrepresentation of Aquinas is not that problematic as long as the 
misrepresentation provides a coherent, sophisticated theory in its own right that can be 
contrasted with Proverbs. 
It should also be noted that the comparison between Thomas and Proverbs will be very 
limited. Thomas’s moral theology, his whole theological‒philosophical system, and his way of 
handling Scripture will be discussed only to the extent that they serve a comparison in the 
specific question of ‘selfishness.’ Nevertheless, a very brief overview of Thomas’s Summa 
Theologiae might help us to see Thomas’s thoughts in their broader context. The Summa 
Theologiae has three major parts. The first (Prima pars) deals with God, the second (Secunda 
pars) with ethics, that is, with ‘the journey to God of reasoning creatures.’362 This second part, 
in its two sub-sections (Prima Secundae and Secunda Secundae), clarifies notions like 
‘happiness,’ ‘habit,’ ‘virtue,’ etc. and discusses the individual virtues. The third part (Tertia 
pars) discusses ‘Christ, who, as man, is our road to God.’363 So, a simplified structure of the 
Summa would look like this: 
I. God 
II. Ethics (the journey to God) 
III. Christ (the way to God) 
From this brief structural analysis it should be clear that Thomas’s ethics, which is often 
discussed in isolation, is embedded in, and, for Thomas, probably undividable from his 
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theology. The topics of imago Dei and imitatio Christi surround and explain his thoughts on 
ethics.364 As most issues directly relevant for our interests are in the Secunda pars, it is 
especially important to bear in mind their theological centrality as we are discussing them. To 
these issues we now turn. 
Human ends 
According to Thomas Aquinas, the principles of moral life are similar to the axioms of 
theoretical thinking: it is not appropriate to seek logical proof for these axioms as they are to 
be grasped by the rational human being through observation and insight (ST I‒II, 91, 3; ST II‒II, 
47, 6). 
These principles follow from the human goods, the main ends for which human beings strive. 
The most basic such principle is that every being wants to preserve its life, self-preservation 
being the most basic end (ST I‒II, 94, 2). This is not something to be condemned, this is simply 
how God intended human (and other) beings to function. This principle is subordinated to the 
higher ends like living in community and knowing God (ST I‒II, 90, 2; ST II‒II, 26, 4). When 
these ends seem to be in conflict in a particular situation then the higher end is to be chosen. 
However, this subordination does not mean in Thomas’s thinking that the higher end makes 
the lower (and often more immediate) end wrong (ST II‒II, 47, 11).365 The higher ends 
influence the way in which someone strives for the lower ends but do not demolish them (see 
for example how the love of God relates to the love of self in ST I‒II, 109, 3). The higher ends 
are achieved through striving for the lower ones and striving for the higher ones is the well-
spring for the striving for the lower ones. So, self-interest—as long as we understand ‘self-
preservation’ as ‘self-interest’—plays a crucial and positive role in Thomas’s moral theology.366 
Virtues 
However, how is one able to comprehend the right hierarchy of ends, that is, the right order 
between the lower and the higher human ends which really provides happiness? Furthermore, 
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how is one able to recognise in every given situation what act would bring him or her closer to 
those ends? Finally, what enables one to perform those acts? Thomas’s answer is: the virtues. 
Virtue, in Thomas’s thinking, is a quality that makes its possessor good and renders his or her 
acts good (ST II‒II, 47, 4). It is a ‘perfect power’ which directs the human being’s ‘particular 
choices in such a way that she acts in accordance with her own good and the wider goods that 
she seeks (ST I‒II, 56, 5; ST I‒II, 60, 3).’367 ‘The virtues are precisely those qualities the 
possession of which will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of which will 
frustrate his movement toward that telos.’368 According to Thomas’s terminology these virtues 
are ‘habits,’ but they are not 
...unthinking habits of action of the sort that could be produced by mindlessly drilling 
children in certain patterns of behaviour. To say they are concerned with “choice” 
(prohairesis) means they involve not a tendency to some noncognitive urge or brute 
impulse but rather a stable disposition to act in the relevant way when appropriate 
because one thinks and feels in the right way about the situation.
369
 
Thomas groups the virtues into three main categories. The first two categories are the 
intellectual virtues (wisdom, science, understanding, ST I‒II, 57, 2) and the moral virtues (the 
four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, courage, temperance, ST I‒II, 61, 3). The third 
category, the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, ST I‒II, 62, 3), comprise a special group, 
they are entirely ‘infused’ by God, that is, they are unavailable for the natural person on his or 
her own. They are necessary for reaching the highest end, which is contemplation of God and 
partaking in the divine nature (ST I‒II, 62, 1). This is perfect happiness. However, an incomplete 
happiness is theoretically attainable by everyone through the rest of the virtues which, to a 
certain extent, can be acquired without supernatural infusion (ST I‒II, 4, 5‒7; ST I‒II, 5, 5‒7; ST 
I‒II, 62, 1; ST I‒II, 65, 3). 
The virtues comprise the most important part of a complex system of virtues, gifts of the Holy 
Spirit, beatitudes, sins, fruits. In this system every virtue can be perfected by a particular divine 
gift, corresponds to a beatitude, opposed by some sins, and expressed in fruits. The following 
table shows the theological and cardinal virtues and the corresponding non-virtue elements of 
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the system. As charity and prudence will be discussed shortly, the gifts, sins, etc. 
corresponding to these two virtues are underlined:370 
TABLE 2: THE THOMISTIC SYSTEM OF VIRTUES; GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT; BEATITUDES; SINS; FRUITS 
The seven main non-
intellectual virtues 
prudence, justice, courage, temperance, faith, hope, charity 
The seven gifts of 
the Holy Spirit 
counsel, courage, piety, fear, understanding, science, wisdom  
The seven 
beatitudes 
merciful, hungry and thirsty after justice, meek, poor in spirit, 
mourner, pure in heart, peacemakers 
The seven capital 
sins 
lust, pride, envy, avarice,371wrath, sloth, gluttony  
Twelve fruits of the 
Holy Spirit 
goodness, benevolence, faith, charity, patience, long-suffering, 
meekness, moderation, continence, chastity, joy, peace 
Self-interest is accepted 
I have already noted that self-preservation is the most basic human end in Thomas’s system of 
ends and it is perfectly natural and good for a human being to strive for that end. However, 
Thomas goes even further than emphasising the natural (and rightful) inclination for self-
preservation. To see this positive presentation of self-interest more clearly it will be useful to 
take a closer look at two of the above listed virtues. 
Let us begin with charity, the most important theological virtue in Thomas’s system. As the 
primary object of charity is God, one could expect it to divert a person’s attention away from 
him or herself completely. The picture is, however, more complex than this. Thomas not only 
refers to self-love in a positive light (ST II‒II, 123, 12; ST II‒II, 126, 1), but claims that even one 
who loves with (divine) charity, loves him or herself the foremost except God. This is so not 
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because the self is necessarily more precious than one’s neighbour, but because the one who 
loves from charity loves God in everything and God is more directly present in the self than in 
the neighbour (ST II‒II, 26, 4). 
Charity is also relevant for our investigations because in Thomas’s system it is connected to 
wisdom. However, we have to recognise that it is not the (intellectual) virtue of wisdom that it 
is connected to, but the gift of Wisdom. The two are related but not to be confused. The 
(intellectual) virtue of wisdom makes the person know the deepest causes of the phenomena 
of the world and so helps in ordering them (ST I‒II, 37, 2). The gift of Wisdom, however, makes 
one know the highest and deepest cause without qualification, that is, God (ST II‒II, 45, 1), and 
this gift enables one to love God properly in everything. 
However, there is another virtue which is even more promising than charity if one tries to find 
parallels to the practical admonitions of Proverbs in Thomas’s thinking. It is the virtue of 
prudence. If charity is one of the least self-oriented virtues, prudence is one of the most self-
oriented. It is basically the virtue of putting the (Thomist) moral theory into proper action here 
and now, in the actual, messy reality of the world. Prudence, in Thomas’s thinking, is nothing 
else than practical wisdom in human affairs (ST II‒II, 47, 2).372 As we have seen, he defines 
wisdom as an intellectual virtue which helps to perceive the deepest causes of worldly 
phenomena and helps to order those phenomena appropriately (ST I‒II, 37, 2). Similarly, 
prudence puts the different interests and contradicting desires of the manifold everyday life 
into proper order and enables one to achieve the human end, that is, happiness. This 
happiness is when ill is banished and desires are fulfilled (ST I‒II, 5, 3). As I have noted above, 
this happiness has an incomplete form (relative security, living harmoniously in a community) 
and a complete form (security, community, and partaking in God). For reaching either of them 
one has to have the appropriate desires and has to use the appropriate means to fulfil them. 
This is where prudence helps.  
Not every kind of self-interest is accepted 
So, as a summary, we can say that self-interest and self-love recur often in Thomas’s moral 
theory and play a crucial role in it: self-preservation is accepted as a legitimate human end; the 
one who loves God with charity also loves the self in a particular way because there is where 
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God is the closest; and one of prudence’s main roles is that it helps the prudent person to 
achieve happiness. 
At the same time, the natural inclination for self-preservation and the priority of self-love does 
not mean selfishness in this system.373 I can see three main factors in Thomas’s thinking, the 
first of which has already been mentioned, which differentiate proper self-interest from 
selfishness: 
 The higher human ends should govern the lower ones. The highest good for a human is 
to live and know God in a God-fearing community, so proper self-love means love of 
the community, and proper love of a community also involves and supports a proper 
love of the self.374 Precisely this hierarchy of ends is what differentiates Thomas’s 
moral theology from most utilitarian systems. As Insole writes, ‘Aquinas stands ready 
to invoke the criterion of “great usefulness or necessity” (ST I‒II, 97, 3) when 
considering the rightness of actions, precisely because there is always a higher end to 
which human things are to be measured and used.’375 
 The virtue of justice is the cardinal virtue which is completely other-oriented, but this 
virtue is in accordance with prudence, which is self-oriented, precisely because the 
communal goods and individual goods are in harmony (ST I‒II, 60, 3).376 So, justice 
complements prudence. It is not possible to have one of these virtues and lack the 
other (ST I‒II, 65, 1). 
 The spiritual self is to be loved the foremost, not so much the physical self.377 E.g. the 
neighbour is more to be loved than our own body (ST II‒II, 26, 5),378 but our soul is 
more to be loved than the neighbour.379 
In other words, Thomas does not only accept self-interest as a crucial part of his system, but 
very carefully describes what that self-interest should look like. According to this, the main 
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question is not ‘how much’ a person is self-interested but ‘how’ he or she is self-interested.380 
Though Thomas does not say this explicitly, I would suggest that a correct paraphrase of 
Thomas’s teaching is that prudence is the ability to love oneself properly.381 Prudence is the 
right sort of (practical) self-love, that is, the self-love which is beneficial for the individual, the 
human community, and the community between God and humans (in the latter case speaking 
about prudence accompanied and perfected with the theological virtues—ST I‒II, 65, 2). 
Is this the self-love and self-interest we can see in Proverbs? Do we find the same checks on 
self-interest there as in Thomas’s moral theology? In the following pages I am going to 
investigate Proverbs’ ‘selfishness’ with regular attempts to relate my exegetical investigations 
to these questions. 
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Is Proverbs about individualistic selfishness? 
Is the assertion that Proverbs’ apparent ‘selfishness’ is different from the rest of the Bible true 
at all? If it is true, then what is the nature of its ‘special’ selfishness? Does it speak more about 
human needs and less about Yahweh than other parts of the Bible—thereby neglecting the 
‘highest human end,’ which is an important ‘Thomistic check’ on self-interest? Is it more 
individualistic than other biblical books—thereby failing to be in harmony with love for the 
community, which is another important ‘Thomistic check’? 
A comparison with the whole Bible would be too big a task for the present. However, a 
comparison with Deuteronomy, which focuses on the issues related to self-interest, will serve 
our purposes well. Though Deuteronomy is not entirely dissimilar to Proverbs,382 it is different 
in its way of presentation (i.e. written in a story- and homiletic-form), and it possesses all of 
those characteristics which are often listed as non-sapiential but characteristic for the most 
books of the Bible: it emphasises the role of Yahweh in history, the importance of the Law, the 
nation of Israel, and its covenant relationship with Yahweh. So, if Proverbs has a special 
selfishness then we would expect to find something else in Deuteronomy, which represents 
the ‘normal’ mode of biblical utterance. 383 This contrast might help us to clarify the nature of 
Proverbs’ self-interest. 
Self-interest in Proverbs and Deuteronomy 
Is Proverbs more self-interested than Deuteronomy? 
Cyril S. Rodd contrasts the ethics of Proverbs with the ethics of the Old Testament Law. 
Whereas the latter comprises commandments, the former, says Rodd, is ‘humanistic.’ 
This is confirmed by the kinds of motives for obeying this teaching… Unlike the motive 
clauses in the law, these are similar to those in non-biblical wisdom writing. McKane 
comments that their function in the Instruction of Ptah-hotep and the Instruction of Meri-
ka-re is to recommend the advice by showing that it is reasonable and effective… This 
might equally be said of Proverbs. Even where Yahweh is mentioned in the motive clauses, 
instead of referring back to his salvation in the past, the sages declare that he watches the 
actions of men and women (e.g., Prov. 5.21; 24.17‒18). He protects those who ‘walk in 
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integrity’ and ‘keep sound wisdom’ (e.g., Prov. 2.7‒8; 3.21, 26). He pleads the cause of the 
poor and ‘despoils of life’ those who despoil them (Prov. 22.23). Wisdom declares that 
those who find her obtain favour from Yahweh (Prov. 8.35). The upright are admitted into 
the divine council (Prov. 3.32). For the most part, however, the motive clauses speak of 
the happy consequences which follow doing right… 
The motive clauses may be analysed under six heads: 
(1) to follow the teaching of wisdom or the sages will give pleasure (e.g., Prov. 2.10; 
3.13‒18; 8.33‒34); 
(2) various happy consequences will follow, such as a long and happy life (e.g., Prov. 3.2, 
18; 4.10, 13, 22, 23; 8.35), or great prosperity (Prov. 3.10; 8.18‒21); 
(3) wisdom will protect those who seek her (Prov. 2.11‒12; 3.23; 4.6); 
(4) disaster will come to those who do not follow the teacher’s advice (Prov. 5.9‒11; 6.11, 
26, 32‒35; 23.3, 5, 8, 9, 21, 27‒35), and ‘death’ will be the fate of the wicked (Prov. 1.32; 
2.18‒19; 5.4‒6, 22‒23; 7.26‒27; 8.36; 9.18); 
(5) sometimes this reward or punishment is ascribed to God’s intervention (e.g., Prov. 
2.6‒8; 3.12, 26; 5.21; 23.11; 24.12); and 
(6) more often the retribution is the natural consequence of some actions and follows 
automatically without any direct action by God (e.g., Prov. 1.26‒27; 2.21‒22; 6.15, 27‒29; 
22.25; 23.21; 24.16, 20).
384
 
However, if we make a similar analysis of the motive clauses in Deuteronomy,385 we find that 
the difference between the motivational system of Proverbs and that of the Law is not that 
significant as it might first appear. In the following table I give the analyses in the left column. 
In the right column I provide a few explanatory comments relating to the concrete points of 
the analysis. The underlined comments show where I think Proverbs lacks a parallel to 
Deuteronomy. 
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TABLE 3: THE MOTIVE CLAUSES OF DEUTERONOMY 
Categories of motive clauses Comments 
You shall follow the teaching of 
this book because then... 
(2) Happy consequences will 
follow (long and happy life, 
prosperity): 4:1, 40; 5:16, 29, 
33; 6:2, 3, 18, 24; 7:12‒15; 8:1; 
10:13; 11:8‒9, 13‒17, 22‒25; 
12:25, 28; 13:17‒18; 14:29; 
15:4‒5, 10, 18; 16:15, 19‒20; 
19:13; 22:7; 23:19‒20; 24:19; 
25:15; 28:1‒14; 29:8; 30:5‒6, 9, 
15‒16, 19‒20; 32:47. 
(4) Disaster and death will come 
to those who do not follow 
Deuteronomy’s teaching: 4:24ff; 
5:9, 11; 6:15; 7:4, 10, 26; 
8:19‒20; 27:14‒26; 28:15‒68; 
29:20; 30:17‒18. 
((5) Usually the reward and 
retribution is ascribed to God’s 
intervention: for example 
4:24ff; 5:9‒10, 11; 6:15; 7:4, 




Most of Deuteronomy’s motive clauses can be ordered 
under Rodd’s headings. Though there are a few ‘happy 
consequences’ that do not feature in Proverbs (like 
occupying the country (4:1; 16:20; 19:9) or a special 
emphasis on long life in the land (4:40; 25:15; 30:20; 
32:47; etc.)), Deuteronomy, just like Proverbs, speaks 
mainly about long life and material prosperity and 
security. 
There are only two of Rodd’s headings that are missing 
here. The giving of pleasure (number 1) and protection 
(number 3). As for the former, I am not convinced that it 
is a fortunate category in itself. The Hebrew word םענ, 
from which Rodd seems to mainly derive the special 
category of ‘pleasure,’ might indeed be etymologically 
connected to physical pleasure, but it has a very broad 
meaning and diverse connotation,386 especially in the 
wisdom literature, where it simply means ‘lovely, good.’ 
It might have been used partly because it does have the 
connotation of the taste of a good, sweet food, but this 
hint at physical pleasantness only expresses that, for 
example, the right words are as sweet and pleasant as 
honey (Prov. 16:24) but this hardly motivates by 
promising physical pleasure directly. So, for example, the 
‘so that it might go well’ phrase in Deuteronomy (5:29; 
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(6) Sometimes the text does not 
mention God, so the 
reward/retribution seems to 
follow automatically: for 
example 4:1, 40; 5:15, 29‒33; 
6:2, 3; 8:1; 10:13; 19:13; 22:7; 
29:8.) 
 
6:18; 12:25, 28; 22:7), however general it is, would not 
provide a bad parallel to the םענ motivational clauses in 
Proverbs. 
As for number 3 in Rodd’s list, the explicit mention of 
(physical) protection is indeed lacking in the motivational 
clauses of Deuteronomy, though it must not be alien to 
Deuteronomy’s thinking as it is logically included in the 
promise of long life and prosperity which, as we have 
seen, features quite often in the book. 
Beneath this line are listed all the motivational clauses in Deuteronomy which do not have a 
direct parallel among the motivational sentences of Proverbs as listed in Rodd. 
You shall follow the teaching of 
this book because... 
 
Doing what is opposite to it is 
hateful/abhorrent to the Lord: 
12:31; 16:22; 17:1; 18:9‒12; 
20:16‒18; 21:22‒23; 22:5; 
23:18; 24:4; doing what is in 
accordance with it is right in the 





Rodd has not listed all of the motivational sentences of 
Proverbs in his analyses. A prime example is the ‘do not 
do this because that is abhorrent to the Lord’ type which 
features in Proverbs as it does in Deuteronomy: Prov. 
3:32 (see also 6:16; 12:22; 15:8; 20:10, which are not 
motivational formally but are clearly so semantically).387 
 
The judgement is God’s: 1:17. Though formally not in a motivational clause in Proverbs, 
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 the idea does occur in it (for example 16:33; 29:26). 
Then you will learn to fear the 
Lord: 6:2; 14:23; 17:19. 
 
Again, the idea is significant in Proverbs, too. These 
sentences might not be formally motivational, but there 
is no doubt that they are semantically (especially Prov. 
2:5; but also 1:7; 9:10; 15:33; etc. For the connection 
between long life and fear of the Lord which we can see 
in Deut. 6:2 see Prov. 10:27; 14:27; 19:23). 
Then the king’s descendants 
might reign for a long time in 
Israel: 17:20. 
 
Though not an exact parallel, especially because Israel is 
not specifically mentioned, Proverbs mirrors the same 
idea when it speaks about how the throne is established 
if one rules according to the principles of righteousness 
and wisdom (for example Prov. 8:15‒16; 16:12). 
Then the Lord will be with you 
(so don’t be afraid); you can 
trust him as he was with you in 
the past: 1:30‒31; 2:7; 3:22; 
7:9; 8:1‒5; 31:3‒8. 
 
Validating the Lord’s trustworthiness by referring to 
salvific events in the past are indeed missing from 
Proverbs. However, the importance of trust in God with 
its behaviour-modifying effects are a major topic in 
Proverbs, too (3:5; 16:20; 22:19; 23:17‒18; 28:25‒26; 
29:25). 
Caring for other people will be 
regarded as a righteous act in 
the sight of the Lord: 24:13. 
 
Although there is no direct parallel in Proverbs, the idea 
of caring for others, righteousness, and that the Lord 
pays attention to these issues is certainly present (cf. 
Prov. 2:9; 12:10; 16:2; 21:3). 
 
Caring for the safety and 
honour of the oppressed, 
innocent, weak and poor, and 
providing everyone with what 
he or she deserves is ethical: 
Caring for the weak, poor, oppressed is a major topic in 
Proverbs, too. Usually this behaviour is motivated by 
promising rewards for the carer (as in Deuteronomy); 
even if close, verbal parallels are missing, the topic can be 
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5:14; 15:11; 20:5‒8; 20:19; 
21:14, 17; 23:15‒16; 24:6; 25:3. 
 
found in Proverbs (Prov. 29:7; 30:14; 31:5, 8‒9). 
Otherwise you might incur guilt 
(אטח): 15:9; 23:21‒22; 24:15. 
 
Again, though not in a formally motivational clause, it is 
also stated by Proverbs that socially irresponsible 
behavior makes one a sinner (Prov. 14:21). 
The temptation is only a test 
from the Lord: 13:2‒3. 
 
As far as I am aware, Proverbs does not attribute a 
temptation as coming explicitly and unambiguously from 
the Lord. However, the idea that God has power over 
temptations and he can use bad, tempting events for 
character formation is not alien to Proverbs (see Prov. 
17:3; maybe 16:4 can be read this way, too).388 
Not following the book’s 
teaching would defile the land: 
21:23; 24:4. 
 
The ‘defilement of the land’ as a motivation for right 
behaviour is lacking in Proverbs. 
The Lord will (or will not) give 
success in occupying a land: 2:5, 
9, 19, 31. 
 
The ‘occupation of the land’ as a motivation for right 
behaviour is lacking in Proverbs. 
You can remember (that you 
were a slave yourself, that the 
Lord spoke to you and was with 
you): 4:31‒38; 5:15; 7:18‒19; 
10:19; 11:1; 15:15; 16:1, 3, 12; 
Historical memory as a motivation for right behaviour is 
lacking in Proverbs. 
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17:16; 23:3‒6; 24:8‒9, 17‒18, 
21‒22. 
 
You must be holy so that he 
might not turn from you for you 
are the Lord’s: 7:6; 14:1‒2, 21; 
23:14; 27:9‒10. 
The holiness of the nation Israel as a motivation for right 
behaviour is lacking in Proverbs. 
On the one hand, we find exactly that difference between Deuteronomy and Proverbs that we 
expect to find there, as it is shown by the last few items in the above table. That is, national 
history, covenant with Yahweh, the holiness of the nation, and the holiness of the national 
land, which play an important role in the motivational system of Deuteronomy, are absent in 
Proverbs. At the same time, self-interest does not play a less significant role in the 
motivational system of Deuteronomy than in Proverbs. 
Deuteronomy has fewer motive clauses than Proverbs (see footnote 349) and as a result its 
reader might find the presence of self-interest less overwhelming than in Proverbs. However, 
when motive clauses occur, self-interest does not play a less significant role than in 
Proverbs.389 Deuteronomy is full of sentences like ‘So that you, your children and your 
children’s children may fear the Lord your God all the days of your life and keep all his 
ordinances and commandments that I am commanding you so that your days may be long’ 
(6:2b), or ‘However, there will be no poor people among you because the Lord will surely bless 
you in the land that the Lord, your God, is giving to you as a possession to occupy, but only if 
you listen obediently to the voice of the Lord your God’ (15:4‒5), or ‘Keep the words of this 
covenant and do them so that you may prosper in all your deeds’ (29:8). 
Similarly, the various curses and blessings in chapters 27‒33 are all about material issues and 
appeal to self-interest. They speak about long life, military success, prosperity, fertility, etc. 
Though most of these sentences might not contain formal motivational clauses, their 
rhetorical function is presumably to have a strong motivational effect on the reader. 
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 A similar understanding of Deuteronomy’s motive clauses is presented by Blenkinsopp 1995:45. 
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Although Rodd is right when he says that it is a peculiarity of Proverbs that it does not refer to 
Yahweh’s salvation in the past, Deuteronomy refers to that salvation only in a minority of the 
motive clauses and even when it does, it usually refers to the effectiveness of the right 
behaviour in the same sentence, too. The vast majority of the motive clauses in Deuteronomy 
are about effectiveness and long life. So, when Rodd writes that ‘McKane comments that their 
function in the Instruction of Ptah-hotep and the Instruction of Meri-ka-re is to recommend 
the advice by showing that it is reasonable and effective… This might equally be said of 
Proverbs’ one could add ‘and, regardless of the differences between Proverbs and 
Deuteronomy, this might equally be said of Deuteronomy, too.’390 
Is Proverbs less Yahwistic than Deuteronomy? 
However, even if the role of self-interest is just as central in Deuteronomy as in Proverbs, is 
not Rodd still right in claiming that there is something special in the nature of Proverbs’ self-
interest? After all, it is true that Proverbs does not refer to Yahweh in most of its motive 
clauses. 
I have to admit, I cheated a little in the above table when I listed motive clauses from 
Deuteronomy which do not mention Yahweh. In fact, in most of the cases it is clear from the 
context that they do not speak of an independent world-order but a world which is constantly 
ordered by Yahweh. Even if those verses only state, ‘do this, and then you will prosper’ (like 
29:8), the context almost always emphasises Yahweh’s role in that prosperity (like 29:16‒28). 
However, this difference between Proverbs and Deuteronomy (and many of the non-sapiential 
works of the Bible) is probably only apparent and comes from the different nature of the two 
genres: namely, that there is a narrative context in Deuteronomy which is lacking in Proverbs. 
If the reader disregards the narrative context then he or she can find sentences in 
Deuteronomy which do not seem less ‘humanistic’ than many of the context-less sentences in 
Proverbs. However, there is no compelling reason for disregarding the narrative context of 
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 In one of his articles Gammie recognised the importance of anthropocentric self-interest in 
Deuteronomy’s teaching about retribution, but he claimed that Deuteronomy, in its final form, ‘move[d] 
on to theocentricity’ (Gammie 1970:9). Even if one grants Gammie’s reconstruction of religion-history, 
self-interest appears in his ‘later, more developed, theocentric’ sections, too (like 8:1‒9:6; 10:12f). So, 
regardless of the truth in Gammie’s argument, it does not invalidate my claims about the crucial role of 
self-interest in Deuteronomy’s motivation system. 
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Deuteronomy when one is reading the book.391 Similarly, if one takes Prov. 1‒9 as the context 
of its sentence-literature, then it is no less Yahwistic than Deuteronomy. 
Is Proverbs ‘individualistic’? 
If it is not the non-Yahwistic nature of Proverbs’ motivation which makes it special, then can it 
be its focus on the individual? After all, compared to Deuteronomy, it does have an 
individualistic flavour, as it does not mention the nation and the holy land. Does not this 
‘individualism’ make Proverbs’ self-interest distinctively selfish? 
However, the different focuses of the two books are just that: different focuses. For, while 
there is a real difference here between the two works, it does not necessarily reflect two 
fundamentally different worldviews, anthropology, or religious thinking. 
The narrative context in Deuteronomy makes an emphasis on the communal, national side of 
life almost inevitable. Moses addresses the nation just before occupying the national land and 
urges them to obey the law in order that the nation can live long and prosper in the land. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that it is the individual who has to keep the law. It is an individual 
who finds the ox of a neighbour and not the nation (22:1), an individual who must have right, 
honest weights (25:15), an individual man and not a nation who engages a woman (28:30), and 
it is not only the nation but the individual, too, who will gain a long life through responsible 
behaviour in such situations and will enjoy the fruits of his or her deeds (22:7). So, though 
Deuteronomy looks at the issues from a national perspective, it also counts on the 
responsibilities, aims, and rewards of the individual. 
Similarly, though Proverbs is written from the perspective of individuals, it is hardly 
‘individualistic’ in the sense of being blind to corporate issues. Indeed, wisdom as such already 
presupposes a community, as many of its functions relate to relationships with others and 
                                                          
391
 Of course, when someone wants to decipher the composition-history of the book it is legitimate to 
suppose and argue that the narrative context is a later layer. (There are numerous reconstructions for 
the composition-history. More recent ones include theories like Crüsemann 1996:201‒215; 265‒275 
and Rofé 2002:4‒9.) However, if one wishes to understand the book as a whole then paying attention to 
all of its parts and their interactions is advisable and possible (see, for example, Christensen 
2001:LXVIII‒LXX; McConville 2002:38‒40). Deuteronomy is an excellent example of the literary and 
theological importance of the narrative framework in a book. Note, for example, the dominant role of 
Moses in Deuteronomy, even though his name never appears in Deut. 6‒26. (I am grateful to Prof. 
Walter Moberly for drawing my attention to this feature of Deuteronomy.) 
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promote the well-being of the community.392 As Solomon asked for wisdom in order to be able 
to govern Yahweh’s chosen nation (1 Kings 3:9) so we read in Proverbs that kings and rulers 
rule through wisdom (8:15‒16) and kings uphold the justice and well-being of the whole 
community (16:10; 20:8, 26; 29:4). What is more, it is a major role of righteousness and 
wisdom to enable not only kings but also commoners to build their community.393 
What might be somewhat misleading is that besides the numerous references to the benefits 
of wisdom for the whole community, Proverbs contains many verses that do not refer 
explicitly to society. However, even in these individual-focused verses, the vocabulary does not 
let the reader forget about the corporate side of wisdom. Take, for example, one of the key 
categories of Proverbs, the ‘righteous’ person.394 I suggest that the implied reader of the text is 
supposed to remember every time he395 reads about the ‘righteous’ that righteousness is 
intrinsically connected to the well-being of the whole society. He is supposed to remember this 
simply because it is mentioned so often in other verses. The wise and the righteous provide 
knowledge, healing, and life to others (Prov. 10:21; 12:18; 15:2, 7), they care for the needs of 
others (12:10; 14:21), they provide wise guidance for the whole nation (11:4), and promote 
impartiality in judgment. For this community-building behaviour they are praised by the whole 
nation (24:23‒24; 28:21). It is no wonder that the whole city rejoices when it goes well for the 
righteous (11:10). 
If we search all of those verses of the whole Bible that contain either קדצ, הקדצ or קידצ, we find 
that the three most common words mentioned together with righteous people and 
righteousness are הוהי, רשע , and טפשמ. These terms define the place and function of the קידצ in 
society. רשע  is the opposite of a קידצ (some proverbial examples are Prov. 10:2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 16, 
20, 24, 25, 28, 30; 11:5, 8, 10, 18, 23, 31; 12:3, 7, 10, 12, etc.); הוהי loves the קידצ and protects 
him (Prov. 3:33; 10:3; 15:9, 29; 18:10); and משטפ , (right) judgement, seems to be one of the 
main activities of a קידצ (1:3; 2:9; 8:20; 12:5; 16:8; 21:3, 5). טפשמ incorporates caring for the 
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 The ‘community’ implied by the Solomonic title of the received form of the book is the whole of 
Israel, but, of course, the actual reader (as differentiated from the implied reader) might also think of 
the particular community he or she is part of, be it the Persian province of Yehud or the Christian 
community. 
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 In most ancient near eastern societies the king represented the god(s) by mediating his/their justice 
and righteousness. About the democratisation of this idea in Israel see Levenson 1988:114‒117. 
394
 In a linguistic study of appellations in Proverbs, Heim argued persuasively that םכח and קידצ are 
usually co-referential (Heim 2001:77‒103). 
395
 The usual ‘my son’ address and other features of the text suggest that the implied reader is male. 
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well-being of the poor, the neighbour, and anyone who has a just cause against someone else. 
This close connection between טפשמ and righteousness shows, again, the corporate function of 
a קידצ. So, the frequent use of terms like קידצ and טפשמ keeps the social significance of wisdom 
constantly in the reader’s attention, even where the corporate aspects of wisdom are not 
explicitly mentioned. 
William P. Brown reached a similar conclusion. He writes, ‘To welcome wisdom necessarily 
involves becoming a responsible and productive citizen of a community whose character is 
formed by justice and equity by those who have gone before, laying a foundation for those to 
come.’396 
Consequently, Deuteronomy and Proverbs should be probably understood as speaking about 
the two sides of the same coin. The two books simply construct different implied readers: one 
is a nation at the border of the land to be occupied, the other is an individual member of that 
nation who already lives in the land. But the difference in implied readers, and therefore the 
emphases of the two books, does not necessarily mean that one is ‘individualistic’ and the 
other is ‘communal.’ Proverbs’ emphasis is on the self-interest of the individual, but it also 
makes clear that it is also the interest of the whole community—and we can see the reverse 
picture in Deuteronomy. 
Summary 
We have seen that if Proverbs’ ‘selfishness’ seems ‘special’ compared to Deuteronomy’s then 
it is: 
 because there are a few (but only a few), typically Israelite religious motivational 
sentences in Deuteronomy; 
 because most proverbial sayings lack a Yahwist context (but the literary framework of 
Proverbs can provide such a context); 
 because the emphasis is on the individual (though this does not make Proverbs 
‘individualistic.’) 
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We can draw three main conclusions from these observations. First, compared to 
Deuteronomy, the special nature of Proverbs’ ‘selfishness’ is more apparent than real. Second, 
this does not mean that Proverbs’ motivational system is as ‘selfless’ as that of Deuteronomy. 
In fact, quite the opposite: Deuteronomy’s appeal to self-interest seems to be as undeniable as 
that of Proverbs. This means that the problem of self-interest is not a special problem of 
Proverbs, but a more general one, probably relevant for much of the Bible. If Proverbs is more 
suitable for investigating this problem than many other biblical books then it is so because the 
above listed three characteristics make self-interest more palpable for the modern reader in it 
but not because it is more real there. Third, the most significant difference between the two 
books seems to be a difference in perspective. Namely, the implied reader of Proverbs is the 
individual and not the community as in Deuteronomy. However, the individual perspective of 
Proverbs does not rule out, but presupposes, communal aims. 
If these thoughts about the relationship between the individual and communal interests in 
Proverbs are right, then Proverbs’ teaching is not dissimilar to the thinking of Thomas Aquinas 
in these matters. After all, Thomas also emphasised the complementarity of individual and 
communal interests. He also taught that the individual, by acting according to his or her true 
interest, builds up the community, and that the other-oriented justice has to accompany the 
self-interested prudence. 
However, the acknowledgement of self-interest and its combination with other-oriented 
justice and communal interests are only two, though crucial, agreements between Proverbs 
and Thomistic thinking. Thomas goes further than this. He can accept self-interest as a 
motivation because it does not focus solely on material issues and because it is subordinated 
to higher aims. Can we find parallels to these aspects of Thomistic thinking in Proverbs, too? 




Is Proverbs solely about material success? 
As we have seen, Thomas differentiates between the spiritual self and the material self in his 
system. The body is something to be cared for, but it is the soul and not the body that is to be 
loved more than anything else except God. The material body, in fact, is to be loved less than 
other people. Such a differentiation between soul and body mirrors ancient Greek and 
medieval thinking and one looks for its equivalent in the Hebrew Bible in vain.397 However, the 
lack of a clear borderline between body and soul obviously does not have to mean that 
Proverbs is only interested in material success and lacks any interest in spiritual gains. So, what 
kind of gains exactly does Proverbs promise to those who follow its teaching? 
Self-preservation 
It seems that the most important feature of wisdom is that it protects the wise. Scholarly 
discussions often define wisdom as the ‘know-how’ of living,398 as something which is integral 
to living life well,399 or as the knowledge and art of living.400 These definitions are faithful to the 
text in broad terms, yet, they disguise maybe the most significant feature of wisdom in the 
book of Proverbs, namely, that wisdom is a tool to survive. Proverbs sees the world as a 
fundamentally dangerous place. Whybray notes in connection with chapters 10:1‒22:16 and 
25‒29 that it is dominated by the language of disaster. No less than 103 verses (out of 513) are 
about different possibilities of personal disasters.401 And the references to different snares of 
life seem to be no less common in other parts of Proverbs, either. One can be trapped in debt 
slavery (6:1‒5; 22:26) or drunkenness (23:29‒35), one’s unguarded speech (before equal 
peers, kings, or God) can cause big losses (4:24; 6:2, 12), and loose women try to entice the 
student of wisdom (7:1‒27; 23:27‒28; 30:3), etc. 
As the following table about the benefits mentioned together with the םכח word-group 
shows,402 the topic of protection and (long) life forms quantitatively the most significant 
benefit of wisdom: 
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 Wolff 1974a:7‒9. 
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 Weeks 2007:106‒107. 
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 Moberly 1999:16. 
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 Barth 1960:433‒439. 
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 Whybray 1990:23. 
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 In order to make the overview of the table easier I use the following code in it: protection; life; 
speech; honour, shame, appreciation by others; and riches. 
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TABLE 4: THE BENEFITS OF BEING WISE 




1:2 הָמְכָח  
1:5 םָכָח  
1:6 םָכָח understanding 
proverbs, parables 
and riddles 
1:7 הָמְכָח  
1:20 תוֹמְכָח living in safety, 
without fear of 
harm (verse 33) 
2:2 הָמְכָח understanding the 
fear of the Lord, 
finding knowledge 
of God (verse 5) 
2:6 הָמְכָח protection (verses 
7‒8) 
2:10 הָמְכָח protection (verse 
11) 
3:7 םָכָח health (verse 8) 
3:13 הָמְכָח long life, riches, 
honour (דוֹבָכ) 
(verse 16) 
3:19 הָמְכָח establishing the 
world plus(?) life 
(verse 22) and 
security (verses 
23‒26) 
3:35 םָכָח honour (דוֹבָכ) 
4:5 הָמְכָח protection (verse 
6) 
4:7 הָמְכָח honour (דבכ, verse 
8) 
4:11 הָמְכָח protection, 
security (verse 
12), life (verses 10 
and 13) 




6:6 םכח sustenance, food 
(verse 8) 
7:4 הָמְכָח protection from 
the "strange 
woman" (verse 5) 
8:1 הָמְכָח  
8:11 הָמְכָח  
8:12 הָמְכָח riches, honour 
(דוֹבָכ, verse 18) 
8:33 םכח life (verses 35‒36) 
9:1 תוֹמְכָח life, understanding 
(verse 6) 
9:8 םָכָח  
9:9 םָכָח more wisdom 
9:10 הָמְכָח  
9:12 םכח reward 
10:1 םָכָח the father’s joy 
(and mother’s) 
10:8 םָכָח protection (see 
10:8b) 
10:13 הָמְכָח  
10:14 םָכָח help in (keeping 
back) speech 
10:23 הָמְכָח  
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10:31 הָמְכָח  
11:2 הָמְכָח  
11:29 םָכָח the fool will be the 
servant of the 
wise 
11:30 םָכָח life for others (?) 
12:15 םָכָח  
12:18 םָכָח the speech of the 
wise heals 
13:1 םָכָח  
13:10 הָמְכָח  
13:14 םָכָח life, protection 
from death 
13:20 םָכָח more wisdom 
14:1 םָכָח builds house 
(metaphor for 
life?) 
14:3 םָכָח wise speech 
(which protects 
the speaker) 
14:6 הָמְכָח  
14:8 הָמְכָח guard against 
(self)deception 
14:16 םָכָח avoidance of evil 
14:24 םָכָח riches (?) 
14:33 הָמְכָח  
15:2 םָכָח knowledgeable 
speech 
15:7 םָכָח helps in teaching 
15:12 םָכָח  
15:20 םָכָח the father’s joy 
(and mother’s) 
15:31 םָכָח  
15:33 הָמְכָח honour (?) 
16:14 םָכָח appeasing the 
king's deathly 
wrath 
16:16 הָמְכָח  
 
16:21 םָכָח appreciation by 
others 
16:23 םָכָח makes wise the 
mouth 
17:16  ָחהָמְכ   
17:24 הָמְכָח  
17:28 םָכָח  
18:4 הָמְכָח  
18:15 םָכָח seeks knowledge 
19:20 םכח  
20:1 םכח modesty in 
drinking 
20:26 םָכָח helps the king to 
recognise and 
defeat the wicked 
21:11 םָכָח makes one 
teachable 
21:20 םָכָח provides riches 




21:30 הָמְכָח  
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22:17 םָכָח  
23:15 םכח the father’s joy 
23:19 םכח  
23:23 הָמְכָח  
23:24 םָכָח the father’s 
delight 
24:3 הָמְכָח builds house 
(metaphor for 
life?) 
24:5 םָכָח strength 
24:7 וֹמְכָחת   
24:14 הָמְכָח future, hope 
24:23 םָכָח  
25:12 םָכָח precious rebuke 
26:5 םָכָח  
26:12 םָכָח  
26:16 םָכָח  
27:11 םכח the father’s joy 
(and honour) 
28:11 םָכָח  
28:26 הָמְכָח escape 
29:3 הָמְכָח the father’s joy 




29:8 םָכָח turning away 
anger 
29:9 םָכָח  
29:11 םָכָח controls his (or 
others’?) anger 
29:15 הָמְכָח does not bring 
shame on his 
mother 
30:3 הָמְכָח  




31:26 הָמְכָח speech 
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Protection features fifteen times in the immediate context of the םכח word group, but we 
should also add to this fifteen occurrences verses which speak about turning away the anger of 
somebody (since, for example, the anger of the king is a potential source of danger, 29:8). We 
can also add at least some of the verses which simply speak about ‘(long) life’ as one of the 
most important gifts of wisdom without mentioning protection explicitly, since a long life 
presupposes that one has successfully avoided the snares of death (8:33; 9:1). Many of those 
verses which speak about wisdom’s help in speaking well should also be connected with the 
topic of protection, since one of the main sources of danger in Proverbs is unguarded speech 
(10:14; 14:3; etc.). So, it seems that protection is overwhelmingly the most significant effect of 
wisdom. 
The tenet that survival in a dangerous world is a most significant topic in Proverbs is also 
confirmed by the high number of words referring to protecting and guarding people. רצנ 
appears 19 times,403 which makes the book second (but proportionately the first) after Psalms 
in terms of using this word. שרמ  is also often used, after Psalms and Deuteronomy Proverbs 
uses it most often in the whole Old Testament. 
So, though the definition of wisdom being that it helps to live life well is correct, the special 
emphasis of wisdom is on long life and the ability to avoid dangerous situations. This emphasis 
is too little recognised in scholarly discussions,404 maybe because of wisdom’s special 
connection with the wise and fabulously rich Solomon, and maybe also because of the 
sociological context of many modern western interpreters, who are probably more interested 
in prosperity than in survival. As a relatively recent empirical sociological investigation states,  
The transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies... brings a polarization 
between Survival and Self-expression values. The unprecedented wealth that has 
accumulated in advanced societies during the past generation means that an increasing 
share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have 
shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an 
increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life.
405
 
This, however, should not distort the perception of the modern interpreter and we should 
recognise that it is precisely the ‘survival values’ which are mirrored in the book of Proverbs. 
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 Not counting the Qere in 23:26 where the Ketiv has ןצר instead of רצנ. 
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 However, it is recognised occasionally. See, for example, Gerstenberger’s comment about ‘family 
religion’ which he connects with wisdom sayings: ‘in fact, when we speak of family religion, this is 
primarily a theology of the elementary needs of life’ (Gerstenberger 2002:27). 
405
 Inglehart 2011. 
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So, even if one is troubled by the fact that self-interest seems to be the most decisive factor in 
Proverbs’ motivational system, and that this is predominantly expressed in material terms, one 
has to recognise that this self-interest is accentuated in an important way. It does include 
prosperity, but the emphasis is on self-preservation. This in itself might not be enough to 
‘tame’ the self-interested nature of Proverbs, but it at least calls to mind what Aquinas said 
about self-preservation as an undeniable and acceptable basic good of human beings. 
However, Aquinas wrote about a hierarchical system of human ends, in which self-
preservation is only the most basic one. Can we detect other human ends in the book of 
Proverbs, ends which we could call more ‘spiritual’? 
Honour 
Some verses suggest that we can summarise the results of a wise life by grouping the benefits 
of wisdom into three main categories: honour, riches, and long life. These are the three 
rewards offered to Solomon, the paradigmatic wise king in 1 Kings 3:13‒14: ‘and also, what 
you did not ask, I give to you: both riches and honour, so that there will be no equal to you 
among kings in your lifetime. And if you walk in my ways and keep my statutes and commands 
just like David your father did, I will lengthen your days.’ We should probably recognise that 
the triplet of benefits is divided into riches and honour on the one hand and long life on the 
other. The latter is conditional upon a special and constant obedience to God’s ordinances.406 
These three rewards are also listed together in Proverbs 3:16 (‘length of days in her right hand, 
in her left hand riches and honour’) where length of days is again separated from riches and 
honour. They are also mentioned in 22:4: ‘the wage for humility—the fear-of-the Lord sort—is 
riches, honour, and life.’407 
The occasional separation of ‘length of days’ may signal its special importance as we have just 
seen. Nevertheless, even if the main emphasis is on long and secure life, honour and riches 
must be quite significant, too. These two benefits of wisdom are mentioned several times in 
different forms throughout the whole book of Proverbs. Wisdom helps to acquire (or preserve) 
riches (3:16; 8:18; 14:24; 21:20; 28:20; 31:11; etc.). Honour (דובכ) and shame (שיבמ,408 or ןולק) 
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 Though the condition might apply to all three gifts (Briggs 2010:78). 
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 I follow Waltke’s translation here. Waltke 2005:193. 
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 Proverbs always uses the participle form of שוב. 
132 
 
are also often discussed (3:35; 6:33; 9:7; 10:5; 12:16; 13:18; 15:33; 18:3, 12; 20:3; 22:4; 25:2, 
27; 26:1; 29:15; etc.). We can probably also take at least some of those verses which discuss 
the wise son as a source of joy to the father and the mother as references to the topic of 
honour and shame since some verses connect the joy of parents with these benefits (27:11; 
29:15). 
Have we found a non-material, spiritual gain offered by Proverbs by identifying one of its main 
promises as ‘honour’? On the one hand, the answer seems to be ‘no.’ Of course, ‘honour’ is 
clearly non-material in a sense, but it still would not satisfy a Thomist thinker who searches for 
spiritual gains. Honour, i.e. one’s reputation in the society, is still something external to one’s 
‘soul’ (so Thomas in ST II‒II, 103, 1 and ST I‒II, 2, 2); it speaks more about a person’s success 
than about his or her spiritual formation—or so it might seem at first sight. The fact that it is 
sometimes emphatically mentioned in parallel with riches also does not help to recognise it as 
the spiritual benefit offered by Proverbs. For one might have the impression that honour and 
riches rather speak about the ‘career-development’ of someone, to use a modern category, 
and not about one’s spiritual formation. 
On the other hand, one could argue that this is an anachronistic understanding of ‘honour’ 
which does not count on the fact that in ancient thinking, or at least in some important 
versions of ancient thinking, honour was more intrinsically connected to personal qualities 
than in modern thought. Alasdair MacIntyre describes this kind of thinking as follows: 
Excellence and winning, it is scarcely necessary to repeat, are not the same. But it is in fact 
to winning, and only to excellence on the occasions when it does in fact produce victory, 
that a certain kind of reward is attached, a reward by which, ostensibly at least, excellence 
is to be honoured. Rewards of this kind—let us call them external rewards—are such 
goods as those of riches, power, status, and prestige, goods which can be and are objects 
of desire by human beings prior to and independently of any desire for excellence. In 
societies and cultures, such as that represented in the Homeric poems, in which the 
pursuit of these latter goods and that of excellence are to some large degree linked 
together within the dominant social institutions, any incompatibilities between the human 
qualities required for the pursuit of such goods and the qualities required for the pursuit 
of excellence are apt to remain latent and unacknowledged.
409
 
Though MacIntyre writes about the Homeric world, this kind of thinking probably comprises a 
part of what some Old Testament scholars mean by ‘creation theology.’ It affirms the order of 
the universe in the sense that, at the end, it is the honourable people who get the honour, and 
                                                          
409
 MacIntyre 1988:31‒32. 
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the ‘external’ reward is inseparable from the ‘internal’ value of a deed or person.410 If this is so, 
then, when Proverbs mentions ‘honour’ it also means ‘honourable character,’ which is already 
a more clearly non-material gain. 
However, as I argued earlier, it is questionable that the ancient Israelite view of the world was 
similar in every detail to the Greek understanding of world-order. Even if Israelites maintained 
a closer relationship between honour and character than moderns, it is far from certain that 
the reader can practically replace one of these concepts in the text by the other. And even if 
this could be granted, it would be strange if Proverbs had never referred to unambiguously 
internal gains that a modern reader would also recognise as such. Even if ancient people had a 
more ‘holistic’ worldview and did not differentiate between ‘external’ and ‘internal,’ ‘material’ 
and ‘spiritual’ goods so neatly (or artificially) as modern people, they did not lack the 
vocabulary to name those qualities which moderns would call ‘internal’ or ‘spiritual.’ If 
Proverbs constantly and unanimously states that ‘wisdom gives riches and honour’ and if it is 
always enthusiastic about wisdom because it provides riches and honour, then one starts to 
wonder if this modern scholarly talk about the holistic worldview of the ancients and about 
world-order is only a romantic justification of a way of thinking which is, after all, focused on 
the material needs, and only on the material needs, of people. 
So do we have explicit references in Proverbs to what modern readers would also recognise as 
‘internal’ and ‘spiritual’ gains? 
‘Better than riches’ 
One of the clearest indications of the importance of the non-material sides of wisdom’s gains 
are the so called ‘better than’ sayings, which can be found in the three longest sections of 
Proverbs (1‒9; 10:1‒22:16; 25‒29), and repeatedly remind the reader that wisdom is better 
than riches. Before a short analysis of these sayings let me provide a list of them together with 
some textual and basic interpretative notes, and also with a list of those qualities which these 
sayings promote (in opposition to riches). 
                                                          
410
 Gese 1958:10. 
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TABLE 5: THE ‘BETTER THAN’ SAYINGS 
Hebrew verse Translation Paraphrase Qualities 
recommended411 
3:14 
רחסמ הרחס בוט יכ  ףסכ
התאובת ץורחמו 
For her profit is better 
than the profit of 
silver and her income 
better than gold. 





יכ םינינפמ המכח הבוט  
לכו י אל םיצפחשוו הב  
For wisdom is better 
than rubies, no 
treasure compares 
with her. 





יתאובתו זפמו ץורחמ יירפ בוט 
רחבנ ףסכמ 
My fruit is better than 
gold, even fine gold, 
and my income than 
choice silver. 





דבכתממ ול דבעו הלקנ בוט 
רסחו םחל  
Better a lowly one 
who is a servant to 
himself than one who 
glorifies himself and 
lacks food.412 
Depending on the 







                                                          
411
 The list in this column is almost identical with the list reconstructed by Perry 1993:42: ‘work, fear of 
God, love, righteousness, lowliness of spirit, slowness to anger, quiet (peace), integrity, openness, 
nearness, and wisdom.’ 
412
 The translation is problematic. If one repoints דֶבֶע as דֵֹבע with the LXX, Syr., and Vulg. then it says: 
‘Better a lowly one who serves (works) for himself...’ Some have suggested דבע be emended to רבע (Fox 
2009:550): ‘Better a lowly one who has (agricultural) produce...’ The usual translation of the MT (NAS, 
NJB, NKJ, NRSV, TNIV, KJV, ESV, etc.) is ‘better a lowly one who has a servant.’ In my translation I follow 
Ehrlich 1968:61‒62, who keeps the MT without emendation but suggests that it can have the meaning: 




attitude is better 
than proud 
pretentiousness. 
 (Basic) material 






בוט  רצואמ הוהי תאריב טעמ
וב המוהמו בר 
Better a little with the 
fear of the Lord than a 




Peace413 (based on 
the trust in the 
Lord) is more 
valuable than 
riches. 
Fear of the Lord 
15:17 
הבהאו קרי תחרא בוט  םש
האנשו סובא רושמ וב  
Better is a meal of 
vegetables but with 
love than a fattened 
ox but with hatred. 
 
Loving peace is 




בוט  תואובת ברמ הקדצב טעמ
Better a little with 
righteousness than a 
large income without 
Righteousness is 
more valuable than 
riches. 
Righteousness 
                                                                                                                                                                          
glorifies himself and behaves as if he had a servant and rather hungers instead of doing the ‘dirty’ work. 
This translation understands the verse as recommending a humble, hardworking attitude, as does Fox’s 
and the ancient translations which follow a different Hebrew from the MT. 
413
 See my interpretation later. 
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טפשמ אלב justice. 
16:16 
הנק המ המכח  תונקו ץורחמ בוט
ףסכמ רחבנ הניב 
To acquire414 wisdom, 
how much better than 
gold, and acquiring 
understanding is 
preferable to silver. 





 (םיינע)  בוטשלפ תא חור   
 קלחמשתא לל םיאג  [םיונע] 
Better to be humble in 
spirit and to be with 
the lowly than to 
divide spoil with the 
proud. 





 לשמו רובגמ םיפא ךרא בוט
ריע דכלמ וחורב 
Better the one who is 
slow to anger than the 
mighty, and who rules 
his temper than one 
who captures a city. 







ו הברח תפ בוטשהול תיבמ הב  
יחבז אלמ ביר  
Better a dry morsel 
and peace with it than 
a house full of feasting 
with strife.415 




                                                          
414
 The MSS and ancient translations are divided in their pointing. Some read ֶהֹנק (participle), while 
others read ֵהנְק (Qal imperative) instead of ֹהנְק (a rare inf. absolute). However, these variants do not 
alter the meaning of the proverb. For the LXX translation which reads תוֹנִּק (nests) see Fox 2009:1012. 
415
 Literally ‘sacrifices of strife’ which probably means that those who offer the sacrifice and eat the 
sacrificial meal together are not at peace with each other (Fox 2009:623‒624; Waltke 2005:35). The 
parallel between 17:1a and 17:1b suggests that it is not the sacrificial nature of the meal that is 
significant but its richness. It is also possible that the Hebrew does not necessarily have the connotation 




בוט  שקעמ ומתב ךלוה שר
ליסכ אוהו ויתפש 
Better a poor man 
walking in his integrity 
than one of crooked 
lips who is rich.416 





בוטו ודסח םדא תואת  שיאמ שר
בזכ 
…better a poor man 











לע תבשל בוט תנפ  תשאמ גג
רבח תיבו םינידמ 
Better to live on the 
corner of the roof 
than in a house shared 
with419 a quarrelsome 
wife. 




                                                          
416
 The MT reads ליסכ (fool) instead of רישע (rich). Syr. has רישע and some modern scholars have 
suggested that this might be the original reading and maybe a scribe who was accustomed to the 
frequent condemnations of fools unintentionally altered the text to ליסכ (Clifford 1999:175; Ehrlich 
1968:107; Fox 2009:647‒648). I accept the emendation because it fits the structure of the ‘complex 
better than’ sayings better (see discussion later) and because it sounds banal to declare that a person of 
integrity is better than a fool. 
417
 The translation of 19:22a and its connection to 19:22b is contested. The main options are: ‘What 
people desire in a human being is his unfailing kindness’ (Waltke, Proverbs 15‒31, 115‒116); ‘One’s 
desire, one’s disgrace’ (Murphy 1998:140‒141, 145); ‘What is desired of a person is his fidelity’ (Clifford 
1999:175, 178); ‘A man’s kindness is his fruit’ (Fox 2009:658‒659); and ‘A man’s desire should be [to 
show] kindness’ (Ramaq, Radaq, Hameʼiri, in Fox 2009:659). 
418
 At least if the verse is supplemented by the reader with the logical word pairs: poor (but honest) vs. 
(rich) but liar; or if 19:22a is connected to 19:22b and דסח is understood as the opposite of being a liar. If 
the verse is not supplemented or if 19:22b has to be understood on its own then the major emphasis is 
on the negative characteristic as if it said ‘anything is better than being deceitful.’ 
419
 The meaning of רבח תיב is uncertain. Some emend it to בחר תיב (as Ehrlich 1968:122‒123), others have 
suggested different translations, e.g. a busy household (as compared to the solitude of living on the 
roof), alehouse, granary, etc. based on Akkadian and Ugaritic parallels. For a list of suggestions see Fox 
2009:683; Waltke 2005:175 n. 72. Though some of these translations would fit the ‘complex better than’ 
pattern better, it is far from certain that the saying fits into that pattern (see discussion later). Here I 
follow the translation of Waltke 2005:1161, ESV, NAS, NJB, NKJ, NRS, TNIV because it seems to be more 




בוט שתב ץראב רבדמ אמשת  
סעכו  [םינידמ] (םינודמ)  
Better to live in a 
desert land than with 
a quarrelsome and 
angry wife. 





 ףסכמ בר רשעמ םש רחבנ
בוט ןח בהזמו 
An (honourable) name 
is to be chosen rather 
than great riches and 
favour is better than 
silver and gold. 
Good reputation is 




רמא בוט יכ  הנה הלע ךל
 ואר רשא בידנ ינפל ךליפשהמ
ךיניע 
For it is better for him 
to say ‘come up here’ 
than that he humiliate 
you before a 
nobleman (whom your 
eyes have seen).420 
Trying to exalt 





 בוטשבלע ת תנפ אמ גגשת  
רבח תיבו [םינידמ] (םינודמ)  
Better to live on the 
corner of the roof 
than in a house shared 
with a quarrelsome 
wife. 




27:5 Better open rebuke Hidden love is 
useless and not 
Honesty/active 
                                                          
420
 The function and meaning of 25:7c is not clear in this sentence. Most commentators join it to the 
next sentence. Clifford 1999:220, 223; Gemser 1937:70‒71; Longman 2006:447, 452; McKane 1970:250, 
580‒581; Murphy 1998:187‒188, 191; Plöger 1984:294, 296; Ringgren 1962:100, 102; Scott 1965:153, 
155; Toy 1899:458‒461; Waltke 2005:303, 316‒317. 
421
 If the verse is read together with the previous verse, ‘North wind produces rain, and a secretive 
tongue (produces) an angry face,’ then the idea of living on the roof might connote being exposed to 
uncomfortable weather (Van Leeuwen 1988:85). 
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 הבהאמ הלגמ תחכות הבוט
תרתסמ 




לא ךיבא הערו ךער בזעת  
לא ךיחא תיבו ךדיא םויב אובת  
 בוטשקוחר חאמ בורק ןכ  
Do not forsake your 
friend and your 
father’s friend and go 
not423 into your 
brother’s house on the 
day of your hardship. 
Better a neighbour 
nearby than a brother 
far away. 
A distant relative is 
not useful. A close 




בוט  שקעמ ומתב ךלוה שר
רישע אוהו םיכרד 
Better a poor man 
walking in his integrity 
than one of crooked 
ways who is rich. 




Michael V. Fox helpfully notes that there are two basic types of ‘better than’ sayings. He calls 
them ‘simple better than sayings’ (3:14; 8:11, 19; 16:16, 32; 19:22b; 22:1; 25:7; 27:10c) and 
‘complex better than sayings’ (12:9; 15:16, 17; 16:8, 19; 17:1; 19:1; 21:19; 25:24; 27:5; 28:6). A 
                                                          
422
 Bühlmann, partly on the basis of Sir. 19:13-17, speculates that the situation behind the saying might 
be that when one is offended by his/her friend then instead of withdrawing (‘hidden love’) he or she 
should openly rebuke the offender, thereby providing opportunity for clarification and reconciliation 
(Bühlmann 1976:114‒116). This is a possible conjecture though it might be a bit too specific for such an 
open-ended proverb. Nevertheless, read together with the following verse, ‘faithful are the wounds by a 
friend (בהוא) and profuse the kisses of an enemy (אנוש),’ our verse seems to recommend some kind of 
honesty. 
423
 Some suggest to omit לא or to translate it as ‘surely’ as in Ugaritic. However, there is no textual 
support for emendation here and the usual translation of the verse makes sense as it is. See Davies 
2010:140. 
424
 ‘Nearness’ is not necessarily spatial, it can be metaphorical, too (Lev. 21:3; Ruth 2:20; Ps. 148:14—
see Fox 2009:808; Waltke 2005:379). 
425
 The relationship between 27:10ab and 27:10c is contested. See the different opinions of Clifford 
1999:238 and Fox 2009:808 for example, the former taking the three parts of the verse as closely 
connected, the latter interpreting 27:10c as a separate proverb. If we connect them to each other than 
the whole verse could be interpreted as speaking about the value of friendship as opposed to kinship. 
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simple ‘better than’ saying simply states that A is better than B. The complex one states that A 
with B is better than A’ with B’. ‘The point is that B is so good that it outweighs something 
everyone desires, even when combined with something less desirable. The logic requires that 
A be less desirable than A’, and B much more desirable than B’’426 like ‘Better a little (A) with 
the fear of the Lord (B) than a full storehouse (A’) with turmoil (B’)’ (15:16).  
First of all, let me make two comments on Fox’s system. The first is that, although usually it is 
obvious which saying belongs to which category, this is not always so. For example, Fox takes 
27:5 (‘Better open rebuke than hidden love’) as complex (openness + rebuke > hiddenness + 
love) but he takes 27:10c (‘Better a neighbour nearby than a brother far away’) as simple. I do 
not see a significant difference between the structure of the two sentences. On the one hand, 
27:5, just like 27:10c, lacks the usual preposition (ב, with) of the complex sayings, while on the 
other hand, 27:10c can be construed as a complex saying just as easily as 27:5 (i.e. closeness + 
neighbour > distance + brother). So, both 27:5 and 27:10c lie somewhere on the borderline of 
simple and complex ‘better than’ sayings. 
Similarly, the sayings about the troublesome wife (21:9, 19; 25:24) do not fit neatly the 
‘complex better than’ category that Fox put them in. One would expect a positive item in the 
place of B’ whereas in these sentences we get a negative one. For example, in 21:19 (‘Better to 
live in a desert land than with a quarrelsome and angry wife’) we have two negatives both for 
A’ and B’ (quarrelsome (A’) + angry (B’) wife). Furthermore, not all of the four elements are 
named explicitly in these sentences, for example in 21:19 B is not mentioned. Whereas A is 
there (‘living in a desert land’) B is only implied (be it solitude, unpleasantness, singleness, 
peacefulness, etc.). So, the quarrelsome wife sayings might comprise a category on their own. 
My other observation is that, although Fox only states that ‘A be less desirable than A’, and B 
much more desirable than B’’ we can actually be more specific about the relationship between 
A vs. A’ and B vs. B’ in the ‘complex better than’ sayings. They are usually opposites: 
 
 
                                                          
426
 Fox 2009:597. 
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TABLE 6: LOGICAL RELATIONS IN THE ‘BETTER THAN’ SAYINGS
427
 
 A vs. A’ B vs. B’ 
12:9 lowly   ↔   glorifies himself servant to himself(?)   ?   lacks food 
15:16 little   ↔   full storehouse fear of the Lord   ?   turmoil 
15:17 vegetable   ↔   ox love   ↔   hatred 
16:8 little   ↔   large income righteousness   ↔   without justice 
16:19 humble in spirit   ?   divide spoil with the lowly   ↔   with the proud 
17:1 dry morsel   ↔   feasting peace   ↔   strife 
19:1 poor   ↔   rich integrity   ↔   crooked lips 
21:9 corner of the roof   ↔   house (peacefulness(?))   ?   troublesome wife 
21:19 desert land   ?   (peacefulness(?)) quarrelsome   ?   angry wife 
25:24 corner of the roof   ↔   house (peacefulness(?))   ?   quarrelsome wife 
27:5 openness   ↔   hiddenness rebuke   ?   love 
                                                          
427
 The question marks in the table signal uncertainty in translation or interpretation. Many of them 
have been discussed at Table 5 and most of them will be also discussed after Table 6. The oppositions 
(signalled by ↔) are not always perfect. For example, ‘crooked lips’ in 19:1 is not the perfect opposite 
of ‘integrity’ because they are on different levels: Integrity vs. an example of being corrupt. Yet, the 
opposition between the concepts is clear. 
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27:10c neighbour   ?   brother nearby   ↔   far away 
28:6 poor   ↔   rich integrity   ↔   crooked ways 
This table shows that in the clear majority of cases A‒A’ and B‒B’ are opposites. There are 18 
clear opposites and 8 not so clear or non-opposites. The majority of the not so clear or at least 
not clearly and explicitly stated opposites are in 21:9, 19; 25:24; 27:5, 10c but, as we have just 
seen, all of these verses are examples of ‘imprecise complex better than’ sayings which might 
not be rightfully categorized as ‘complex better than’ sayings at all. If we do not count these 
verses then we have 13 clear opposites and 3 not clear ones. In 12:9428 the precise meaning of 
the verse is opaque, so we should not draw a conclusion from the fact that we cannot be sure 
how B and B’ oppose each other if they do at all. In 16:19,429 though A and A’ are not clear 
opposites, they have opposing connotations: humble in spirit (contrite, powerless, fragile, poor 
see Isa. 57:15) vs. dividers of spoil (powerful, arrogant, in control, rich; see Prov. 1:13‒14). The 
only unclear case left is the pair fear of the Lord‒turmoil in 15:16.430 I would suggest that, 
based on the opposing relationships in other cases, we should let ‘turmoil’ clarify the meaning 
of ‘fear of the Lord’ in this case and understand it as some kind of peaceful state, or a complex 
state which at least includes some kind of peacefulness and feeling of security. 431 
After these clarifying notes, it is time to turn back to our original quest for non-materialistic 
gains in Proverbs. Are these ‘better than’ sayings a good place to search for them? It seems so. 
The majority of these sayings recommend a good character comprising virtues like wisdom, 
honesty, integrity, humility, love, self-control, righteousness. They also clearly state that such 
human qualities are much better than material riches. 
However, the issue might be a bit more complicated than it appears at the first sight. Why 
precisely are these qualities better? Fox, commenting on 19:1, answers the question as 
follows: 
                                                          
428
 ‘Better a lowly one who is a servant to himself (?) than one who glorifies himself and lacks food.’ 
429
 ‘Better to be humble in spirit than to divide spoil with the poor.’ 
430
 ‘Better a little with the fear of the Lord than a full storehouse with turmoil.’ 
431
 Fear of the Lord is associated with trusting the Lord and his protection in Prov. 3:5‒8 and 14:26. Trust 
in the Lord is considered the major protection against trouble and the source of a secure life and 
peaceful mind (Prov. 3:21‒26; 28:25‒26; etc.). 
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The reasons why an innocent poor man is better than a dishonest rich one are not stated 
here, but other proverbs give them: The innocent man lives in confidence, the wicked one 
in anxiety (28:1). The innocent man is delivered from disaster, and the wicked one takes 
his place (11:8). The innocent man is remembered after death, while the wicked one sinks 
into oblivion (10:7). The list goes on and on. All the benefits ascribed to righteousness 
easily outweigh the benefits of wealth.
432
 
Yet, I suspect, most items on this ‘ongoing list’ can easily be grouped under the three headings 
I suggested above: protection (long life), honour, and riches. Wisdom repeatedly claims about 
herself that she provides riches, so, though it is not stated explicitly, one can logically deduce 
that wisdom is better than riches because wisdom can provide riches, whereas riches do not 
lead to wisdom. Furthermore, the context of some of the ‘better than’ sayings suggest that this 
virtuous character is useful for survival and protection. For example, between 16:16 and 16:19, 
two ‘better than’ sayings recommending wisdom and humility, there are two sayings about 
how carelessness and pride can lead to disaster. So, 16:16‒19 read together might lead the 
reader’s thoughts towards the conclusion that a humble, wise character is better than riches 
because it provides better protection.433 Or, humility, which is recommended in the ‘better 
than’ sayings of 12:9; 16:19; 25:7, is so often and so emphatically connected to honour in 
Proverbs (15:33; 18:12; 22:4; 29:23) that a reader might be expected to connect humility and 
honour and think, ‘Of course humility is better than riches, as it leads more surely to honour.’ 
So, at least part of the answer to the question regarding why good human character is more 
valuable than riches is that which I have stated above: because it leads to protection, honour, 
and riches. 
Nevertheless, these ‘better than’ sayings might also point to something else besides these 
three benefits, which may not appear spiritual enough for the modern reader. Some of them 
acknowledge the fact that it is possible that someone is virtuous, yet poor (like 16:8; 17:1; 
19:1; 28:6). Yet, they clearly state that even if integrity does not lead to wealth, it is better 
than wealth. Indeed, one possible explanation, as we have just seen, is that it is better because 
it leads to long life and honour. However, as we have also seen, this is not often stated 
explicitly in these sentences, rather, it is conjectured by the reader from the context of some 
of them. Would not we expect more explicit praise of protection and honour in these 
sentences if their provision is the only reason of a good character’s superiority to riches? There 
is an intrinsic openness of formulation in these verses which invites more than one 
                                                          
432
 Fox 2009:648. 
433
 Indeed, this is how Knut Heim interprets this section (Heim 2001:219‒220). 
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interpretation. ‘Better’ may not always mean ‘more useful for gaining “external” gains’ but, 
instead, ‘more useful for fulfilling one’s role in society,’ or ‘more rewarding in itself than the 
“external” rewards of riches and honour and long life,’ or, in other words, ‘more worthwhile 
than riches, honour, and long life.’ 
This latter possibility is strengthened by the fact that these sentences seem to refer to a fourth 
desirable gain besides honour, riches, and protection, one which might be even more highly 
valued than these: (inner and outer) peace and contentment.434 Regardless of the 
uncertainties in the interpretation of 12:9,435 the verse arguably promotes acceptance of one’s 
situation and warns against reaching beyond it. As I have just noted, fear of the Lord might also 
have a ‘peaceful’ connotation in 15:16. Proverbs 15:17436 is also about the value of a peaceful 
social life. The context of 16:8 (namely 16:7)437 also suggests that the reward of righteousness 
might be a peaceful, strife free life. Proverbs 17:1438 explicitly values peace above riches. The 
troublesome wife sayings definitely emphasise the value of trouble free life. 
Based on these sentences, the reward of a virtuous life in Proverbs could be described as 
‘happiness,’ even if that is a vague term. The notion of happiness can comprise the material 
benefits, like long life and riches, the social benefits, like honour, but it also expresses 
something of the peaceful, content mindset that is mirrored in many of these verses. This is, 
finally, something which, though not necessarily unrelated to material needs, goes beyond 
them, and satisfies even a reader who searches for non-material, ‘spiritual’ gains.  
Summary 
We have seen that the word ‘success’ is not precise enough as a description of what is 
promised by Proverbs, as the book has a prime emphasis on self-preservation. Yet, it talks 
about success too, and the paradigmatic gains it offers beside a long, secure life are riches and 
honour. Although honour is not an unambiguously spiritual gain, it might not be an exclusively 
‘external’ one either, as it is probably intrinsically connected to virtuous character. Indeed, 
                                                          
434
 Compare with Thomas’s thought in which peace is one of the fruits of charity which is, in his system, 
accompanied by the gift of wisdom (ST II‒II, 29, 4; Stump 1999:62). 
435
 ‘Better a lowly one who is a servant to himself (?) than one who glorifies himself and lacks food.’ 
436
 ‘Better is a meal of vegetables but with love than a fattened ox but with hatred.’ 
437
 16:7‒8: ‘When the Lord likes someone’s way he makes even his enemies peaceful towards him. 
Better is a little with righteousness than a large income without justice.’ 
438
 ‘Better a dry morsel and peace with it than a house full of feasting with strife.’ 
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there are explicit and very emphatic references to virtues and their importance in the ‘better 
than’ sayings. These sentences also emphasise that peaceful contentment is at least as 
important as the other, more ‘material,’ gains. Therefore, I proposed that we could summarise 
all the goods that one can obtain by acquiring wisdom and integrity as ‘happiness,’ which 
seems to me to be a fair description of a contented, peaceful, protected life furnished with 
necessary material resources. 
There is much in this description which echoes Thomas’s moral theology. He also emphasised 
that the ultimate end of human life is happiness, acknowledged that some basic human needs 
(like self-preservation) are indispensable for that end, and claimed that living a virtuous life is 
the way towards that happiness. 
One significant difference is that Thomas acknowledged the value of riches and honour more 
cautiously than Proverbs. He acknowledged that honour is a natural reward for honourable 
deeds, and as such a reward to be sought (ST II‒II, 129, 1‒2), that it can be an assurance to one 
that he or she walks in the right way (ST I‒II, 2, 2), that it can be an encouragement for good 
acts (ST II‒II, 131, 1), and it, together with riches, can be a tool for performing magnificent and 
magnanimous virtuous acts (ST I‒II, 4, 7; ST II‒II, 134, 3). However, he also emphasised that 
one should not be too preoccupied with honour and riches (ST II‒II, 129, 2; ST II‒II, 131, 1‒2) 
because too much desire for them can lead one astray (ST II‒II, 131, 1; ST II‒II, 132, 2‒3). As 
well he warns that they are external rewards (ST I‒II, 2, 2; ST II‒II, 103, 1) and, as such, too 
much connected to the material body and not to the soul’s happiness (ST I‒II, 2, 5; ST I‒II, 2, 1; 
ST II‒II, 131, 1), and that they can be misleading since the ‘right’ persons do not always get 
them (ST I‒II, 2, 3). So, he acknowledged them as rewards which can be enjoyed with 
moderation, but they are definitely not the right ends which provide happiness to the soul. 
One can argue, of course, that Thomas’s cautious recognition of honour and riches as good 
rewards and rejection of them as potential sources of real happiness (and, as such, human 
ends) stems at least partly from his differentiation between body and soul. If one takes into 
consideration that Proverbs does not makes this differentiation and also that the ‘better than’ 
sayings emphasise a contented, inward happiness, then Proverbs’ view of human ends appears 
to be much closer to the system of Aquinas than it might initially appear after a cursory 
comparison between what Proverbs and Thomas say about honour and riches. 
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Nevertheless, even if the common points are emphasised, this Proverbial thinking is still 
different from that of Thomas in one crucial respect. Namely, Thomas would recognize this 
happiness as only partial since it is not connected to the most important factor for Thomas: 
the highest human end, that is, God. As I have written in the beginning of this chapter, Thomas 
considers that, ‘The highest good for a human is to live and know God in a God-fearing 
community.’ So, in a Thomistic system, the lower human goods find their meaning in the 
highest one. Is Proverbs writing only about ‘incomplete’ happiness, available to the ‘natural’ 
human being, without reference to God as the ‘highest end’? 
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Is God the highest end in Proverbs? 
What does it precisely mean that God is the highest end? 
As we have seen, Thomas taught that self-interest can be good as long as it is subordinated to 
higher ends. However, what does it precisely mean that God is the highest end and how 
precisely is one supposed to subordinate the other ends to this one? The answer to these 
questions can be deduced from Thomas’s explanation of a section of the Sermon on the 
Mount (Mt. 6:19‒34). There he lists four factors which make self-interest ‘inordinate’:439 
1. Serving God for the sake of benefits (‘We should not… serve God for the sake of the 
necessities of food and clothing’). 
2. Not hoping in God (‘We should not so concern ourselves about temporal things as to 
lose hope in divine help’). 
3. Relying on one’s own powers (‘We should not think that we are able to procure all the 
necessities of life by our own concern without divine help’). 
4. Obsessive anticipation of the problems of the future (‘Concern is inordinate when a 
man anticipates the time of it, by being concerned now about something which is a 
matter of care for the future, not for the present’). 
Points 2 and 3 are closely related: one should hope in God (2) and not in oneself (3). Point 4 is 
somewhat different, but it is not unrelated to trusting in God and as such to points 2 and 3. 
Separating these points was probably suggested only by the text of the Gospel which Thomas 
wanted to follow closely. However, if we take into account the overlap between the four 
points and focus on the broader issues behind them, then we can say that, according to 
Thomas, having God as the final end requires two crucial things: 
A. Not serving God because of the benefits of that service (1). 
B. Having a God-centred thinking, hope, and trust (2‒3‒4). 
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Are these two criteria true to Proverbs? The answer will be given mainly on the basis of Prov. 2 
in the rest of this chapter. The choice of Prov. 2 as a starting point for my investigations is 
justified by two factors. 
First, as Weeks comments, Prov. 2 ‘comes as close as anything to epitomizing Proverbs 1‒9 as 
a whole.’440 Called the Lehrprogramm for Proverbs 1‒9 by Meinhold, it introduces the major 
motifs of the later chapters (like the foreign woman and the path metaphor),441 and as such it 
is one of the most significant introductory chapters for the whole book. 
Second, and even more significantly, the chapter writes about the ‘knowledge of God’ (Prov. 
2:5; variations of this expression also occur in Prov. 9:10 and 30:3), which happens to be 
Thomas’s typical phrase referring to the highest end of human existence.442 So, if anywhere, 
here one can expect to find some parallels with Thomas. However, caution is recommended. 
This lexical parallel does not necessarily mean that the meaning, role, and significance of the 
‘knowledge of God’ are the same in Thomas and Proverbs. These issues require a 
thoroughgoing investigation. 
Before attempting to clarify the meaning of Prov. 2 and to decide whether the above-
mentioned two Thomistic criteria of having God as the final end can be found in it, a 
translation of the chapter will be provided. Some exegetical observations will be made in the 
footnotes. These observations will concentrate mainly on issues which might influence the 
following argument. 
My son, if you take in my words and hide my 
commands with(in) you, 
[then], turning your ear to wisdom,443 you will direct 
your heart to understanding.444 
 
1 םא ינב ךתא ןפצת יתוצמו ירמא חקת   
 
 2 הנובתל ךבל הטת ךנזא המכחל בישקהל   
                                                          
440
 Weeks 2007:62. 
441
 Meinhold 1991a:43. 
442
 ST I‒II, 3, 4; ST I, 12, 1‒13 (especially ST I, 12, 13); ST III, 9, 1‒4; SCG, III, 37‒63; etc. 
443
 I take בישקהל as a gerundive ל + inf. which specifies the manner or method in which the finite verb of 
the previous clause is executed (Merwe 1999:155; Waltke 2004:213 n. 1).  
444
 Imperfect forms can express apodosis (Waltke 1990:510‒513). My translation somewhat separates 
the first 2 verses, as an introductory section, from the rest of the chapter. It roughly follows the 
149 
 
Indeed, if to insight you call out, to understanding you 
raise your voice, 
If you seek it like silver, and like treasure you search 
for it, 
Then you will understand the fear of the Lord and the 
knowledge of God you will find, 
Because it is the Lord himself who gives wisdom, and 
from his mouth [come]445 knowledge and 
understanding. 
He hides446 prudence447 for the upright—(he is)448 a 
shield for those who walk in integrity, 
Guarding the paths of justice he safeguards the way 
3 ךלוק ןתת הנובתל ארקת הניבל םא יכ  
 
 4 םא הנשפחת םינומטמכו ףסככ הנשקבת   
 
 5 יהלא תעדו הוהי תארי ןיבת זאאצמת ם   
 
 6 יכ הנובתו תעד ויפמ המכח ןתי הוהי    
 
)
 7 ןפצו] (ןפצי[ םת יכלהל ןגמ הישות םירשיל   
 
 8ךרדו טפשמ תוחרא רצנל) ודיסח] (וידיסח[ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
translation of Waltke (Waltke 2004:213) and parallels the LXX, which also takes verse 2 as the apodosis 
of verse 1 (see Cook 1997:114, 118). 
445
 The ‘come’ is presupposed by the preposition ןמ. The Targ., α’, σ’, θ’, and ε’ has ‘and from his face’ 
(וינפמו). 
446
 I translate the Qere (ןפצי) which is supported by Targ. and Vulg. Ketiv (ןפצו) is supported by LXX and 
Syr. The textual difference does not have a theological significance which would affect my later 
argument. 
I chose ‘hide’ and not the more usual ‘store up’ (Clifford 1999:44; Fox 2000:114; McKane 1970:213; 
Murphy 1998:13; Waltke 2004:214; NRSV, etc.) as a translation of ןפצ because I see a 
hiding‒seeking‒finding motive possibly running through Prov. 1:10‒2:5 (2:1, 5; cf. 1:11, 13, 18, 28). 
447
 LXX apparently translates העושת (σωτηρία, salvation) but this does not necessarily presuppose a 
different Vorlage. It could simply be a misreading of the Hebrew or an interpretation of it (Cook 
1997:120). 
Some translate הישות as ‘success’ (Murphy 1998:13; Waltke 2004:214), others as ‘resourcefulness’ 
(Clifford 1999:44; Fox 2000:114). I follow Weeks, who argues that its basic meaning is probably close to 
that of המכח (Weeks 2007:197). None of these suggestions is able to account for all of the occurrences of 
the word in my judgement. Job 5:12 suggests that one can do הישות with his/her hands, which would 
suggest ‘success’ and not ‘resourcefulness.’ The concept of ‘wisdom’ is also a possible candidate as it 
can also refer to practical skill and הישות often occurs simply as a general parallel to wisdom or counsel, 
which would make a more restricted meaning unlikely (Job 11:6; 26:3; Prov. 8:14—though in this verse it 
can be taken as parallel to הרובג (strength); Isa. 28:29). So, based on these observations, ‘wisdom’ seems 
to be the best translation. However, ‘success’ or ‘resourcefulness’ might be more appropriate for Job 
6:13, though the precise meaning of the verse is not clear. 
Other appealing solutions would be ‘competence,’ suggested by McKane 1970:282, or ‘sound 
judgement’ by Waltke 2004:225. 
I (tentatively) chose ‘prudence’ because it captures well its close relationship to wisdom and also its 
connotations with resourcefulness, success, sound judgement and competence. 
448
 Grammatically ‘shield’ can be in apposition both to Yahweh and also to prudence. As ‘shield’ is a 
common Old Testament metaphor for the Lord (cf. Prov. 30:5; Deut. 33:29; Ps. 3:4) and it is clear that 
the Lord is the subject of 2:7a and 2:8b, to suppose that the Lord is the subject throughout verses 7‒8 
seems to me the most natural reading. However, the ambiguity might also be intentional, or at least it 
can be utilized in an interpretation which is in harmony with the context. See later discussion. 
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of his faithful ones.449 
Then you will understand righteousness and justice 
and equity,450 every good track, 
Because451 wisdom will come into your heart and 
knowledge will be pleasant to your soul. 
Shrewdness will safeguard you, understanding will 
guard you: 
Saving you from the way of the evil one,452 from the 
man who speaks perversions, 
Those who abandon straight paths to walk in ways of 
darkness, 
Those who delight in doing evil, who rejoice in evil 
perversions, 
Whose paths are twisted and who are crooked in 
their tracks; 
Saving you [also] from a strange woman, from an 
outsider who has polished her words, 
Who abandons the companion of her youth, and 
forgets the covenant of her God. 
For her path descends to death and her tracks to the 
realm of the dead:453 
רמשי 
 
 9 לכ םירשימו טפשמו קדצ ןיבת זא לגעמ בוט  
 
 10 יכ םעני ךשפנל תעדו ךבלב המכח אובת   
 
 11 כרצנת הנובת ךילע רמשת המזמה   
 
 12 תוכפהת רבדמ שיאמ ער ךרדמ ךליצהל   
 
 13 יכרדב תכלל רשי תוחרא םיבזעה ךשח   
 
 14 ער תוכפהתב וליגי ער תושעל םיחמשה  
 
 15 םתולגעמב םיזולנו םישקע םהיתחרא רשא   
 
 16 הקילחה הירמא הירכנמ הרז השאמ ךליצהל   
 
 17 תאו הירוענ ףולא תבזעה החכש היהלא תירב   
 
 18 לא החש יכ לאו התיב תומ היתלגעמ םיאפר   
                                                          
449
 It cannot be ruled out that there is a more complicated textual history behind the text than what is 
suggested by the simple ketiv/qere variation in the MT. This is the only occurrence of the word דיסח in 
Proverbs. The Syr. translates הסח which also occurs in 14:32 and 30:5. The LXX also seems to translate 
הסח, when it renders the Hebrew as εὐλαβουμένων (those who respect [him]), as in 30:5. Cook suggests 
that the LXX translator (or redactor) might have been influenced by 30:5 (Cook 1997:121‒122). 
450
 Masoretic accents suggest that the list of objects overflows into the second colon. κατορθώσεις in 
LXX can be understood as a verbal form (you will make straight) but it can also be taken as a noun and 
the parallel with Prov. 1:3 makes an emendation unnecessary here (see BHQ, p. 32, the commentary on 
the critical apparatus). 
451
 From this point on the LXX is different from the MT. It takes 2:10 as a protasis and verses 11‒12 as 
the apodosis and does not mention the ‘foreign woman’ in verses 16‒18. For a brief overview of LXX’s 
understanding of the section and scholarly opinions about its interpretation see Fox 2000:374‒376. 
452
 Or from ‘evil way.’ Here I follow Fox who, on the basis of the parallel with 2:12b and 2:16, argues that 
ער is not an adjective but a noun (Fox 2000:117). This uncertainty of translation does not affect my 
forthcoming argument. 
453
 The text is full of lexical and grammatical problems. Is החש to be derived from החש (bow down, lay on 
the floor) or חוש (sink down, walk)? Or should we emend it to החוש (pit)? The תיב is masculine, whereas 
the verb is feminine. Should we emend התיב to התביתנ (my translation follows this suggestion)? What is 
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Structure of Proverbs 2 
 
A. If you listen to me (v. 1) 
B. then your heart will turn to wisdom. (v. 2) 
C. If you seek wisdom (i.e. listen to me) (vv. 3-4) 
D. then you will know God (v. 5), 
1. because it is God who gives wisdom (v.6), 
2. and protects you (vv. 7-8) 
E. then you will know righteousness (v. 9) 
3. because wisdom will come into your heart(v. 10), 
4. and she will protect you (v. 11) 
F. 5. from wicked men (vv. 12-15) and 
6. from wicked women (vv. 16-19), 
G. so that you will walk on the right path (v. 20), 
H. which is the salvation of the righteous one (vv. 21-22). 
None who go to her return or regain the paths of life. 
 
Thus you will walk in the way of the good and keep to 
the paths of the righteous. 
Surely the upright will inhabit the land and those with 
integrity will be left in it, 
But the wicked will be cut off from the land, and the 
treacherous will be torn from it. 
 19 לכ אלֹו ןובושי אל היאב םייח תוחרא וגישׂי   
 
 
 20 םיקידצ תוחראו םיבוט ךרדב ךלת ןעמל
רמשת   
 
 21 יכ ונכשי םירשי הב ורתוי םימימתו ץרא   
 
 22 הנממ וחסי םידגובו ותרכי ץראמ םיעשרו 
 
 
Does Proverbs 2 speak about a God-centred thinking, hope, 
and trust? 
As we will see shortly, the structure of Prov. 2 makes it likely that the answer to this question is 
‘yes.’ 
TABLE 7: THE STRUCTURE OF PROV. 2 
My structural analysis is 
basically identical with that of 
Michael Fox.454 There is only 
one minor divergence 
between Fox’s analysis and 
mine: I take the first two 
verses of the poem as an 
introductory sentence. Fox 
understands the first 4 verses 
as one long protasis. I 
tentatively choose to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the precise meaning of םיאפר? Regardless of these difficulties, the general meaning of the verse seems 
to be clear and these lexical problems do not affect my interpretation. For these and further suggestions 
see Clifford 1999:45; Fox 2000:121‒122; Fuhs 2001:59; Longman 2006:116‒117; McKane 1970:287‒288; 
Murphy 1998:14; Toy 1899:48‒49; Waltke 2004:215‒216; Weeks 2007:201. 
454
 Fox 1994:235; it is in broad agreement with Clements 2003:440; Clifford 1999:45‒46; Estes 1997:119; 
Farmer 1991:31; Fontaine 1988:452; Fuhs 2001:59‒67; McCreesh 1990:456; McKane 1970:213‒214; 
Meinhold 1991a:63; Murphy 1998:14‒15; Oesterley 1929:13‒14; Plöger 1984:24; Ringgren 1962:17; 
Waltke 2004:216‒219; Weeks 2007:61. 
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separate the first two verses, recognising that the translation of Fox and others is also possible, 
even if, in my opinion, it provides a less smooth reading. 
From the modern commentaries and monographs that discuss the Hebrew of Prov. 2 
extensively, Pardee’s is the only one that diverges somewhat from this structural analysis.455 
He reconstructs three grammatically independent conditions in the first half of the chapter: 
verses 1‒5; 6‒9; 10‒11. His analysis is, however, not followed by most scholars and I also find 
it slightly less persuasive. Nonetheless, much of what I am going to argue for could be adjusted 
to his structure, as well. 
The structure shows sophisticated symmetries in the chapter. The first 11 verses (A to E in 
Table 7) comprise three, 4‒4‒3 verse long strophes. The second half of the chapter also has a 
4‒4‒3 verse long strophe structure, G and H comprising a 3 verse long conclusion to the whole 
chapter. 
This ‘tightly knit structure,’ as Fox describes it, makes theories of redactional intrusions 
somewhat speculative.456 But even if there is a redactional history behind the text, the 
received form of the text ‘forms a meaningful, well-structured literary and conceptual unity,’ 
so it is easy to read it in its received form.457 
The first half of the chapter contains a long conditional sentence, verses 3‒4 being the protasis 
which is picked up by two apodoses (verses 5 and 9). The parallel between the two apodoses 
(verses 5‒8 and 9‒11) is the structural feature which is immediately relevant for us. In verses 
10‒11 wisdom is the subject whereas in verses 6‒8 it is Yahweh (verses 5 and 9 will be 
discussed later). In verse 10 wisdom comes into the heart of the student though in verse 6 
Yahweh gives wisdom to the student. In verse 11 wisdom defends the student but in verses 
7‒8 Yahweh defends him. It appears as if verses 6‒8 tell the same story as verses 10‒11, but 
from a different angle. It is as if verses 6‒8 provide important background information which is 
not necessarily visible to the observer who sees only the reality of verses 10‒11. This 
background information is that it is Yahweh who is behind wisdom.  
                                                          
455
 Pardee 1988:69‒71. 
456
 For such theories see Michel 1992:233‒243; Murphy 2002:236‒237; Whybray 1966:486‒492. 
457
 See Fox 2000:127‒128 and Schäfer 1999:66‒74. 
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If a reader had thought that wisdom is the ‘power’ which governs the world and protects the 
wise, now he or she is informed that there is an even more significant power behind wisdom: 
Yahweh. This message is beautifully expressed by the—maybe only accidental—ambiguity of 
verse 7 too. It is not entirely obvious there whether ‘shield’ describes prudence or Yahweh. 
Grammatically, both are viable options. The broader context, however, makes it clear that the 
real actor is Yahweh. Those who see the broader context of the verse (and also of life) can see 
Yahweh behind wisdom’s protection. 
To conclude, we can say that the structural parallel between wisdom and Yahweh exemplifies 
and recommends a God-centred thinking. 
Wisdom: seeing the divine providence 
The logical order of some key concepts in Prov. 2:5‒6 
As we have just seen, those who carefully listen to Proverbs and internalise its teaching are 
enabled to see the divine providence behind their own security. This teaching is not only 
expressed by the structure of the chapter. It is also conveyed by other literary tools. 
God is introduced into the thought world of the chapter by a powerful rhetorical tool: one 
would expect that if someone is looking for wisdom as eagerly as it is recommended in verses 
1‒4, then she or he will find wisdom. Instead of finding wisdom, however, verse 5 promises 
finding the knowledge of God and understanding the fear of him. That this surprising turn is a 
deliberate rhetorical tool is signaled by the following verse, which gives an explanation for it: 
for it is Yahweh and no one else who gives wisdom. The author is apparently well aware that 
the message of verse 5 takes the reader by surprise and requires some clarification. He applies 
preposing458 in verse 6, that is, הוהי is placed before the verb. Though preposing is not always 
used to give extra emphasis to the first element of the sentence, especially not in a poetic text, 
it probably is here, after the surprising statement of the previous verse.459 A comparison with 
the parallel verse 10 makes this even more obvious, as there we can find an unmarked word 
order: 
                                                          
458
 I am adopting the terminology from Moshavi 2010. 
459
 ‘Emphasis’ is an imprecise word for the effect of preposing. However, it describes well the complex 
role preposing plays in this particular text. Using the terminology of recent linguistic approaches, it 
signifies both ‘focusing’ and ‘topicalisation.’ For the intricate question of the function of preposing see 
Moshavi 2010:18‒47, 90‒103. 
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הנובתו תעד ויפמ המכח ןתי הוהי יכ 6 םעני ךשפנל תעדו ךבלב המכח אובת יכ 10  
Yet, a careful reading of the chapter suggests that however emphatic the role of Yahweh is, the 
text, including verse 5, speaks about wisdom, too. As we will see shortly, verse 5, when read 
together with its wider context, says that seeing Yahweh’s importance is precisely what 
wisdom is. At least this seems to be the most obvious reading of the text if we consider the 
logical and temporal relationships between its elements. 
The sequence of happenings in the first 6 verses in order of appearance is: seeking (verses 
1‒4); finding God (verse 5); and getting wisdom (verse 6). It could be argued that this is not 
only a literary but also a temporal order, i.e. finding God precedes finding wisdom. However, 
this is unlikely in the light of the parallel between verses 5‒8 and 9‒11. In verses 9‒10 it is the 
arrival of wisdom (verse 10) which explains the student’s understanding of righteousness 
(verse 9), so the action of verse 10 logically precedes verse 9. It seems to be a natural reading 
of verses 5‒6 if one sees the same logical order there, namely, that the action of Yahweh in 
verse 6 is a presupposition of the student’s understanding in verse 5. This leaves open two 
possibilities: First, that one gets wisdom from God (verse 6) and after that understands God 
(verse 5). In this case the text speaks about a temporal order.460 Or second, that one gets 
wisdom from God (verse 6) and at the same time understands God (verse 5), that is, being wise 
is (manifested in) understanding God. In this case the text speaks about a logical order. The 
latter option seems to be more likely because of several reasons: 
1. In the parallel statements of verses 9‒10, where ethical behaviour flows from gaining 
wisdom, we can hardly think of a stage when someone is already wise but still non-
ethical. So, verses 9‒10 seem to speak about a logical and not about a temporal 
relationship. 
2. ןיבת in verse 5 can remind the reader of הניב, which is one of the synonyms of wisdom 
(1:2; 8:14; 9:10; etc.) and תעד in the second half of the verse can also call to mind 
wisdom, as it is one of its synonyms (1:4, 7; 8:12; etc.). These associations can give the 
impression that, although not mentioned explicitly, already verse 5 is about wisdom. 
                                                          
460
 See Fox 1994:238. 
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3. Prov. 9:10b states that ‘the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding.’461 Here it 
seems that understanding (which is parallel with wisdom in 9:10a) is identical with the 
knowledge of the Holy One. So, if one reads 2:5 together with 9:10 (which would be 
quite natural as they are similar462 and both of them are at structurally key positions in 
Prov. 1‒9) then an obvious reading of 2:5 would be to take wisdom and knowledge of 
Yahweh as simultaneous, quasi identical phenomena. 
So, it seems that the reader’s expectation to find ‘wisdom’ after the search for it in verses 1‒4 
is satisfied, after all. I would suggest that verse 5 does not use the actual word ‘wisdom’ 
because it wants to emphasise the most important element of wisdom’s content: the 
knowledge of God and understanding the fear of the Lord. 
To summarise my interpretation so far, verse 5 emphasises Yahweh’s central role in giving 
wisdom and also that knowing God is actually the most important part of wisdom. The verse 
expresses these ideas by its position in the whole chapter and also by its word order. In the 
following I am going to argue that verse 5 uses a third literary tool, too, by which it similarly 
suggests that the main part of wisdom is the perception of Yahweh’s central role in life. This 
tool is the careful selection of words and expressions with theologically rich connotations. 
The meaning and connotations of ןיב 
ןיבת, to begin with the first verb of the verse, seems to be a surprising choice of word. Does the 
‘fear of the Lord’ require cognitive apprehension? One would rather expect verse 5 to say 
‘then you will start to fear the Lord.’ The appearance of the same word in the parallel verse 9 
just makes the expression even more peculiar: can it really mean there that the student was 
not familiar with the concepts of justice and righteousness and he had to learn what they are? 
Would not ‘then you will become righteous, just, etc.’ read more naturally in 2:9? 
                                                          
461
 הניב םישדק תעד; I take םישדק תעד as referring to God. This is in agreement with the majority of modern 
commentators (Clifford 1999:107; Ehrlich 1968:45; Fritsch 1955:837; Fox 2000:308; Kidner 1964:83; 
McKane 1970:368; Murphy 1998:60; Ross 2008:105; Toy 1899:194; Waltke 2004:441; Whybray 
1972:53). It cannot be completely ruled out that it refers to the heavenly court as an expression of the 
divine realm (Ringgren 1962:41; Weeks 2007:223) but even then it would be parallel with the statement 
in Prov. 2:5b. 
462
 ‘Fear of the Lord’ (a key term both in 2:5 and 9:10) and its significance, meaning and connection to 
knowledge, understanding, and ethical action will be discussed later. 
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Explaining Prov. 2:5, Fox writes: ‘when the object of hēbîn is a mental state (such as fear of 
God) or a cognitive faculty, the verb means to acquire the designated object in an insightful, 
cognitive way.’463 There are important factors which make Fox’s suggestion persuasive: the 
second half of 2:5 uses אצמ in relation with the ‘knowledge of God’ and this parallel would 
make a similar meaning for ןיבת natural;464 Prov. 1:3 promises that the reader of the book will 
acquire (חקל) precisely the three characteristics mentioned in 2:9. 
On the other hand, though ‘acquiring a mental state in a cognitive way’ seems to be a feasible 
explanation of the term in some contexts, we will see a little later that it is a matter of 
question how much ‘fear of the Lord’ can be equated with a ‘mental state.’ Furthermore, the 
phrase ‘acquire in a cognitive way’ describes a consequence of understanding something 
truly—but I wonder if there are other consequences which are also included in the 
connotations of ןיב and to which one should pay attention. Therefore, it might be worth 
spending some time with deciphering some potential connotations of this word and see if it is 
possible to paraphrase it in a way that fits the context of Prov. 2 just as well or even better 
than ‘acquire in a mental way.’ 
The semantic field of the verb ןיב is wide. Besides ‘understanding’ the dictionaries list possible 
meanings like ‘discern,’ ‘recognise,’ ‘acknowledge,’ ‘apply understanding,’ ‘experience,’ ‘give 
heed to,’ ‘have regard.’ It regularly occurs in parallel with verbs of perception (האר, עמש, 
ןיזאה).465 It is worth quoting some characteristic examples from other biblical books. 
Isaiah 6:9‒10 famously says:  
And He said, Go and tell this people, “listen carefully but do not understand (וניבת), see 
carefully but do not know.” Make the mind of this people dull, make their ears hard of 
hearing, close their eyes. So that they would not see with their eyes, hear with their ears, 
understand (ןיבי) with their minds, and turn and be healed. 
Then in Isa. 32:3‒4a we read, ‘Then the eyes of the seers will not be blind, and the ears of the 
listeners will hear, the mind of the rash will understand well (תעדל ןיבי).’ In these verses the 
word means something like true perception which goes beyond mere knowledge of the facts; 
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it involves perceiving the existential importance of the prophet’s words, a perception which 
leads to action (i.e. repentance). 
In other places we meet the word in contexts which recall wisdom literature. In Deut. 32:29, 
after reading about God’s harsh dealings with a rebellious Israel, we read ‘If only they were 
wise and would understand this and would perceive (וניבי) what their end will be’ (see also Jer. 
9:12). In Ps. 73:17 and 92:6‒7 it is about understanding the end of the wicked. So, in these 
verses the word refers to understanding where wicked deeds lead, to an understanding of the 
connection between behaviour and fate, to a true understanding of cause and effect. 
In the light of these biblical passages I find Ehrlich’s suggestion for the meaning of the word in 
Prov. 2:5 and 2:9 especially attractive. He suggested that we should understand it as 
‘appreciating, valuing’ (Würdigung) the already known facts.466 It is clearly close to how it is 
used in the above quoted Isaian texts where it refers to the right appreciation of seen and 
heard things. It is also in accordance with the idea of seeing clearly where things will lead and 
the correct evaluation of certain factors (like wicked behaviour) in the chain of causation (cf. 
the just discussed Deut. 32:29; Ps. 73:17; 92:6‒7). 
These connotations would be very much at home in the context of Proverbs, where the 
student is encouraged to see that wicked behaviour leads to destruction (cf. 1:10‒33) and that 
right behaviour (2:9) and ‘fear of the Lord’ (2:5) both have the opposite effect. So, besides 
‘understand,’ probable shades of meaning of ןיבת in verses 5 and 9 are ‘appreciate,’ ‘evaluate 
rightly,’ ‘see where it leads.’ 
Of course, if someone is able to evaluate the ‘fear of God’ (verse 5) and righteousness (verse 9) 
correctly, if one sees how they lead to a good life, and if one is able to grasp the existential 
consequences of this vision then this can mean that he has already acquired these qualities. 
So, in an indirect, logical way Fox’s ‘acquire’ could be a right translation of ןיב in these verses. 
If this understanding of ןיבת is correct, then it is very much in line with the above delineated 
message of the whole section: wisdom is a right vision of reality, the perception of the crucial 
role Yahweh plays in protecting people. If one has this right vision, then he or she will also see 
the value of fearing Yahweh. 
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The connotations of םיהלא תעד 
The same message is conveyed by the expression ‘knowledge of God.’ The locus classicus for 
deciphering the meaning of ‘knowledge of God’ is the book of Hosea, since the word עדי, with 
the objects of הוהי, םיהלא, and God’s deeds, occurs there especially frequently (Hosea 2:10, 22; 
4:1, 6; 5:4; 6:3, 6; 8:2; 10:12 (LXX); 11:3; 13:4). In fact, outside Proverbs the exact phrase  תעד
םיהלא appears only in Hosea (Hos. 4:1; 6:6). 467 
Before H. W. Wolff’s influential article468 it was customary to understand  תעדםיהלא  in the light 
of Hosea 1‒3 and stress its sexual, marital, and intimate connotations. Wolff, however, argued 
for the primacy of a covenantal context.469 Though one probably should not contrast marriage 
with covenant, since marriage is sometimes conceived covenantally (see Mal. 2:13‒16), and 
one should not ignore completely the metaphorical power of intimate family relationship,470 I 
find Wolff’s argument persuasive. For, in Hosea, knowing God is mentioned together with דסח 
and תמא (Hos. 4:1; 6:6), with the word ‘covenant’ (6:6‒7; 8:1‒3),471with the deliverance from 
Egypt, the giving of the land, the living in the land (Hos. 4:1; 11:1ff; 13:4), and idolatry (Hos. 
8:2). Thus the covenantal context is hardly deniable. 
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According to Wolff, and many of his followers, there are two important components of this 
covenantal understanding of  תעדםיהלא  in Hosea: history and law. 472 I am going to concentrate 
on law a little later. As for history, Hosea wanted the Israelites to know about God’s historical 
acts: that he led the nation out of Egypt; gave the land to Israel; and provided everything for 
them (Hos. 2:10; 10:12; 11:3; 13:4; etc.). 
Though Prov. 2, as typical wisdom literature, is devoid of any references to the national history 
of Israel, it has an obvious parallel with Hosea. The Hosean emphasis is not purely on knowing 
the historical facts but also on perceiving that it was the Lord who was behind those historical 
events: ‘She did not know that it was I who gave her the grain, the wine, the oil…’ (Hos. 2:10a), 
‘it was I who taught Ephraim to walk, I took them up in my arms, but they did not know that I 
healed them’ (11:3). All this is in line with Prov. 2:6‒8, which, just after mentioning the 
‘knowledge of God,’ teaches that it is Yahweh and Yahweh alone who provides wisdom and 
protection. 
Summary 
As a summary of the discussion so far we can say that Prov. 2 provides the same God-centred 
vision as Hosea by means of several literary tools. The literary structure of the chapter (i.e. 
parallel between verses 5‒8 and 9‒11), the logical structure of verses 5‒6 (i.e. that knowing 
God is wisdom) and the careful choice of vocabulary (  תעדםיהלא , ןיבת) all aim to teach the 
reader to perceive God behind wisdom, justice, protection, and success. All of these literary 
tools depict a God-centred worldview and place God at the centre of the wisdom quest. This is 
very much in harmony not only with Hosea’s God-centred vision but also with what Thomas 
said about having God as the final end. Thomas taught that this means having a God-centred 
thinking, and it is just such a thinking which is encouraged by Prov. 2. 
The element of Thomas’s statement which we have not mentioned yet in connection with 
Proverbs is that Thomas not only spoke about God-centred thinking but also about God-
centred trust. There is, however, hardly any difference in this between Prov. 2 and Thomas. 
Though Prov. 2 does not use the word ‘trust,’ the idea is there as it speaks about divine 
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providence. In fact, the reader does not have to wait long for an explicit mention of trust. The 
next chapter, continuing the theme of knowledge of God and the way-metaphor, both 
introduced in Prov. 2, connects ‘knowing him in all your ways’ (3:6) with trusting in him and 
not relying on one’s own wisdom (3:5). 
Teaching the reader how to trust in God and nothing else is certainly an important topic in 
Proverbs (see 3:21‒26; 22:19). The security that Proverbs offers to the reader is not a cheap 
security. It does not say ‘do not worry, you are secure.’ It says, ‘Trust not in your wisdom (3:5; 
28:26), trust not in unethical means promising success (1:10‒19; 9:17), but trust in the Lord 
and then you will be secure.’ 
So, one of the two Thomistic criteria of having God as the final human end, that is, having God-
centred thinking, hope, and trust, is satisfied by Prov. 2. Before going on, however, to 
investigate the other Thomistic criterion, namely that one must not serve God because of the 
benefits of that service, we should discuss another feature of Prov. 2’s God-centred worldview, 
which provides some interesting further parallels with Thomistic thinking. 
Wisdom: not only seeing but participating in the divine Providence 
My main argument in this section is that according to Prov. 2:5 the sheer knowledge that God 
plays a crucial role in the wisdom quest and protection is not enough for being wise. Behaviour 
is just as crucial as knowledge. ‘Having a God-centred thinking and trust’ includes physical, not 
only mental activity. 
Whereas the vocabulary of Prov. 2:9 conveys the connotation of physical activity since 
‘righteousness,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘equity’ are at least as much behavioural as cognitive patterns, 
the words of Prov. 2:5 seem to depict mainly cognitive processes: ‘understanding,’ ‘fear (of 
God),’ ‘knowledge (of God).’ It would be a mistake, however, to make such a distinction 
between the two verses. Whereas the connotations of the words of 2:5 might seem 
predominantly cognitive for the modern reader, they present a strong emphasis on activity if 
read in their canonical context. 
תעד םיהלא  and behaviour 
As for the ‘knowledge of God,’ we have seen that most commentators understand it in Hosea 
in a covenantal framework in which, as they argue, it refers both to history and law. We have 
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also seen that in the case of history it means more than simply being aware of the historical 
facts; it also means knowing that it is Yahweh who is behind those historical facts. It very 
probably also means more than simply being aware of some legal precepts, in the case of law. 
Knowledge is not enough: true knowledge is expressed by action.473 In Hosea 4:1‒2 we read 
that there is no knowledge of God in Israel, instead there is ‘swearing, and deceit, and murder, 
and stealing, and adultery.’474 In Hos. 6:1‒3 the people think that the ‘knowledge of God’ is like 
a few days long devotion in the temple, which they can easily accomplish, but in 6:4ff God 
reminds them that it is rather steadfast love (דסח) expressed continuously in everyday life. 
This ‘behavioural understanding’ of the ‘knowledge of God’ is also in line with Jer. 22:15‒16 
which offers a ‘quasi-definition’ of knowing God, equating it with טפשמ and הקדצ,475 two terms 
that occur in Prov. 2:9, the parallel verse to Prov. 2:5.476 So, the behavioural connotation of the 
‘knowledge of God’ in Prov. 2:5 fits the context of Prov. 2 very well. This behavioural aspect is 
further emphasised by the ‘way’ metaphor in the verses following 2:5 (םת יכלהל (verse 7), תוחרא 
and ךרדו (verse 8), לכ לגעמ בוט  (verse 9)), which is ‘used by most of the biblical writers to refer 
to human behaviour.’477 
הוהי תארי and behaviour 
The definition of the meaning and connotation of the other key expression of Prov. 2:5, ‘fear of 
the Lord,’ is more complicated than the case of the ‘knowledge of God.’ Is it primarily an 
emotion and attitude,478 or does it rather refer to obeying God’s rules without reference to 
emotions?479 Is it the ‘Hebrew equivalent to “faith” in Christian parlance,’480 or it is fear from 
(the punishment of) God?481 The complexity of the problem is well exemplified by Fox’s 
explanation of the phrase in Prov. 2:5. He argues that one can construct two types of ‘fear of 
the Lord’ lying behind the single biblical expression: ‘Fear of God motivates the search for 
wisdom, which develops into a more sophisticated fear of God, one in which a moral 
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conscience is fused with knowledge of his will.’482 A few pages later he seems to imply that the 
first fear is a fear from external calamity whereas the ‘more sophisticated fear’ is a sort of 
internalised fear, which becomes an intrinsic part of the student’s character.483 
I will return to Fox’s explanation a little later. Now I will simply argue that despite the 
difficulties in pinpointing the meaning of the term, one can be certain of its strong practical 
connotations, which are probably even more apparent than in the case of ‘knowledge of God.’ 
One major source of difficulty is that we are speaking about an ‘open ended’484 term which 
occurs in many contexts with many different connotations. As Moberly writes, ‘“fear of 
God/YHWH” is such a fundamental term within the Old Testament that it risks being as difficult 
to elucidate as terms such as “religion” or “morality”; any single or simple definition is likely to 
be partial and more or less inadequate to the range of textual data.’485 The most common 
solution to this problem in standard 20th century discussions486 was to construct a ‘semantic 
development,’ that is, to attribute distinct meanings to the occurrence of the phrase in texts 
written in different ages or in texts belonging to different genres. However, besides the 
notorious problem of dating texts, it seems unlikely that different traditions could exist in 
isolation without influencing each other. On a hermeneutical level it is also questionable 
whether someone reading a text in a canonical context should ignore resonances created by 
the textual corpus even if some authors were not necessarily aware of all of those resonances. 
So, for historical and hermeneutical reasons, I tend to agree with Dell, who, after listing 
possible numinous, cultic, legal, covenantal, and ethical connotations of the phrase, writes: 
While different contexts may indicate nuances of meaning, the question is raised whether 
one needs to posit a whole different set of meanings for the use of such terms in wisdom 
literature, or whether in fact one should bring to the wisdom context the wider overtones 
of meaning contained in the concepts as used elsewhere. I propose the latter path.
487
 
However, even if one allows for the possibility that the phrase retains the richness and 
deepness of its meaning created by its diverse connotations in other biblical texts, it is 
nevertheless pertinent to try to ascertain which connotations best fit the text in hand. I would 
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like to draw the attention to three such connotations, all of which refer at least as much to 
behavioural patterns as to cognitive ones: ethical behaviour, serving God, and imitating God. 
First, ‘fear of God’ is closely related to ethical behaviour throughout Proberbs. 488 As 14:2a 
writes, ‘the one who walks in his uprightness fears the Lord’ (see also 8:13; 16:6; 23:17). In our 
text, 2:5’s parallel with 2:9 underlies this ethical connotation: there the student is supposed to 
‘understand’ (ןיבת) righteousness and justice and equity just as he is supposed to ‘understand’ 
(ןיבת) ‘fear of the Lord’ in 2:5. 
Moberly notes in connection with the moral connotation of the ‘fear of God’ that it ‘can signify 
moral restraint out of respect for God, a moral restraint specifically that refuses to take 
advantage of a weaker party...’489 This aspect of moral behaviour fits the context of Proverbs 
well. Though Prov. 1:11 does not mention the weak but the innocent, one can see the 
opposition between the behaviour of the sinners in Prov. 1:10‒19 who want to ambush the 
innocent on the one hand and the ‘moral restraint’ of the ‘fear of the Lord’ in Prov. 2 (and in 
1:7 and 1:29) on the other. This kind of moral restraint is also in the semantic field of 
righteousness and justice (Prov. 29:7; 31:9; Lev. 19:15; Ps. 72:2; 82:3; Isa 11:4; etc.) mentioned 
in 2:9.  
Second, ‘fear of the Lord’ probably has the general connotation of serving God. Stuart Weeks 
makes a brief comment in relation to ‘fear of the Lord’ in Proverbs 1‒9, saying that ‘the fear of 
YHWH should probably be understood to imply a relationship of loyal, obedient respect: Mal. 
1:6 suggests that fear is something owed to a master, just as honour is something owed to a 
father.’490 Mal. 1:6 writes: ‘A son honours [his] father, and a servant his lord. If I am a father, 
where is the honour due to me; and if I am the Lord, where is the fear (יארומ) due to me?—says 
the Lord of hosts to you—The priests despise (יזוב) my name. But you ask: in what have we 
despised (וניזב) your name?’ 491 
Weeks, in a footnote, refers to Deut. 6:13 as a verse which strengthens this servanthood 
connotation of ‘fear of the Lord.’ In fact, however, the themes of being God’s servant and 
fearing him are mentioned together several times besides Mal. 6:13 and Deut. 6:13 (Deut. 
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10:12, 20; 13:5 [English 13:4]; Josh. 24:14; 1 Sam. 12:14, 24; Neh. 1:11; Job 1:8; 2:3; Ps. 
119:38). 
Proverbs itself does not mention ‘serving’ explicitly in connection with ‘fear of the Lord.’ 
Nevertheless, it does connect ‘fear of the Lord’ with a character trait which is typical for 
servants: obedient listening. In Proverbs we find three variations of the statement ‘the fear of 
the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.’ The first is in a programmatic sentence to the whole 
book (1:7), the second at the end of the first section (9:10), and the third towards the middle 
of the whole book (15:33). At these structurally significant places the sentence is placed next 
to verses which speak about paying attention to instruction. Proverbs 1:7 is followed by two 
verses motivating the student to listen to his father’s and mother’s instruction (רסומ). Proverbs 
9:10 is preceded by three verses discussing the different reactions of scoffers and wise people 
to others correcting (רסי) them. Proverbs 15:33 is preceded by two verses that speak about the 
positive and negative reactions given to instruction (רסומ).492 
A similar connection can be observed in Prov. 1:20‒33, where listening to wisdom’s instruction 
(1:20‒25, 33) surrounds the mention of the ‘fear of the Lord’ (1:29). The topic is carried over 
into chapter two, which begins with an encouragement to listen to the words of the father 
(Prov. 2:1‒2). In fact, this encouragement in 2:1‒2 follows the encouragement to listen to 
wisdom in 1:33 so swiftly that an inattentive reader might even miss the change of speaker. 
The swift change creates an effect that gives the father a special authority and that makes the 
impression that listening to him is like listening to (divine) wisdom.493 
So, although there is no explicit mention of servanthood in Proverbs, the context does not 
disallow such a connotation of the ‘fear of the Lord,’ and the emphasis on listening to 
instruction might even activate it. 
There is one more factor which suggests that the servanthood connotation of ‘fear of the Lord’ 
is accommodated well by the context of Prov. 2. A canonical reading which views Prov. 2 in the 
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light of Deuteronomy could be offered easily, as Prov. 2 contains numerous deuteronomic 
elements: living in the land (Prov. 2:21‒22, c.f. Deut. 4:10; 5:16, 33; 6:18; 11:9; 15:4‒5; 16:20; 
17:20; 22:7; 25:15; 32:47); the idea of knowledge of God (Deut. 7:9); path metaphor (Deut. 
11:28; 13:6 [English 13:5]); and warning against foreign women (Deut. 7:4).494 Such a canonical 
reading would strengthen the servanthood connotation of ‘fear of the Lord’ because, as we 
have already seen, the ideas of servanthood and ‘fear of the Lord’ occur in close proximity 
several times in Deuteronomy (6:13; 10:12, 20; 13:5 [English 13:4]). 
So, if there is a connotation of the term ‘fear of the Lord’ which ‘one should bring to the 
wisdom context [from among] the wider overtones of meaning contained in the concept as 
used elsewhere’495 then ‘servanthood’ seems to be a good candidate. 
The image of a servant can be useful for the modern reader not only because it is a possible 
connotation of ‘fear of the Lord’ which, though not mentioned explicitly, fits the context of 
Prov. 2 well, but also because it can help us to visualise the complex concept of ‘fear of the 
Lord.’ It might be a wise tactic when describing such an open-ended idea as the ‘fear of the 
Lord,’ to use an image which is open to many connotations instead of a fixed definition. A 
servant can obey his master automatically, out of fear of retribution, or out of love. The 
emphasis can be on his actions, his feelings, his thinking, or his humble status, depending on 
the context. The image of the relationship between a servant and his lord is as similarly open-
ended as the concept of ‘fear of the Lord,’ but maybe more suggestive to the modern reader. 
Besides helping us to grasp the meaning of ‘fear of the Lord’ by the help of a single image, the 
picture of a servant also underlies how indivisible ‘fear of the Lord’ is from action. Being a good 
servant is always expressed in action, not only in thought. This leads us to our third point 
about the possible connotations of ‘fear of the Lord,’ which is the connection between ‘fear of 
the Lord’ and imitatio Dei. 496 Israel, as a servant of God, was expected to mirror God’s actions 
as it can be seen in Deut. 10:12-20 in which the themes of fearing God, serving God, and 
imitating God are intermingled: 
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And now, Israel,… fear the Lord your God, walk in all his ways, love him, and serve the Lord 
your God… because the Lord your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great God, 
mighty and awesome, who is not partial and takes no bribe, does the justice of the orphan 
and the widow, and loves the alien, giving him food and clothing. You shall [also] love the 
alien… The Lord your God you shall fear, him you shall serve.
497
 
The theme of imitatio Dei is clearly connected to ‘fear of the Lord’ in Pss. 111‒112, too. Taken 
as one unit, as it is often done,498 ‘fear of the Lord’ is at the centre of these twin psalms 
(111:10; 112:1). There are eleven words or phrases in Ps. 112 which seem to be taken from Ps. 
111.499 Many of those which describe the God-fearer in Ps. 112 are used to describe God in Ps. 
111:500 





His righteousness continues forever 
(דעל תדמע ותקדצ) (111:3) 
Their righteousness continues forever 
(דעל תדמע קדצות ) (112:3, 9) 
He is merciful and affectionate (םוחרו ןונח) 
(111:4) 
They are merciful and affectionate 
(םוחרו ןונח) (112:4) 
The works of his hands are just (טפשמ) 
(111:7)  
They conduct their affairs in justice (טפשמ) 
(112:5) 
His wonderful deeds (or he himself?) are 
remembered (רכז) (111:4) 
They will be remembered (רכז) (112:6) 
 
His deeds are firm (ךומס) 
(111:8) 
Their hearts are steady (ךומס) 
(112:8) 
He gives (ןתנ) food to those who fear him 
(111:5) 
They give (ןתנ) to the poor 
(112:9) 
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This imitatio Dei theme also fits the context of Prov. 2. We have seen that the deeds of wisdom 
and that of Yahweh are parallel in verses 6‒8 and 10‒11, so one can suppose that the God-
fearing, wise person also follows the divine pattern of behaviour. In this respect we should 
note how Prov. 2:9 is related to the previous verses. In Prov. 2:8 we read that God guards 
justice (טפשמ). Maybe it is significant that the text does not say ‘just people’ but ‘justice.’ The 
concept itself is dear to God, not only certain people. In the next verse (2:9) the student begins 
to ‘appreciate’ (ןיב) precisely that justice which is so important for Yahweh. In a (limited) way, 
the student becomes similar to God, just like the God-fearer of Ps. 112 is similar to the God of 
Ps. 111. 
Another feature of Prov. 2 which might strengthen the imitatio Dei connotation of ‘fear of the 
Lord’ is that ‘knowledge of God’ itself could probably have the same connotation in certain 
contexts. At least Wolff, though not using the exact phrase, referred to the theme of imitatio 
Dei in his discussion of the ‘knowledge of God’ in Hosea: ‘human behaviour is only a reflection 
of the divine behaviour pattern.’ 502 As Wolff argued, in Hosea God expresses his דסח towards 
his people, so the Israelite is expected to express similar דסח towards God and towards his 
fellow Israelite.503 In a similar fashion, Christopher Wright argued that the virtues mentioned 
throughout Proverbs imitate the characteristics of God.504 
Knowledge, action, participation in the divine: parallels between Thomas and 
Proverbs 2 
So, both ‘knowledge of God’ and ‘fear of the Lord’ have strong practical, behavioural 
connotations in Prov. 2:5. They describe knowledge and a servant attitude that are expressed 
through action. The student not only knows about divine providence but also acts according to 
this knowledge. 
This ‘behavioural’ understanding of knowledge is not far from how Thomas understood it. He 
also thought that happiness, which is the knowledge of God, was connected to virtuous 
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behaviour just as much as to perceiving God’s providence (ST II‒II, 180, 4). Not only does 
contemplating virtuous behaviour lead to a knowledge of God but this knowledge of God, 
claimed Thomas, leads to a virtuous behaviour, too: 
Now, granting that wisdom is the knowledge of divine things, our notion of it is one thing 
and that of pure philosophers, another. For us, life is directed towards the eventual 
possession of God and its principal orientations are those deriving from our participation 
in the divine nature by way of grace, with the result that we do not look upon wisdom as 




All this is very close to how Prov. 2 sees ‘knowledge of God.’ 
However, there is an important dissimilarity between Prov. 2 and Thomas. Thomas 
differentiated between an imperfect contemplation, which was only ‘through a glass’ and ‘in a 
dark manner’ (ST II‒II, 180, 4), and a perfect one. Perfect contemplation, for Aquinas, was only 
attainable in the heavenly bliss and it is a direct vision of God not ‘disturbed’ by actions. As he 
wrote, ‘…the more our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more is it 
withdrawn from sensible things.’506 He thought that virtuous behaviour is imitation of God only 
in a limited, metaphorical sense: 
The last end of all is to become like God… Now this is not in regard to moral actions, since 
suchlike actions cannot be ascribed to God, except metaphorically… therefore man’s 
ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions.
507
 
So, moral actions are useful here on earth, they enable one to contemplate God, but they only 
lead to an end without significantly taking part in that end.508 
This differentiation between the earthly contemplation which is connected to action and the 
heavenly one which is not connected to practical life goes well beyond the text of Proverbs, 
which does not know about a ‘perfect,’ heavenly knowledge of God unaided by action. 
Nevertheless, the earthly, imperfect knowledge of God was crucial for Thomas’s moral 
theology, and, as we have just seen, very much in line with Proverbs’ understanding of the 
knowledge of God: both include a certain worldview, an understanding of God’s providential 
actions, and also a life accompanied by actions which is in accordance with this worldview. In 
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this respect we should also note that for Thomas, just as for Proverbs, this (earthly) knowledge 
of God is connected to the theme of imitatio Dei. 
Some of Thomas’s modern interpreters explain even Thomas’s most debated and most 
influential concept, the natural law, in a way which is very much in line with the imitatio Dei 
understanding of right human actions and the teaching of Prov. 2. 
Thomas differentiates between four types of law: 
 eternal law, which is in God’s mind and occasionally identified with God himself;509 
 divine law (divided into Old and New law), which can be found in the Bible; 
 human law, that is, the regulations of society; 
 natural law which is in (human) nature. 
Now Thomas, in Summa Theologiae, devotes only one question to discussing natural law (I‒II, 
94) and eighteen others to discussing the other laws (I‒II, 90‒93; 95‒108). If quantity is a sign 
of interest then Thomas’s interests were somewhere else than later scholarly interpretations 
of his thought imply, for they focus much more on his thoughts about natural law. 
Hittinger (and some others)510 suggests that, by utilising the concept of natural law, one of 
Thomas’s major interests was to provide a theological framework for right human action. This 
framework sees appropriately self-interested human behaviour as a conversation with God, 
even as a participation in divine providence. According to this interpretation of natural law it is 
important to understand that natural law is explicitly defined in the context of eternal law. As 
Thomas writes in ST I‒II, 91, 2: 
Intelligent creatures are ranked under divine Providence the more nobly because they 
take part in Providence by their own providing for themselves and others. Thus they join 
in and make their own the Eternal Reason through which they have their natural aptitudes 
for their due activity and purpose. Now this sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent 
creatures is what we call ‘natural law’. 
In other words, God provides for his creatures, and when rational creatures provide for 
themselves (and others) then they imitate God, that is, participate in his eternal law.511 So, 
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following the principles of natural law, in other words caring for one’s own material, social, 
and spiritual needs, is nothing else than taking part in God’s providence;512 at least if someone 
conducts this self-care wisely, making the right choices which lead to appropriate human ends. 
Thomas basically describes prudence as an imitation of divine providence. It is not only an 
accident, he claims, that the very name of prudence is taken from providence (ST II‒II, 49, 6, 
ad. 1; see also ST I, 22, 1). This Thomistic vision is in accordance with Prov. 2, in which wisdom 
is expressed in actions that are in accordance with God’s providential activity. 
In this sense, of course, one can participate in divine providence without being aware of this 
participation. But for Thomas and for Prov. 2 human happiness contains awareness. Knowing 
that God provides and acting in a God-imitating way (i.e. providing for oneself and for others) 
goes hand in hand in both Proverbs and Thomas. 
Summary 
According to Thomas’s ethics, a non-selfish person is supposed to consider God as the highest 
end. Such a person has a God-centred thinking, hope, and trust. Does Proverbs lead its reader 
towards this kind of thinking and attitude? The answer I have given to this question is 
affirming. In Prov. 2 the focus on God is expressed by 
 A God-centred worldview (parallels between wisdom [Prov. 2:9‒11] and Yahweh 
[Prov. 2:5‒8], knowing [that] God [is behind protection] [Prov. 2:5‒8], and valuing the 
fear of the Lord [Prov. 2:5]). 
 Trust in God (presupposed by Prov. 2, explicitly taught later [Prov. 3:5]) 
 God-imitating action (Prov. 2:9, connotations of ‘fear of the Lord’ and ‘knowledge of 
God’ in Prov. 2:5). 
Before going on to Thomas’s other criterion for having God as the final end (i.e. not serving 
God for its benefits), I will address these three points again in relation to some theological 
issues. I will also underline some further similarities between the thought of Thomas and 
Proverbs. 
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As one of Thomas’s interpreters puts it, for Thomas ‘wisdom... is a matter of having a certain 
understanding of reality.’513 The teaching of Prov. 2 is similar. It stresses that one has to 
understand reality correctly in order to be able to make wise decisions. In other words, values 
and criteria for wisdom are not created by individual humans, not even by human society, but 
they are based on this reality. As Jonathan Sacks puts it, 
Religious faith suggests that... the moral rules and virtues which constrain and enlarge our 
aspirations are not mere subjective devices and desires. They are ‘out there’ as well as ‘in 
here’. They represent objective truths about the human situation.
514
 
Speaking about ‘reality’ and moral rules being ‘out there’ might call to mind one of the key 
expressions of modern biblical Proverbs interpretations: world-order. However, I have already 
expressed my sympathy with the opinion of some scholars who claim that it is dubious 
whether the category ‘world-order’ is a useful one for describing Proverbs’ teaching. Can these 
seemingly different views be reconciled? 
Prov. 2 undeniably describes reality in a certain way, and, if one wants, one can call this reality 
an ‘order.’ However, a simple statement like this can be misleading. 
First of all, one has to recognise that speaking about this order does not necessarily mean that 
it can be deciphered purely by human rationality. In Prov. 2 the whole learning process begins 
by listening to the teaching of the father and not by careful investigation of the world. There is 
not a single admonition for such an investigation in Prov. 2. So, if Thomas maintained that one 
can get to know God and the order of reality by using his or her rational abilities, then his 
teaching is not supported by Prov. 2.515 
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Furthermore, Prov. 2 does not teach that the ‘world-order’ is independent from Yahweh. On 
the contrary, the order of reality is that wisdom, and therefore justice and protection, proceed 
from Yahweh. The teaching is not about Yahweh and the world-order but about Yahweh’s 
mind as the world-order. If one longs for understanding the world properly, then he or she has 
to understand God first, as he is the order of the world. God is the reality. As Prov. 9:10 puts it, 
‘the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding’ ( יבהנ  םישדק תעד). That is, knowing God means 
understanding reality properly. It is noteworthy that this equation, at least in 9:10, works only 
one way, from God to the world. It does not claim that knowing the world means knowing 
God. The ‘knowledge of the Holy One’ is a definite noun phrase and as such more determined 
than the indefinite ‘understanding,’ consequently it is the subject and ‘understanding’ is the 
predicate of this nominal sentence. 516 
So, though Prov. 2 recommends knowing the ‘world-order’ properly, this knowledge is 
somewhat different from what the connotation of the expression ‘world-order’ might suggest 
at first sight. It is knowing a person, namely Yahweh, and this knowledge is expressed by a 
humble, trustful, servant-like relationship to him. 
Trust 
However, one might still ask why the God-centred worldview of Prov. 2 makes self-interest 
‘ordinate’? Can one not use his or her knowledge of God-centred reality, even his or her 
trustful relationship to Yahweh, for achieving selfish aims? One certainly can, but maybe the 
issue of trust qualifies the picture somewhat. 
Trusting despite the temptation of easy, though unethical, success is not convenient. Trusting 
in the face of imminent danger is hard. Hence the need for frequent promises of security in 
Proverbs and the often emphatic encouragement to trust in God (3:5, 21‒26; 16:20; 22:19; 
23:17‒18; 28:25‒26; 29:25). It is not an accident that Thomas connected trust and hope with 
the virtue of courage (ST II‒II, 129, 6; ST I‒II, 23, 3; ST I‒II, 45, 1‒2; ST I‒II, 40, 4). Or, as a 
scholar of the Hebrew Bible, Levenson writes: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
governs all things directly or that He wishes to be worshipped in some particular way, is a matter 
relating to faith’ (CT, 2.246). 
Nevertheless, though recognizing Thomas’s complex thought and its debated interpretation, since I am 
not an expert on Thomas, I refrain from arriving at a verdict on this issue. 
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Though the persistence of evil seems to undermine the magisterial claims of the creator-
God, it is through submission to exactly those claims that the good order that is creation 
comes into being. Like all other faith, creation-faith carries with it enormous risk. Only as 
the enormity of the risk is acknowledged can the grandeur of the faith be appreciated.
517
 
To use the philosophical terminology of Charles Taylor, being wise and trusting in the Lord is a 
‘strong evaluation’ which restricts ‘preferences’ that involve direct personal satisfaction.518 So, 
though in a sense being wise (i.e. trustful) for the sake of security is a self-interested act, in 
concrete cases it might involve courageous giving up of one’s control over one’s situation. The 
way to security is the way of hope which might lead through seeming insecurity. 
The opposite of trust in God in Proverbs is not so much ‘doubt’ in God (which is seldom 
mentioned if at all, at least not explicitly) but trust in oneself (cf. 3:5 vs 3:7; 28:25‒26.) No 
wonder the reader of Proverbs is so often reminded about the dangers of pride. In the case of 
pride we can see similar dynamics to what we have just seen in connection with trust: one has 
to give up something to attain it. In order to acquire honour, one has to give up control over it, 
e.g. by avoiding boasting, that is, actively and explicitly trying to acquire honour. Human 
control (i.e. boasting) is less effective, yet it requires integrity and trust in God to avoid it. So, 
the theoretically shrewd calculation of not boasting in order to get honour is, in practical 
terms, a very hard lesson in character formation. We can say that, in a paradoxical way, 
appropriate self-interest is nothing else than giving up the self. 
It is noteworthy in connection with pride and the lack of trust in God that Thomas maintained 
that ‘it amounts to the same thing whether pride or self-love be called the beginning of all sin’ 
(ST I‒II, 84, 2, ad. 3). Both pride and inordinate self-love represent a self-centred thinking 
instead of a God-centred one. This means that both pride and inordinate self-love are 
expressed in contempt for God, in lack of willingness to submit or listen to him.519 The 
similarity between the thinking of Thomas and Proverbs is shown by Proverbs’ frequent 
condemnations of the same behavioural pattern, namely mocking, pride, not listening to 
divine and human correction, feeling contempt for the Lord and (divine) wisdom (Prov. 1:22; 
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3:34; 8:13; 9:7‒8; 13:1; 14:2, 6; 15:12; 16:5, 18‒19; 18:12; 19:29; 21:24; etc.) and also by the 
connection between listening and fear of the Lord, which we have observed above. 
Action 
Understanding God-centred reality and trusting in God is also expressed in action. In 
connection with this point I have argued that the theological interpretation of the idea of 
natural law, which places the emphasis not on its independence from divine revelation but on 
its identity with God’s mind, is very much in line with the imitatio Dei theme in Prov. 2. 
According to this interpretation of Thomas and the teaching of Prov. 2, acting in harmony with 
reality (i.e. behaving wisely) is crucial precisely because it connects one to God through 
imitating him and participating in his providence. 
The vision of wisely ‘self-interested’ actions that connect one to God opens up the possibility 
of seeking wisdom not primarily because it provides security—and, only as a by-product, 
connects to God. On the contrary, it might encourage one to seek wisdom primarily because it 
connects to God—and, only as a by-product, provides security. The investigation of this 
possibility belongs to Thomas’s second criterion for considering God as the highest end, which 
will now be discussed. 
Does Proverbs teach that one must not serve God because of 
the benefits of that service? 
Aquinas’s tenet of not serving God for its benefits seems straightforward at the first sight. 
Similarly, in the light of my earlier discussion it also seems clear that Proverbs does build on 
those benefits in its motivational system. So, it seems that Thomas and Proverbs are in 
disagreement about this point. In this section I am going to argue that both statements about 
the thought of Thomas and Proverbs are oversimplifications and that it is possible to read 
Proverbs in a Thomistic frame of reference though not necessarily the way Thomas himself 
read it. 
Thomas, in fact, recognised that the Bible itself often gives the impression as if even a proper 
relationship with God could be motivated by its benefits. To handle the issue he utilised 
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Aristotle’s complex theory of causation.520 In order to understand Aquinas’s thinking at this 
point it is necessary to quote him at length: 
Is God to be loved because of himself?... The term, because of, signifies some kind of 
causal relationship. Now there are four kinds of cause: final, formal, efficient, and 
material, the last including material dispositions also, which are not causes simply 
speaking in a qualified sense. It is in terms of these then that we say that a thing is loved 
because of something else: thus, medicine because of health—final cause; a man because 
of virtue—formal cause, for it is virtue that makes him formally good and consequently 
lovable; others because they are the children of some particular father—efficient cause. 
But in terms of a disposition, which for our purposes comes to the same as a material 
cause, we talk about loving something because of what disposes us to love it, as for 
example favours received; and this holds after we have already begun to love, even 
though then it is not because of such favours that we love a friend, but because of his 
worth. 
As to the first three ways, then, it must be said that we do not love God because of 
anything else, but because of himself alone. For, being himself the last end of all things, 
there is no other end to which he is subordinate; nor does he need any other form to 
make him good, since his very substance is his goodness and the exemplar of all other 
goods; nor does his goodness derive from another, rather is he the source of whatever 
goodness there is in everything else. But if we consider the fourth way, then God can be 
loved because of something else; for we are disposed by other things to advance in loving 
him, for example by favours already received, by the rewards we hope for, or by the 
punishments which, by his help, we purpose to avoid.
521
 
There is much in this lengthy quotation that would require elucidation but for our limited 
purposes it suffices if we concentrate on the fourth type of causation. The ‘material causation’ 
means having the material for the reception of a form. To understand this idea fully we have to 
put it into the wider context of Thomas’s thought. Happiness, for Thomas, meant 
contemplating God and becoming like God as much as possible (ST II‒II, 19, 7). For reaching 
perfection in this, one needs God’s grace, for God has to implant into one certain virtues (faith, 
hope, love). However, this does not mean complete passivity on the human’s part. Humans 
can contribute by preparing themselves for the reception of God’s gift of faith. The human 
character is the matter which can be acquired before receiving its perfect form provided by 
God (that is, faith, love, and hope). This preparation means forming our dispositions (a broad 
category which includes virtues) and in this formation reward and punishment can play an 
important role.522 
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Quite simply, Aquinas presupposes a learning process during which human beings have to 
develop virtues. During this process they are motivated by reward and punishment. 
So, for Thomas, interpreting Proverbs did not pose a serious problem. He eventually explained 
the whole Bible according to this theory, claiming that the Old Testament contains many 
references to rewards because it is written mainly for the formation of largely unformed 
people. However, he notes that there were a few quite virtuous people already in the time of 
the Old Testament and in order to provide them with ‘spiritual food,’ not all of the Old 
Testament passages are full of earthly motivations. Similarly, there were people during the 
New Testament times who were still quite ‘unformed,’ which is why we occasionally find New 
Testament passages that motivate by reward and punishment (ST I‒II, 107, 1; ST I‒II, 91, 5).523 
Thomas also understood the Bible’s teaching about the fear of the Lord in the same 
educational context. He stated that fear of God is the beginning of wisdom in two senses (ST 
II‒II, 19, 7). First, a person fears punishment, and this fear motivates him or her to behave well 
and, consequently, a good character begins to be formed in that person. As he or she becomes 
receptive through this process, God provides the gift of wisdom to him or her. This wisdom will 
produce a fear which is not a fear of punishment anymore but a fear of getting separated from 
God. The first fear was a fear of a slave who was afraid of punishment, the second is a fear of a 
son who loves his father and longs to be with him (ST II‒II, 19, 4; ST II‒II, 19, 10). This way, the 
first fear is the beginning of wisdom in the sense that it leads to wisdom, the second fear is the 
beginning of wisdom in the sense that it is the first effect of it (ST II‒II, 19, 7).524 
Even if one accepts Thomas’s general theory of the role of reward and punishment, some of its 
specific points seem to be questionable. Concerning the fear of the Lord, there is no textual 
indication that there are two distinct types of it. This, of course, does not necessarily mean 
that one cannot interpret the phrase along these lines. (Indeed, it is striking how similar 
Thomas’s understanding of the two types of fear of the Lord is to Fox’s interpretation of Prov. 
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2:5). 525 It only means that the support for this interpretation is in a frame of reference which is 
outside of the text. 
Nevertheless, I would prefer to keep the unified but open-ended notion of ‘fear of the Lord’ in 
the text instead of dividing it into filial fear and servile fear. This is why I used the image of a 
servant, something which is beyond the text of Proverbs though explicitly used in other biblical 
texts and indirectly supported by Proverbs, too. This image is capable of drawing out many 
implications of the text while at the same time keeping the phrase’s unity and ambiguity.526 
This way, the particular connotations of the phrase are always dependent on the immediate 
context. This raises the question of whether there are two different types of contexts. In other 
words, is Thomas right in his differentiation between the more reward-focused (mainly) Old 
Testament texts and the more God-focused (mainly) New Testament texts? 
Thomas’s understanding of the Old Testament as suitable for ‘less formed’ people is not 
dissimilar to the theological framework in which some 19th century scholars tried to make 
sense of the book of Proverbs. One wonders, however, if it is rather a presupposition than a 
conclusion. Of course, one could argue that the New Testament puts a stronger emphasis on 
heavenly rewards, but it is not clear that there are significantly fewer New Testament passages 
referring to rewards than Old Testament passages. It is enough to read through the Sermon on 
the Mount, one of Thomas’s texts from which he deduces what counts as inordinate self-
interest, to see how often the New Testament refers to rewards and punishment (Mt. 5:4, 5, 6, 
7, 19, 25, 46; 6:1, 4, 6, 14‒15, 18, 33; 7: 1‒2).527 
Instead of following Thomas in dividing biblical texts (and fear of the Lord) into two groups, I 
would rather suggest that biblical texts (and fear of the Lord) can be often interpreted in two 
ways. The Sermon on the Mount teaches, first, that one should seek for the righteousness of 
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God and his kingdom, and, second, that God will then provide. On the one hand, this can easily 
be read as saying that one should take God as the final end of one’s life. On the other hand it is 
not impossible that one would be attracted to this God-seeking lifestyle through the texts’s 
promise of security. 
Similarly, many other biblical texts can be read on these two levels. To take a New Testament 
example first, Phil. 2 (in combination with Phil. 3 where Paul’s ‘personal testimony’ represents 
his appropriation of Phil. 2)528 encourages the reader to leave behind his or her status and 
empty him- or herself in order to imitate Christ and become a true servant of God. However, at 
the end, it promises exaltation if one does so (Phil. 2:9‒11; 3:21). When turning to the OT, we 
find that Abraham, a paradigmatic God-fearer of the Bible (Gen. 22:12) is indeed willing to give 
God everything—but because of this willingness, God promises him blessing in the end (Gen. 
22:16‒18). Job, another God-fearer was tested to see whether he feared God for the sake of 
benefits coming from God (Job 1:1. 9).529 But again, in the epilogue to the book, we read about 
the rich blessings Job gains from God for enduring the test (42:12‒17). Solomon did not ask for 
riches and honour but for wisdom—however, God gave him riches and honour because he did 
not ask for them (1 Kings 3:10‒14). These texts suggest that Christ, Abraham, Job, and 
Solomon did not fear God for his blessings. The mention of the gains usually comes at the very 
end, sometimes (as in Job) rather as an afterthought and not as the main message of the text. 
However, the reader of (the final form) of their stories can argue that ‘knowing the whole 
picture, it is worth serving God because it pays, eventually.’ 
So, in a sense, many ‘higher texts’530 which are supposed to be written for the virtuous people 
are more ambiguous than Thomas would like to admit. But one should also recognize that this 
ambiguity is equally true for texts supposed to be written for ‘beginners.’ These texts might 
appear as a detailed outworking of the ‘afterthought’ in the story of Job. Proverbs, for 
example, clearly stresses the ‘…and God will provide’ part. Yet, I argued above that the ‘seek 
his righteousness and kingdom’ is not missing either. Prov. 2, besides highlighting the benefits 
of knowing God and being righteous, offers a vision of being similar to God and serving him by 
partaking in his providence. As it is possible that the reader of Phil. 2‒3, Gen. 22, Job, or 1 
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Kings is motivated by the benefits and not by the interest-free community with God, so it is 
possible that the reader of Prov. 2 is mainly influenced by this vision of imitating God and not 
by the benefits themselves. 
Summary 
There are significant differences between the thought of Thomas and Proverbs: there is no 
sign of a heavenly reward in the book of Proverbs; there is also no clear sign of Thomas’s two 
types of fear of God in it; Prov. 2 does not know about a differentiation between a perfect, 
heavenly and an imperfect, earthly knowledge of God; Prov. 2 does not teach that the moral 
order can be discovered purely through rational investigation (though it is questionable how 
much Thomas teaches this). 
On the other hand, there are also many similarities: wisdom means having a certain 
worldview; having the right worldview is expressed by right action; being prudent means 
participation in providence; speaking about reality means speech about God’s mind. These and 
other similarities provide ground for a ‘Thomistic’ interpretation of Prov. 2. 
However, does this also mean that, as in Thomas, Prov. 2 requires the student to see God as 
the final end of his life? Thomas offers two criteria for deciding if this is so. One of them 
teaches that one should have a God-centered thinking, hope, and trust. Prov. 2 satisfies this 
criterion. 
The other criterion, namely that one should not pursue God because of its benefits, is a trickier 
one. Thomas suggested that there are two types of biblical texts: one which clearly teaches 
this criterion; and one which motivates through offering rewards in order to form the 
character of the reader. Instead of this division between biblical texts, I suggested that most (if 
not all) biblical texts can be read in two ways. Indeed, this is what one, who thinks in the 
paradigm of Thomas’s eudaemonism, would expect. After all, according to this paradigm, (1) 
what is good (2) is also beneficial. If a text is true to reality, it must describe both sides of it. 
Consequently the reader can stress one or the other in his or her reading. 
Although Proverbs repeatedly stresses the ‘beneficial’ side, Prov. 2 describes the wise person 
as the imago Dei, one who participates in God’s providence. This is a vision that can motivate 




We have seen that self-interest plays a crucial role in Proverbs. The book motivates the reader 
towards good behaviour by promising (mainly) material and/or external goods for it. The 
beneficial effects of wise behaviour are not only recognised but they are at the focus of the 
book’s argument. This is why it is problematic to overcome the problem by a simple reference 
to the order of the creation. 
We have also seen that Thomas Aquinas had a lot to say about self-interest. However, he 
differentiated between good self-interest and inordinate selfishness. According to Thomas, 
self-interest is legitimate as long as 
 it is aimed at self-preservation; 
 justice, as a community-oriented virtue, complements self-interested prudence; 
 the spiritual self is loved more than the material self; 
 there is a hierarchy of ends: higher human ends (community and God) modify the 
lower ones (self-preservation) 
As Proverbs used to be ‘accused’ of being eudaemonistic because of its ‘selfishness’ and 
Thomistic moral theology is an eudaemonistic system (that is, it claims that ‘happiness’ is the 
appropriate human end), a comparison of the two might shed some light on Proverbs. Is it 
possible to interpret Proverbs in a Thomistic frame of reference? Can we find the same or at 
least similar qualifying factors in Proverbs’ teaching about self-interest as in Thomas’s moral-
theology? The answer to these questions seems to be a qualified ‘yes.’ 
Is Proverbs focusing on self-preservation? 
Yes, but only partly. We have seen that there is a very strong emphasis on ‘survival’ which is, 
however, sometimes overshadowed in commentaries by an emphasis on ‘success.’ 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Proverbs puts stronger emphasis on material/external 
success (i.e. riches, honour) than Thomas does. 
Does justice complement and regulate the self-interest of Proverbs? 
Yes, it does. ‘Justice’ and ‘righteousness’ are key notions in Proverbs which characterise God, 
the king, and the wise person equally. 
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Is the spiritual self more loved in Proverbs than the material self? 
No, it is not. Physical well-being is not so neatly divided from spiritual well-being in Old 
Testament thinking as it is in Thomistic thinking. This seems to be the main difference between 
Thomas and Proverbs. However, a partial parallel might be found even to this Thomistic 
division, for the ‘better than’ sayings reveal the non-material side (mainly peace) of happiness. 
Does Proverbs speak about a hierarchy of ends? 
Yes, but the parallel between Thomas and Proverbs is only partial. Thomas’s moral theology is 
a well developed system, Proverbs is not. Proverbs does not offer an explicit, systematic 
hierarchy of ends but it does provide a plurality of ends. Even if these ends are not ordered 
clearly and explicitly into a strict hierarchy, there are certain hints in the text which point in the 
direction of such a hierarchy, or at least make it easy for the interpreter to read Proverbs in 
the frame of reference of a Thomistic hierarchy. As I have just mentioned, though there might 
be a stronger emphasis on material interests in Proverbs than in Thomas’s writings, the ‘better 
than’ sayings teach that ‘happiness’ is the main aim and this does not necessarily involve 
financial well-being. Furthermore, though Proverbs might be written for and about individuals, 
it is not ‘individualistic.’ The community plays an important role in it, as it is clear, for example, 
from the emphasis on righteousness and justice. So, the end of self-preservation is 
accompanied by the ends of spiritual well-being and communal well-being. 
With regard to the highest end, Proverbs clearly presents a God-centred worldview. The 
student is supposed to live a God-centred life which requires trust in God. Trust involves some 
insecurity, too, so, while the book promises security, the way to it is through wrestling with 
insecurity. This underlies the emphasis on the relationship with God as opposed to simple 
emphasis on self-preservation. Nevertheless, one could still ask the question, ‘Does Proverbs 
really subordinate all the other ends to this highest end, to the community with God?’ The 
answer is ambiguous. Proverbs can be read both ways. It can be understood as teaching that a 
person should be with God because it will serve the other ends, but it does not have to be read 
like this. The vision of being in the presence of God and imitating him is there, and it can 
motivate the reader by itself. 
Thus, my interpretation gives a slightly larger prominence to the theme of the God‒human 
relationship than is usual in many interpretations of Proverbs. This emphasis leads on to the 
second issue which was highlighted at the end of the chapter about the history of theological 
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interpretation of Proverbs: the issue of secularity. Furthermore, as we will see, the way the 
book (as a unified book) presents ‘secular life’ supports and underlines some of the thoughts 
expressed in this chapter about Proverb’s self-interest.  
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The ‘Secular’ in Proverbs 
The meaning of ‘secular’ 
Let us consider the following three examples of the usage of the word ‘secular’ in connection 
with wisdom literature: 
That wisdom, a secular concept, should become a component of both Testaments of the 
Bible is due to the fact that it is inherent in creation—more specifically, human creation.
531
 
Proverbs presents a special challenge to anyone who raises questions about theology. It is 
often dismissed as being ‘secular,’ and it may be inferred, not really theological.
532
 
Are they [the Yahweh sayings] to be seen as moral formation in a religious manner, or as 
religious education, or are they simply chance references in a substantially secular set of 
proverbs of a generally ethical nature?
533
 
What I would like to direct our attention to is not so much the content of these statements but 
the relative ease with which they use the word ‘secular.’ None of the quoted works provide a 
thorough definition of the word ‘secular’ and this represents the general trend in 
commentaries of biblical wisdom literature with only a few exceptions. This unreflected use of 
the word by biblical scholars is remarkable given that philosophers, sociologists, and 
philosophical theologians fill hundreds of pages in their works with clarifying its meaning. So, if 
someone wants to clarify the issues concerning Proverbs’ supposed secularity, the first task is 
to find out what exactly biblical scholars mean when they use the word ‘secular.’ 
However, before that, it will be useful to have a look at how the word is used in the broader 
academic discourse. The word ‘secular’ comes from Latin saeculum which originally meant 
‘time’ or ‘age.’ In the Middle Ages it was often used in opposition to regular (religious). The 
regular clergy belonged to a monastic order, that is, lived ‘closer’ to eternity, whereas the 
secular clergy lived in ‘this time.’ So, secular means ‘our time,’ ‘this worldly time’ as opposed 
to eternity.534 
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This basic meaning of the word which opposes ‘temporal’ to ‘eternal’ or ‘worldly’ to ‘heavenly’ 
is nuanced further in the academic discourse of the last one hundred years mainly due to 
sociological investigations of the so called ‘secularisation’ of western societies. In order to 
make the topic searchable and the results quantifiable sociologists had to come up with more 
refined definitions of ‘secular’ than simply ‘this worldly.’ If they wanted to measure 
‘worldliness’ they had to clarify precisely what exactly they were measuring. So, 
‘secularisation’ and consequently ‘secular’ came to be defined along one or a combination of 
the following three factors: 
א. The declining of the divine in public space, as expressed in the careful separation of 
religious and non-religious institutions like the church and the state. 
ב. The declining of the divine in private lives, as shown by the drop of church attendance 
or the time spent on prayer by individuals. 
ג. The declining of ‘mythical,’ ‘enchanted,’ ‘sacral’ human thinking, defined as 
rationalisation which resulted in the ‘disenchantment’ of the world. ‘Properly 
secularised’ modern people are not supposed to count on unpredictable, supernatural 
forces in their practical planning or scientific thinking, even if they are religious people 
otherwise. 535 
At first sight all of these definitions seem to be anachronistic in connection with ancient near 
eastern societies and their literary products. State and church were not separated as they are 
in post-enlightenment states, and it is also hard to imagine that devotion of some kind and 
counting on supernatural forces did not play a significant role in the everyday life and thinking 
of ancient near eastern people. Nevertheless, as we will see shortly, these definitions are not 
without parallels of some biblical scholars’ understanding of the ‘secular’ in the book of 
Proverbs. 
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The meaning of ‘secular’ according to biblical scholars 
As most biblical scholars do not give a succinct definition of ‘secular,’ one has to decipher their 
understanding of the term from the context they are using it in. 
Given the vast amount of literature and the limits of this chapter, a comprehensive 
investigation is impossible. This also means that my selection of texts is somewhat subjective. 
It is important to note that I do not even claim that my results are always representative of the 
whole work of the scholar I am quoting as many scholars use the word ‘secular’ with various 
different meanings throughout their works. I concentrate only on the concrete quotations 
themselves. Nevertheless, the excerpts are taken from a diverse collection of contributors to 
scholarly discussion, who often represent contradicting views on the subject, so, even if the 
range of quotations is far from being comprehensive, they hopefully cover most typical usages 
of the word ‘secular.’ 
All of the quotations in the table are taken from works written on Proverbs (or on biblical 
wisdom literature but referring to Proverbs). The words most relevant for our purposes are 
printed in bold. The right column does not summarise the meaning of the quotations but tries 
to capture the meaning and/or the connotations of the word ‘secular’ in the quotation 
regardless of whether the particular author thinks that the word describes Proverbs properly 
or not.  
TABLE 9: THE USE OF THE WORD ‘SECULAR’ BY SCHOLARS OF WISDOM LITERATURE 
Author Text Meaning of 
‘secular’ 
Bossman, D. M. Although the modern age did not invent 
secularity, it did enable secularity to flourish. In 
turn, moderns were freed, by secularity, from 
non-rational bonds that had too long restrained 
human endeavors through lack of accurate 
knowledge and the imposition of substitute 
fictions. The Bible's own brand of secularity may 








Wisdom Literature that has frequently 
discomforted some religionists for its this-world 
realism.536 
This world realism 
Brueggemann, 
W. 
Both Cox and van Leeuwen find in the central 
biblical symbols of Torah, creation, exodus, and 
Sinai the handles by which we may understand 
secularization and which in part has been an 
impetus to it. But it is equally clear that these 
symbols (with that of creation excepted) really 
belong themselves to a sacral view of reality in 
which the intrusion and authority of the holy in 
the realm of human affairs causes the decisive 
turn… 
I believe it is much more plausible to suggest that 
in the wisdom tradition of Israel we have a visible 
expression of secularization as it has been 
characterised in the current discussions. Wisdom 
teaching is profoundly secular in that it presents 
life and history as a human enterprise... Thus, 
wisdom is concerned with enabling potential 
leaders to manage responsibly, effectively, and 
successfully. It consistently places stress on 
human freedom, accountability, the importance 











Presents life as 
human enterprise 
 
Stress on human 
freedom and 
responsibility 
 Creation faith... While expressed in mythological 
form it is secular because it is concerned with the 
 
Concerned with the 
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primacy and dominance of man over his world. 
Though this tradition is cast in the form of myth, 
its drive and intent are linked to wisdom: it is 
concerned with the freedom, power, and 




Clements, R. E. Wisdom’s concepts and images of the physical 
world accord with a broader, more secular, and 
more universal portrayal of it than that which 
the cultus offered… For the cultus, Israel’s 
existence as a nation, its occupation of a specific 
territory, and its ability to ward off the 
threatening powers of darkness and uncleanness, 
all formed part of one single continuum. This 
belonged within a comprehensive mythological 
world-view which was focused on the 
institutions and rituals of the cultus.539 
Universal 







 So wisdom has begun a process of systematizing 
ideas on the themes of virtue and well being 
which had not previously formed part of any 
system. On the contrary, ideas of uncleanness, 
abomination, evil, violence and disease had all 
belonged to a very confused and ill-defined 
world of what threatened danger and harm to 
the unprincipled or unwary…  
The very fact that such notions subsume and 
greatly modify earlier notions which were directly 
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contention that wisdom had begun a process of 
‘de-sanctifying’ and ‘de-mystifying’ a number of 
basic areas of human understanding. These had 
previously largely been the province of the 
priesthood and cultus. In the urgent necessity to 
cater for the daily life of Jews which could no 
longer rely on immediate and direct access to the 
sanctuary of the temple and the ministry of its 
priests a process of ‘secularising’ and isolating 
from cultic activity had been set in train.540 




Catering for the 
daily life 
Crenshaw J. L. Thus Hartmut Gese Writes: “It is well known that 
the wisdom literature constitutes an alien body in 
the world of the Old Testament.” This verdict is 
substantiated by reference to an absence of (1) a 
covenant relationship with God, (2) any account 
of the revelation at Sinai, and (3) a concept of 
Israel’s special election and consequently of 
Yahweh’s saving deeds for his people. Instead, 
wisdom is said to be directed toward the 
individual, and consequently to break down all 
national limits. Gese concludes that “from the 
point of view of Yahwism wisdom can only appear 












 Much early wisdom appears to have been 
remarkably “secular” in mood and content; its 
fundamental purpose was to encapsulate 
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precious observations about reality for the 
benefit of posterity. The subject matter is largely 
domestic; agrarian interests and natural 
phenomena abound.542 
Focus on domestic, 
agrarian, natural 
reality 
Dell, K. J. I would argue, therefore, that the [Yahweh] 
sayings already existed independently in an oral 
context before they were placed in their present 
context. This was not in the service of a 
Yahwehization process of otherwise ‘secular’ or 
even ‘foreign’ material; rather, they were placed 
where they were to reinforce the messages of 
other Proverbs within a religious context and to 








 While wisdom, at its roots, springs from an 
attempt to understand human experience of life, 
much of its concern is with relationship with the 
divine, and there are serious questions whether 
the word ‘secular’ is at all appropriate when 
referring to wisdom literature, which is grounded 




with the divine 
Perdue, L. Efforts to view the early wise as secularistic 
humanists who functioned within an 
international setting devoid of doctrinaire 
theologies fail to take into consideration the fact 
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creator, and God as the overseer of the principle 
of retribution point to a religious, theological 
foundation to wisdom thinking, and that the wise 
of the major cultures of the ancient Near East, at 
least with respect to cult, do engage in certain 
cultic ideas and practices which are unique to 
their own cultures.545 
 
 
No cultic activity 
von Rad, G. Thus, since the objects of this search for 
knowledge were of a secular kind, questions 
about man’s daily life, systematic reflection on 
them was held to be a secular occupation… If one 
reads over these and other sentences, one sees 
at once that wisdom and the acquiring of it is 
here a human activity which is open to 
everyone… The intellectual curiosity of old 
wisdom, its cultural impetus and the zeal with 
which it studied the corresponding cultural 
achievements of other nations stands in 
considerable contrast to the spirituality of the 
pre-monarchical period, even of the period of 
Saul. Whether we speak of a process of 
secularization starting fairly suddenly, of the 
discovering of man, that is of a humanization, or 
of the beginning of a rational search for 
knowledge, at any rate this strong, intellectual 
movement must have been preceded by an inner 
decline, the disintegration of an understanding of 
reality which we can describe, in a felicitous 
expression of M. Buber’s, as ‘pan-sacralism’… 
there are … narratives which stand wholly on the 





Open to everyone, 
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earlier side of this great intellectual upheaval. We 
are afforded interesting insights by the 
comprehensive narrative which depicts one 
stage of Saul’s military involvement with the 
Philistines (I Sam. 13f.). If one follows the fairly 
complicated course of events, it becomes 
immediately clear that the narrator brings every 
decisive event, military advantages and setbacks 
as well as all human conflicts, into association 





No focus on the 
sacral and the 
ritual 
Westermann, C. [Writing about the supposedly older sayings of 
Proverbs.] The Creator has entrusted his creature, 
the human, with this gift [the book of Proverbs] 
because he reckons him capable of finding his 
way through the world, using the special 
endowment given to him of understanding his 
own humanness. Proverbs ascribe the 
importance to the human intellect that it is due. 
They express an autonomy that is rooted in 
creatureliness, in contradistinction to a 
conception that places too great an emphasis on 
education and instruction... 
27:20: “As Hades and the abyss are never 
satisfied, neither are the eyes of man.” 
...One initially marvels that such a “worldly” 
appearing statement is found in the Bible... We 
can only conclude that these people thought and 
spoke in a much worldlier fashion than it appears 
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Testament. It is a bold comparison that is being 
ventured here—“Hades and the abyss”—truly 
insatiable when we consider the huge number of 
those who are deceased!... Even more 
conspicuous... is the seeming absence of any 
indication of condemnation that might appear in 
the Christian ethic of many; rather, this 
phenomenon is viewed as something that is 
inherently human, whether one perceives it as 
good or not. Such an observation applies to all 
the proverbial statements, especially those 
about humanity. They intend to express, not 











 None of the important dates of this history is 
mentioned—neither the flight from Egypt nor the 
revelation at Sinai nor the covenant; neither the 
migration into the land nor the law. Very little is 
spoken of worship to God, while priests and the 
sanctuary are never mentioned. Perhaps even 
more important is that God never speaks in the 
proverbs… Furthermore, nothing is ever spoken 
to God (a prayer appears only in a later 
supplement, 30:7‒9)… The reason for this can 
only be that the proverbs employ a language of 
the workaday world, the context of which is to 
be found only in people relating to one another… 
…the proverbs as such have a universal 
character. Proverbs can surface anywhere among 





God never speaks 
Humans do not 
speak to God 
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[Proverbs mentioning God] have no specifically 
theological function in an explicitly theological 
context. Rather, they speak of God in such a 
manner as would any person without stepping 




Focus on everyday 
 Wisdom has no place within this basic framework 
of an Old Testament theology, since it originally 
and in reality does not have as its object an 
occurrence between God and man; in its earlier 
stages wisdom is overwhelmingly secular. A 
theological wisdom develops at a later stage… The 
theological home of wisdom can be found within 
the context of human creation; the creator gives 
humanity the ability to understand its world and 
to become oriented within it.549 
Not about the 
relationship 







Zimmerli, W. Differentiation of the purely secular rule of 
utility, the moral rule and the religious rule does 
not depend upon the essence of wisdom; rather, 
what is significant for it is that it sets all three 
groups of rules equal and only quantitatively 
establishes gradations among them.550 
Measures 
everything on the 
basis of utility 
For the sake of clarity I list the keywords from the right column of the above table: Bossman, 
D. M.: Rationalisation, no fictions, This world realism, Brueggemann, W.: No sacral view of 
reality, Presents life as human enterprise, Stress on human freedom and responsibility, 
Concerned with the freedom, power, and responsibility of man, Clements, R. E.: Universal, No 
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cultic worldview, No mythological worldview, No confused and ill-defined worldview, No cultic 
activity, De-sanctifying and de-mystifying, Catering for the daily life, Crenshaw J. L.: No 
covenant relationship with God, No Sinai revelations, No salvation history, Focus on 
individuals, no national limits, Focus on domestic, agrarian, natural reality, Dell, K. J.: Not 
mentioning Yahweh, Parallel with ‘foreign’, No relationship with the divine, Perdue, L.: 
International, No doctrinaire theology, No cultic activity, von Rad, G.: Focus on the daily life, 
Open to everyone, to other cultures, too, Humanisation, Decline of ‘pan-sacralism’, No focus 
on the sacral and the ritual, Westermann, C.: Human autonomy, No ethical condemnation of 
human nature, Pure, human centred observation, No salvation history, No cultus, God never 
speaks, Humans do not speak to God, Focus on Human relationships, Universal, Focus on 
everyday, Not about the relationship between God and humanity, Human independence, 
ability to comprehend the world, Zimmerli, W.: Measures everything on the basis of utility. 
The different items listed above can be ordered into six groups as I have indicated by the 
underlining: 
1. universal, not nationalistic; 
2. human autonomy; 
3. focusing on the everyday, ordinary side of life; 
4. human centred; 
5. not about the relationship between God and humanity ; 
6. rational, as opposed to cultic/mythic thinking. 
Items 2‒5 seem to be contractible for me. This way we get three broad definitions of secular: 
A. Secular  universalistic, not national and particularistic thinking (item 1); 
B. Secular  human centred thinking with an emphasis on human autonomy (items 2‒5); 
C. Secular  rational, non-sacral, disenchanted thinking (item 6) 
There are some parallels between this classification of the definitions of ‘secular’ and the 
classification of social scientific definitions delineated earlier. Category C. is parallel with ג: ‘the 
declining of “mythical,” “enchanted,” “sacral” human thinking.’ Category B. is at least partially 
parallel with ב: ‘the declining of the divine in private life.’ The parallel between category A. and 
א: ‘the declining of the divine in public space’ might be less obvious at the first sight, 




Turning from the classification of definitions to the evaluation of them, category A. seems to 
be the most fitting for describing Proverbs’ ‘secularity.’ After all, such national institutions like 
‘temple,’ ‘law,’ or ‘covenant’ are hardly mentioned in it which gives it a universalistic flavour 
despite the use of the Tetragrammaton. 
At this point it is important to note that I am not arguing that the authors of Proverbs had 
‘universalistic’ thinking or that Proverbs was originally interpreted in a ‘universalistic’ way. I am 
simply claiming that it can appear as such. It is another question if this appearance is 
historically misleading or not (which I think it is). My questions are however not about the 
historical reality behind the text but about possible theological utilisations of the received form 
of the text. 
I will argue in the next section of the dissertation that the universalistic, ‘secular’ appearance 
does not mean that Proverbs stands in opposition to the rest of the Old Testament. It can 
easily be read ‘canonically’ because it fits well into the context of the more national, more 
‘Jewishly religious’ parts of the Old Testament. Read this way it can provide important 
theological insights for the ‘secularised’ Christian and Jewish reader in the 21st century. 
Categories B. and C. seem to be a bit more problematic as descriptions of Proverbs. Can we 
really call Proverbs ‘disenchanted’ when it contains such ‘enchanted’ verses like Prov. 3:7‒8 
which sees a connection between ethics and health: ‘Do not be wise in your own eyes, fear the 
Lord, and depart from evil. It will be healing to your navel and refreshment to your bones’;551 
or consider 26:2 which allows for the effectiveness of ‘right’ curses: ‘As a sparrow for 
wandering and a swallow for flying, so a gratuitous curse will not alight’? Or, to foreshadow a 
little bit the later discussion, can we really speak about ‘human autonomy’ when one of the 
key teachings of Proverbs is about having a humble, obedient, listening heart? 
Of course, the refutation or modification of categories B. and C. would require much more 
than a few dismissive sentences. Unfortunately space restrictions prevent a comprehensive 
discussion of these secular interpretations.552 Instead I am going to discuss a more recent 
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theological reading of Proverbs which, though developed from a ‘secular’ interpretation of 
Proverbs which was originally built on these understandings of the ‘secular,’ also leaves the 
category ‘secular’ behind and applies new theological categories to describe the apparently 
secular features of Proverbs. This theological reading is Walter Brueggemann’s treatment of 
Proverbs in his Theology of the Old Testament. 
So, first I will discuss the ‘secular’ as universalistic (category A.), then I will have a closer look at 
Brueggemann’s interpretation of Proverbs that developed from his earlier ‘secular 
interpretation’ which originally emphasised mainly the definitions B. and C. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          




Secular (universalistic) vs. national (particularistic) 
thinking 
Proverbs and the common language of humanity 
The definition which describes the ‘secular’ as the separation of religious and non-religious 
institutions, like the separation between church and state, is one of the most influential 
sociological definitions of the secular if not the most influential one.553 However, at first sight it 
seems to be inapplicable to an ancient near eastern society and to its institutions and literary 
products, where such modern differentiations did not happen. Yet, there is an aspect of this 
sociological approach which is parallel with the conclusions of some biblical scholars who 
emphasise the universal nature of Proverbs and call this characteristic of it ‘secular.’ 
Sociologists, politicians, and philosophers often emphasise the importance of the separation 
between religious and non-religious institutions because it provides a ‘common space,’ a 
‘neutral ground’ on which non-religious and all sorts of religious people can meet each other. 
Even if one wants to avoid the controversial word ‘neutral,’554 they can argue that secularity 
provides a language which is at least understandable to everyone (like the language of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and can be a medium through which the negotiation 
between competing values and interests can happen.555 
Similarly, some scholars emphasise the willingness of the Hebrew sages to listen to other 
cultures and the universal nature of their language, which is, in its biggest part, applicable, or 
at least understandable to everyone regardless of his or her worldview. As Crenshaw wrote 
‘...none can deny the universality of wisdom’s language and concerns, the timeless problems 
of human existence and general observations about life.’556 Claus Westermann concludes his 
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investigation of biblical proverbs by encouraging the reader to follow the impetus of those 
proverbs and have an understanding and open conversation with other (religious) cultures: 
One manifestation of the universal character of proverbial wisdom is that one can observe 
a far-reaching agreement among the exhortations and warnings. For example, proverbs 
found all over the world contain warnings against people who are unable to govern 
themselves... The question is whether or not a common understanding of commendable 
behaviour... lies at the root of these many common sayings—that is to say, a general 
“knowledge of good and evil.” If our awareness of this state of affairs is for the most part 
lost, then conscious recognition of the possibility that this “common knowledge” has more 
in common than not possesses considerable significance for drawing humanity closer 
together... The manner in which God is depicted, both as the human and material Creator 
and as the one who determines the limitations placed on humans, is common to most 
religions. This is not a phenomenon that separates religions; rather, it unifies them... 
proverbial wisdom retains a certain significance that, in terms of its effects, is accessible to 
all people. The notion of humanity as a whole is indeed an ingredient of the proverbs of 
Israel in their universal function. Thus L. Naré: “Biblical wisdom seems to have been built 
on the ground of a common human wisdom.”
557
 
Westermann certainly has a point here. Even if one doubts that this was the intention of 
Proverbs’ authors, the apparent universal nature of the book could encourage the ancient as 
well as the modern reader to be engaged in mutual, appreciative conversation with other 
cultures. However, this is not the only potential impact of the book on the reader. The 
consequent usage of the Tetragrammaton, the many canonical allusions and the Yahwistic 
influence of certain structurally key passages make a different understanding in a canonical 
interpretation of the book possible, if not more likely. According to this, Proverbs is more 
about the sanctification of the ‘secular,’ ‘common’ space and language than simply the 
presentation of it. 
In the following sections I am going to investigate two, interrelated reading strategies. The first 
sees Proverbs in the light of the theological vision offered by Prov. 8, the second sees Proverbs 
in the light of the vision of the Jerusalem Temple offered by the canonical context of the book. 
Rather than creating a ‘neutral space,’ both of these readings encourage the reader to sanctify 
the ‘neutral space’ of everyday life. 
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Proverbs 8 as theological vision 
Theories about the figure of Lady Wisdom 
Prov. 8 provides such a vivid description of Wisdom that I would find it unlikely that it does not 
influence most readers’ interpretation of the following chapters. However, as soon as one tries 
to go beyond this general statement, problems abound. Who is this Wisdom in chapter 8? 
What is the nature of her description? What is its theological significance? How does it change 
the reading of chapters 10‒31? 
Several ancient goddesses have been suspected to influence the picture of woman Wisdom in 
Prov. 8: unnamed Assyrian and West Semitic goddesses, Inanna, Ishtar, Ashtart or Asherah, 
Ma’at, a divine patroness of scribal education like the Sumerian Nisaba, the Persian Asha 
Vahishta, Hellenistic Isis, a pre-gnostic divinity, etc. However, a consensus has not been 
reached either about which of these goddesses influenced the biblical image or about the 
measure and nature of this influence. Furthermore, these religio-historical considerations, very 
interesting though they are from a historical point of view, are usually an end in themselves 
and do not shed too much light on the role of Wisdom in our received text.558 
Unfortunately, if we turn to the question of her role and identity in the present form of the 
text we find an even more confusingly high number of scholarly suggestions. What is she? A 
‘universal’ like a platonic idea?559 The aphorisms and sayings of the book?560 The Torah?561 A 
literary figure standing for human/divine wisdom?562 Yahweh himself?563 The world-order?564 A 
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Hypostasis of God?565 Instead of evaluating all these theories at this point, I am going to focus 
first on a problem which is related to all possible hypotheses about Lady Wisdom’s identity: 
the question of her relationship to Yahweh. 
Lady Wisdom’s relation to Yahweh 
On the one hand, she is described in terms used elsewhere of Yahweh:566 
 Life and death depend on one’s relationship to her (Prov. 8:35‒36, compare, for 
example, with Prov. 14:27; Jer. 21:8; 38:16; Ex. 33:11; 1 Kings 10:8; Isa. 56:1‒2; etc.);567 
 She is the source of legitimate government (Prov. 8:15‒16, compare with Num. 
11:16‒17; 1 Sam. 2:11; 10:1; 1 Kings 3:4‒15; 10:9; Ps. 2:7); 
 She is the giver of wealth (Prov. 8:18‒21, compare with Deut. 28:8; 1 Kings 3:13; 1 
Chron. 29:12; 2 Chron. 1:12; 17:5); 
 She is the one who loves and is to be loved (Prov. 8:17, compare, for example, with 
Deut. 6:5; 1 Kings 3:3; 1 Sam. 2:30; 2 Sam. 12:23; Neh. 13:26; Isa 48:14)—interestingly, 
Yahweh is nowhere mentioned as the direct object of love in Proverbs though that is a 
quite common topic elsewhere in the Old Testament (see, for example, Deut. 5:10; 
7:9; 10:12; 11:13, 22; 19:9; 30:20; Ps. 97:10; 145:20);568 
 Similarly, when רחש II. (Prov. 8:17) refers to searching for a transcendent object, 
outside of Proverbs it always refers to Yahweh (Job 8:5; Ps. 63:2 [English 63:1]; 78:34; 
Isa. 26:9; Hos. 5:15);569 
 The seeking and finding motive (8:17) is also very emphatic elsewhere in connection 
with Yahweh (Hos. 5:6; Am. 5:4‒6; Deut. 4:29);570 
 Wisdom is more precious than riches (Prov. 8:10‒11) and the same might be applied 
about Yahweh in Prov. 18:10‒11 where 18:10 says in an unqualified way that ‘the 
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Lord’s name is a fortified tower’ whereas 18:11 qualifies the similar ‘A rich man’s 
wealth is his fortified city’ by the statement ‘in his imagination’ (ותיכשמב); 
 Her words are described with terms in 8:6‒9 (םירשימ, קדצב) which, when used in 
connection with speech, only describe Yahweh’s words elsewhere (Ps. 19:9; 33:4; 
119:137; Neh. 9:13; Isa. 45:19); 571 
 ‘Her lips loath wickedness,’ which might also bring to mind the הוהי תבעות expression 
which is characteristic only for Deuteronomy and Proverbs (Prov. 3:32; 11:1, 20; 12:22; 
15:8‒9, 26; 16:5; 17:15; 20:10, 23; Deut. 7:25; 12:31; 17:1; 18:12; 22:5; 23:19; 25:16; 
27:15);572 
 Some even propose that the double use of היהא in Prov. 8:30 echoes the היהא רשא היהא 
of Ex. 3:14.573 
It is also noteworthy that Ps. 104, which seems to be the closest to Prov. 8:22‒29 in its 
language and concepts among all biblical creation texts (though probably not close enough to 
suspect direct dependence between the two texts),574 uses this language for praising God and 
not wisdom. 
On the other hand, Prov. 8 clearly differentiates Lady Wisdom from Yahweh. She might be 
understood as a creature of Yahweh, if we translate יננק in 8:22 as ‘created me,’575 or as a being 
who is co- or even pre-existent with Yahweh, if we translate יננק as ‘acquired me.’576 She might 
also be understood as the daughter of Yahweh, as the verb ליח in verses 24‒25 refers more 
often to giving birth than to creation activity.577 But however ambiguous the description is, all 
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202 
 
of the possibilities speak about a separate being from Yahweh and this separateness is 
maintained throughout the whole description: she is beside (ולצא) and in front of (וינפל) 
Yahweh (8:30). 
It seems that Prov. 8 does two different things at the same time. It associates Wisdom with 
Yahweh so closely that she appears as a super-human being with Yahweh’s characteristics; at 
the same time the text differentiates her from Yahweh. 
A ‘mistake’ or sophisticated theological discourse? 
Stuart Weeks realises the same ambiguity578 in his work on Prov. 1‒9.579 He proposes that 
Wisdom’s separation from Yahweh (i.e. her personification) is only a byproduct of the author’s 
intention to parallel wisdom with Lady Folly. The ‘poor’ writer was simply not aware of what 
huge theological debates and speculations his rather unfortunate literary move would initiate 
in the following centuries: 




Judging by the vagueness of 8:22, indeed, the author has little interest in trying to specify 
just how such a figure might have come into existence, or in creating an explanatory 
cosmological framework within which his characters may be understood. We are on our 
own, then, if we wish to understand just how wisdom in Proverbs 1‒9 can at once be a 




In particular, I am not convinced that the writer is trying to establish wisdom as something 
that has an active intermediary role between humans and God. Viewed as a concept, 
wisdom is essentially a spiritual or intellectual attainment which gives one automatic 
insight into the divine will, not a messenger service from God…
582
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Since the most obvious role of the character is as a counterpart to the foreign woman, it is 
tempting to suppose, therefore, that the idea of that woman came first… Whether that is 
the case or not, the author’s decision not only to use a character to represent wisdom, but 
also to use a personification of the concept, rather than a type like the woman or the 
sinners, has left him with problems both in correlating their roles, and in dealing with the 
implications of Wisdom (the person) for wisdom (the concept).
583
 
While fully acknowledging the powerful influence of the personification on subsequent 
literature and thought, I am wary of attributing an authorial intention to many of the 
implications that have been identified. Gerlinde Baumann, for instance,… lists a wide 
range of consequences, and describes the personification in terms of filtering and unifying 
a previously diverse phenomenon: even if it does all these things, I suspect that many 
were incidental, or even contrary to the author’s intentions.
584
 
So, according to Weeks, the author’s aim was to depict wisdom as belonging to Yahweh and at 
the same time he (I just presume we are speaking about a male author)585 wanted to parallel 
this wisdom with Lady Folly.586 He simply did not think through that this would result in 
contradictory pictures. He wanted to speak about a wisdom participating in which we can have 
a direct access to Yahweh’s mind. The picture of a separate, personified wisdom in an 
intermediary role between Yahweh and humanity is only a mistake, or to put it more 
positively, a literary tool, ornamentation, to which we should not pay serious theological 
attention. Or, if we do, then we need to be aware that what we find in the text was not 
intended by the author and might even go against his intentions. 
Maybe Weeks is right in his conjecture about the author’s intention. However, I see another 
possible explanation for the semantic tensions in Prov. 8 (and Prov. 1‒9 in general), too. One 
of the things Lady Wisdom does is mediate God’s presence, as I will argue shortly. Now, 
speaking about God’s presence in the world is a complicated issue. So complicated that it 
almost inevitably leads to stammering and to (apparent?) contradictions. How can we point at 
a well circumscribed space, time, or human experience and say ‘there is God’ without making 
God into one item of the world, a creature, so to speak—without falling into idolatry, in other 
words? Nicholas Lash provides a ‘post-biblical’ conceptualisation of ‘idolatry,’ in which he 
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emphasises that it is crucial to maintain a dialectic while speaking about the presence of God 
in the world. As Lash puts it, 
Alerted to God’s presence by some person, some occurrence, fact or thing; some dream or 
project, institution or idea, we take off our shoes, bow down and offer sacrifice. Here, we 
recognise, is God. At once, however, our first lesson has to be: where God is, is not God; 
this sanctuary of God’s presence is, however holy, not divine.
587
 
My tenet can be summarised like this: Prov. 8, or more precisely Proverbs read in the light of 
chapter 8, depicts wisdom in/through which human beings can experience God’s presence. But 
speaking about God’s presence, or about the ‘things’ through which God is present, requires 
the dialectic language of ‘where is God, is not God.’ Through this theological principle it is 
possible to make sense of the ambiguous language of Prov. 8. 
Is Lady Wisdom a mediator? 
One of the main questions of Prov. 8 seems to be ‘Where can we find wisdom’?588 It speaks a 
lot about finding her (verses 17, 35, and also verse 9 though, strictly speaking, the latter is 
about finding תעד and not המכח)589 and also about the places where she can be found. She is 
‘on the top of the heights’ ( שארב םימורמ ; verse 2), ‘at the crossroads’ (or ‘between the paths’, 
תוביתנ תיב; verse 2), ‘next to the gates at the entrance of the city’ ( יפל ברק  דיל םירעש ; verse 3), ‘at 
the doors’ (םיחתפ אובמ; verse 3), ‘on the path of righteousness’ ( ךראב הקדצ ; verse 20), ‘amongst 
the paths of justice’ (טפשמ תוביתנ ךותב; verse 20), ‘in the beginning of Yahweh’s way’ (תישאר 
וכרד; verse 22). When God ordered the elements of the world, she ‘was there’ ( אינ  םש; verse 
27). Now she is playing in God’s habitable world (וצרא לבתב; verse 31), and, as we have already 
noted earlier, she is ‘besides’ Yahweh (ולצא; verse 30) and ‘in front of him’ (וינפל; verse 30). To 
summarise all these, we can say that Prov. 8 has two fundamental things to say about 
Wisdom’s whereabouts: 1. she has been constantly with Yahweh; 2. she is amongst us, in the 
world. 
Of course, some of these expressions can only be understood in a metaphorical way, especially 
the ones speaking about her relationship to Yahweh. As Fox reminds us: 
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Wisdom is unlocalized, unbound by space. Being everywhere, she is, in a sense, nowhere. 
She says, ‘When he established the heavens, there was I‘ (8:27). Where? It cannot be the 




Since the creation of wisdom was the first deed of God’s ‘way’ and prior to his other 
‘works,’ the implication is that before he created wisdom, he had no ‘ways’ or works. 
Though the author may not realize it, the underlying assumption is that prior to creation 
God was in stasis, his power only potential. He brought his power to actuality by acquiring 
wisdom. He acquired wisdom by creating it, drawing it from within, from the infinite 
potential for being that is inherent in Godhead. There is nowhere else he could have 
gotten it. That is why God’s acquiring… wisdom is figured in terms of giving birth.
591
 
Fox’s logical delineations of Wisdom’s ‘place’ highlight how undividable Wisdom is from 
Yahweh: she is where Yahweh is in a ‘nonspatial’ sense, and she appears whenever Yahweh 
acts. If Yahweh is ‘eternal’ she is also. However, according to our chapter, this very same 
Wisdom lives among human beings. She is with God and playing on the inhabited world 
(verses 30‒31). It seems that ‘in the city gates’ (verses 2‒3) is compatible with ‘next to God’ 
(verses 22‒31). 
Fox conceptualises this Wisdom as a ‘universal,’ a transcendent entity (like a platonic idea), of 
which human wisdom and Yahweh’s wisdom are different realizations.592 I have two problems 
with this understanding of Wisdom. First, I am not sure that it is in accordance with my last 
quotation from Fox himself about Yahweh giving birth, so to speak, to Wisdom. Second, Fox is 
able to maintain this understanding of Wisdom for the ‘interludes’ (1:20‒33; 3:13‒20; 6:1‒19; 
8:1‒36; 9:1‒18). Elsewhere in Prov. 1‒9, however, according to Fox, ‘wisdom is a power… The 
function of this power is explicitly defined in sentences dependent on the exhortations: 
protection from sinful men and women… Wisdom is a configuration of soul; it is moral 
character.’593 However, as Weeks comments, such a differentiation between the two wisdoms 
in Prov. 1‒9 (a Universal vs. a protective power which is moral character) is unlikely given the 
‘substantial overlap of language and attitude’:594  
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It is difficult to see how the exhortation to ‘love her and she will guard you’, in 6: 6 
(lecture), is very different from Wisdom’s declaration in 8: 17 (interlude), that she loves 
those who love her.
595
 
In my view, if we understand Wisdom in chapter 8 as the personification of a divine attribute 
and take seriously the intermediary position of Wisdom being with God and at the same time 
in the world, then it is easy to construe a unified picture of wisdom in Prov. 1‒9: being wise 
(which is a protective power indeed, expressed in human character, as Fox suggests about the 
‘lectures’) is participating in God’s wisdom. It is experiencing the presence of the ‘nonspatial’ 
God himself in the world. This seems to me to be the ‘theological’ vision of Prov. 8, which is 
supposed to make the reader enthusiastic about wisdom and eager to continue reading the 
wise sayings of Prov. 10‒31. 
This understanding of Wisdom explains another feature of the text, recognized by Fox: 
Wisdom is in an intermediate position but she is not a mediator.596 As he writes, 
In Prov 8, Wisdom is portrayed as an entity proceeding from God (according to 2:6, from 
his mouth) and intermediate between him and the world.
597
 
It is true that Wisdom exists on an intermediate plane: below God as his creation and 
‘child’ and above humanity as their superior and patroness. But she does not mediate. 
God never speaks to her, and she does not quote him.
598
 
There is no suggestion that individuals can pray to her or that she can intercede.
599
 
As has already become clear, in my view Wisdom is not below God but represents God. She is 
intermediate between God and the world because it is through her that humans can access 
and experience God’s presence. But she is not mediating like a prophet does, as meeting her 
means such a direct, unmediated meeting with God as it is possible for human beings. She is 
simply in the world and can be met in all worldly phenomena, from power (Prov. 8:14‒16) 
through wealth (Prov. 8:18‒21) to love (especially if the picture of the good wife in Prov. 
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31:10‒31 is an echo of Wisdom herself).600 However, she does not simply equal these 
phenomena: she is also God, present in the world. 
Understanding Wisdom this way is not entirely dissimilar to what Gese wrote about Wisdom’s 
mediating role: ‘Sophia appears as a mediatrix Dei. Every realization [Erkenntnis] of Sophia on 
the side of humans leads to a partaking in God.’601 However, Gese understood wisdom mainly 
as a cognitive phenomenon: realizing wisdom, according to him, is mainly a mental activity,602 
it is an understanding of the order of creation. In contrast, though I do not wish to deny the 
mental aspect of being wise, the latter part of Proverbs depicts wisdom at least as much as 
wise living as wise thinking. This means that in order to experience God’s presence in one’s life 
it is inevitable not only to think the right things but also to do them, according to Proverbs. 
This understanding of wisdom echoes (again) what Lash—building on Karl Rahner—says about 
experiencing God in the world: 
All human experience is, in varying degrees of ‘latency’ or ‘actuality,’ experience in 
relation to the mystery of God, and may be accepted as such ‘even if the word “God” is 
never heard and is never used as the term for the direction and goal of the transcendental 
experience known in this way.’
603
 
In the essay to which Lash refers in his discussion Rahner expresses very similar thoughts: ‘The 
experience of God constitutes, rather… the ultimate depths and the radical essence of every 
spiritual and personal experience (of love, faithfulness, hope and so on).’604  
The main difference between Proverbs and the just quoted theologians seems to be that 
whereas Lash and Rahner would probably happily include ‘wisdom’ as one of the basic spiritual 
experiences of humanity, they would say that experiencing God is even one step further, it is 
even more basic, it is a sort of common denominator of all these spiritual experiences—
whereas Proverbs, as I understand it, does not go further than wisdom. However, the 
difference between Lash and Rahner, on the one hand, and Proverbs, on the other, might not 
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be as big as it appears if we consider how complex a category the wisdom of Proverbs is. As we 
have seen, it can be found in all sorts of human activities and it incorporates moral character. 
It includes a right vision of reality, too (see previous discussion of Prov. 2). So, just like Lash’s 
and Rahner’s ‘experience of God,’ it can be found in all human experiences. 
Is Lady Wisdom a Hypostasis of Yahweh? 
I described wisdom in the previous section as ‘God present in the world.’ However, maybe I 
should have been more careful in my language, since ‘where God is, is not God.’ As Lash would 
no doubt warn us, even if it is true in a sense that wisdom is ‘God present in the world,’ we 
should  
…keep the word ‘God’ holy by using it only for that unfathomable mystery with which no 
individual, no image, person, power, fact or thing, neither the world nor all the wonders of 
the world, may simply be identified.
605
 
So, if Wisdom ‘mediates’ God’s presence in the world but we are better not to call her God 
then what kind of being is she? Again, the theological discussion of Lash can help us. Writing 
about the Trinity, he explains 
…that the Christian doctrine of God, declared in the threefold structure of the single 
creed, protects the reference to God of Christian action and speech by simultaneously 
serving as a set of what I have come to call ‘protocols against idolatry.’ 
The creed performs this single twofold service (the technical correlates of which, in 
theological grammar, are three ‘hypostases’ and one ‘nature’) by indicating, at each point, 
where God is truly to be found and then, at each point, by denying that what we find 
there is simply to be identified with God... it enables us to make true mention of God and, 
by denying that the forms of our address (our confession of God as ‘gift’, as ‘verbum’ and 
as ‘Father’, for example) furnish us with some hold upon the ‘nature’ of God, it sustains 
our recognition of the absolute otherness or non-identity of the world and God.
606
 
It is tempting to understand Lady Wisdom in Prov. 8 as a hypostasis of God in the light of 
Lash’s clarifying thoughts about the Christian theological usage of the word: it is ‘where God is 
truly to be found’ but we should deny ‘that what we find there is simply to be identified with 
God.’ 
Hypostasis is a much debated concept in biblical studies. It was often used as a category fitting 
for Wisdom especially in the first half of the 20th century, but it has been somewhat out of 
                                                          
605
 Lash 1996:52. 
606
 Lash 1996:89‒90; see also Lash 1988:275‒280. 
209 
 
fashion for the last few decades.607 Fox and von Rad, for example, dismiss it rather easily, 
saying that Wisdom cannot be a hypostasis of God since she is created and as such she is 
outside of the divine realm.608 However, as we have seen, the יננק of Prov. 8:22 and the whole 
description of Wisdom’s existence in Prov. 8:22‒31 is ambiguous enough to do justice to the 
dialectic nature of a hypostasis: she is part of creation indeed, but as the daughter of God 
begotten in the moment God became active and always there where the nonspatial God is. 
Claudia Camp expressed another critique of understanding Wisdom as hypostasis. The main 
thrust of her sophisticated criticism seems to be rather technical: defining and using hypostasis 
is a complicated and not a clear-cut maneuver at all.609 It is hard not to agree with her, but if I 
am right that Prov. 8 (or rather the book of Proverbs in the light of chapter 8) is at least partly 
about meeting/experiencing/participating in God in the world then the subject matter of the 
book is complicated enough to validate the usage of similarly complicated theological terms in 
the interpretation of it. 
The biblical scholar G. Pfeifer provides a definition of ‘hypostasis’ which matches rather nicely 
Lash’s understanding of the word’s function:610 a Hypostasis is ‘a divine being that participates 
in the essence of a deity who, acting through it, intervenes in the world, without exhausting its 
essence in the work of the hypostasis.’611 Whether we use ‘hypostasis’ or not for describing 
Wisdom in Prov. 8—and as it is a loaded and debated word its usage requires special care and 
clarity indeed—this understanding of it expresses what I have been trying to argue for on the 
previous pages. 
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I have argued in this section that the theological vision provided by Prov. 8 depicts a wisdom 
who mediates, or more precisely displays the presence of Yahweh in the world. When one sees 
wisdom, one sees Yahweh, so to speak. 
Speaking about Yahweh’s presence in the world requires a dialectic language, which is well 
represented by the personification of wisdom in Prov. 8: it distances wisdom from Yahweh, 
whereas the chapter uses language for describing her as if she was Yahweh. 
Weeks suggested that this language is rather problematic and only accidental, stemming from 
the carelessness or from the ignorance of the author about future theological debates and 
enquiries. In contrast, I do not see the language as problematic. I rather see it fitting for the 
discussion of a problematic issue: Yahweh’s presence in the world. 
True enough, the author of Prov. 8 probably did not intend to write an analytical theological 
treatise about the nature of Yahweh and his relationship to the world. His basic intention was 
to recommend wisdom as Fox emphasises and Weeks might very well be right too that the 
parallel with the strange woman influenced significantly the creation of the literary figure of 
Lady Wisdom. But the well-defined exhortatory and literary purposes of the text do not 
necessarily mean that it is confused or irrelevant on a theological level. To adjust Fox’s 
observation slightly to this discussion, 
…granted this rhetorical thrust [and literary function], the poem still conveys an unusual 
conception of wisdom and makes powerful claims for this entity, and these may also be 
read from a theoretical or philosophical [or theological] perspective.
612
 
The theological interpretation I provided was mainly about the function of wisdom 
(‘mediating’ Yahweh’s presence) and not about her precise identity. Is she a literary figure or a 
hypostasis? Is she Yahweh or part of the world? Is she the Torah or the rest of Proverbs? In my 
view, a definitive decision on the answers to these questions is not only impossible but also 
unwarranted as these options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In a sense any of them 
can be true to Wisdom. Relatedly, I do not see significant difference between Wisdom (with a 
capital ‘W’) and wisdom. Reading the received form of the book, the reader inevitably brings 
the vivid picture of Lady Wisdom to the rest of the book and applies her to it. Wise human 
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behaviour and also the wisdom of the book of Proverbs are ‘channels’ through which we can 
experience Yahweh: that is, they are manifestations of Lady Wisdom herself. 
This leads us back to our initial question. If I am right that wisdom is about being with Yahweh 
and this comprises the background for the reading of the whole book of Proverbs, then we can 
hardly call this book, or the world and behaviour which it is about, ‘secular.’ Quite the 
opposite. The thrust of the book seems to be to encourage the reader to experience Yahweh in 
the world. In this sense, it is more about the ‘sanctification’ of the ‘secular’ world than about 
worldliness. 
This interpretation of Proverbs is in a sense parallel with the interpretation I offered earlier in 
connection with the question of self-interest. Both here and there the emphasis is on a 
relational interpretation of the book. What might appear as ‘selfishness’ for some, can be 
looked at from another angle and can be seen as participating in divine providence: that is, one 
can experience properly self-interested wisdom as being in the presence of God. In a similar 
way, what might appear as offering a secular perspective to some, can be looked at from 
another angle and can be seen as being in the presence of God by being wise in everyday life. 
As we will see shortly, these conclusions about the ‘sanctification’ of the secular and about the 
‘relational’ understanding of Proverbs are also reinforced by another reading strategy which 
interprets the book in the light of the vision of the Jerusalem Temple as it is offered by the 
canonical context. 
The temple as theological vision 
Introductory notes 
In the following I am going to argue that a fruitful theological interpretation of the book of 
Proverbs can be done along the lines of temple-theology. This interpretation understands wise 
living as living in a temple. I am agnostic about whether this is the intended meaning of some 
of the authors and editors of the book, though, as I hope to show, this option cannot be ruled 
out. My proposal is that this should be a possible reading strategy of the book in a canonical 
context rather than that this is its authorial meaning. 
The picture of everyday wise living as entering into the temple matches nicely what I wrote in 
the previous section about wisdom as mediating the presence of God. In ancient societies, and 
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Israel was not an exception, it was, first of all, the temple where one could experience God’s 
presence.613 Everyday life lived in wisdom provides such a temple setting. 
The inspiration for my thoughts have come mainly from two sources: the insights of Raymond 
C. Van Leeuwen614 and Claudia V. Camp.615 Van Leeuwen argues that the activity of building (a 
house or a temple) and wisdom were closely connected in ancient near eastern thinking. Camp 
offered an imaginative reading of the Solomon narrative in 1 Kings and the book of Proverbs in 
the light of each other.616 
The main difference between the interpretation of Camp and that of myself will be that 
whereas she sees the book of Proverbs as the image of the Temple617 I am rather inclined to 
see Proverbs as a book about the image of the temple: that is, about everyday life, since the 
book teaches that the reader experiences God’s presence when he or she actively follows the 
book’s instructions and not when he or she only reads them. Entering the temple is living 
wisely and not just reading about wisdom. 
The main difference between my interpretation and that of Van Leeuwen will be mainly a 
difference in emphasis. I agree with him that the conceptual background of the book of 
Proverbs is comprised partly by a connection of wisdom with house-building. However, I would 
like to emphasise that, in the light of Camp’s arguments, in the case of Proverbs we should 
rather speak about the building of a particular kind of house, namely, the (Solomonic) Temple. 
In order to delineate my thoughts it will be necessary to describe the close association 
between temple, wisdom, and universe in ancient near eastern thinking and literature. As the 
major part of this task has been accomplished several times by more able writers618 I am going 
to list the main arguments as succinctly as possible, only providing a few brief examples. 
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The Temple―Universe―Wisdom topos in ancient near eastern texts 
Temple, Universe, and Wisdom were subjects which were closely related to each other in 
ancient near eastern thinking. The temple and the universe were actually often identified with 
each other, they comprised a ‘homology’ to use Levenson’s expression.’619 
In Egypt, the temple represented heaven on earth, but this did not prevent Egyptians from 
perceiving it as the representation of the whole universe at the same time. This was expressed 
not only in inscriptions but also in the decoration of many temples: the floor represented the 
earth, the blue ceiling decorated with stars or constellations stood for the heavens and the 
vegetation was not only represented by the plant-rooms but also by the decoration of the 
walls which often contained many different types of plants.620 
Mesopotamian conceptions of the temple were similar to the Egyptian ones in this respect. 
They often described temples in cosmic imagery. In Sumerian Lagash king Gudea described his 
temple-building project with cosmic language: 
The building of the temple [was done] according to its holy star(s) [and the builders] were 
making the temple grow (high) like a mountain range making it float in mid-heaven like a 
cloud… [it was like] brilliant moonlight… shining. It illuminated the land.
621
 
Enuma Elish, the Babylonian creation myth speaks about the establishment of Esagila 
(Marduk’s temple) and indeed the whole temple district as part of the creation process. In an 
inscription of Esarhaddon the temple of Assur is described with the words 
I raised the top of Esharra to heaven, 
above, to heaven I elevated its top. 
Below in the netherworld 
I made firm its foundation.
622
 
These and other Mesopotamian texts show the close association between the universe and 
temple, though they are not as unambiguous evidence for the temple as universe and universe 
as temple ‘homology’ as the Egyptian temple-decoration. Depending on context, they can not 
only express an identification between temple and world but also that building a temple is part 
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of the god’s creation activity, or that the temple is the centre of the universe,623 or that the 
temple fills the whole universe.624 Nevertheless, the ‘temple as universe—universe as temple’ 
idea was probably also part of the ancient Mesopotamian conceptual world, as it is visible in 
many temple names, like Esharra (House of the Cosmos), Entemenanki (House of the 
Foundation Platform Between Heaven and Earth), etc.625 
It seems that the temple (microcosm)‒universe (macrocosm) topos was typical for the whole 
ancient Near East. However, as I have mentioned above, the topos was more complex than 
this. Creating the Universe and building a temple were equally connected to wisdom. To name 
a famous example, Marduk, the world-creator god in Enuma Elish was not only the son of Ea, 
the god of wisdom, but the very first thing we learn about him is how wise he was: 
Bel, cleverest of the clever, sage of the gods, was begotten. 
And inside Apsu, Marduk was created; 
Inside pure Apsu, Marduk was born. 
Ea his father created him.
626
 
Enki, the Sumerian equivalent of Ea is another good example. He was responsible for ordering 
the world and thereby bringing prosperity.627 It is noteworthy that in connection with his 
ordering and temple building activity he praises himself in a similar fashion as Lady Wisdom 
does in Prov. 8: 
I am the first born of An... I am the principal among rulers... I bring prosperity to 
perfection... I am the wisdom and understanding of all the foreign lands. With An the king, 
on An’s dais, I oversee Justice... I was born as the firstborn son of holy An.
628
 
This is a collection of those elements from lines 61‒80 of Enki and the World Order, which 
especially resemble the language of Prov. 8. However, the similarities should not be 
overemphasised. There is clearly a huge spatial, temporal, and conceptual gap between the 
two texts, which is disguised by this collection of similarities. Nevertheless, the parallels 
exemplify well the similar role and depiction of divine figures responsible for wisdom 
throughout the ancient Near East. It is worth quoting the following lines, too: 
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In a state of high delight
629
 Enki, the king of the Abzu, rejoicing in great splendour, again 
justly praises himself: ‘I am the lord, I am one whose word is reliable,
630
 I am one who 
excels in everything... I have built my house,
631




Similarly, human builders were supposed to be wise just like their heavenly counterparts. As 
Esarhaddon prays in connection with a temple-building: 
Oh ye creators of gods and goddesses, build the structure with your own hands, the abode 
of your exalted divinity. Whatever is in your hearts, so let it be done, without any 
deviations from the command of your lips. The skilled (lit. wise) artificers whom you called 
to carry out this commission,—like Ea, their creator, grant unto them the high(est) 
wisdom, so that their strength and skill, at your exalted command, may accomplish, 
through the craftsmanship of Nin-igi-kug [=Ea], what their hands undertake.
633
 
Many more examples could be listed but the above ones might be enough for exemplifying the 
close connection between the universe (macrocosm) and the temple (microcosm) on the one 
hand and between wisdom and the building of the universe and earthly temples on the other 
hand in the ancient Near East. 
The Temple―Universe―Wisdom topos in the Old Testament 
Biblical literature presents a very similar temple―universe―wisdom topos to what we have 
just observed in the wider ancient near eastern context. Wisdom was closely related both to 
creating the world and to building a temple. 
As for the wisdom‒world-creation relationship, we are told several times that God created the 
universe by wisdom and knowledge (Ps. 104:24; 136:5; Jer. 10:12; 51:15; Prov. 3:19‒20; etc.). 
The fact that we can find this statement in different parts of the Hebrew canon, often 
expressed in very similar vocabulary, shows that this was a well acknowledged, maybe even 
proverb-like idea in ancient Hebrew thinking. 
Eden narratives might also play on wisdom motives. This Eden‒wisdom connection fits the 
temple‒universe‒wisdom topos well since Eden-narratives are not unrelated to the creation 
and as we will see shortly, there is also an Eden‒temple connection. A high number of wisdom 
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motives is observable for example in Gen. 2‒3. The knowledge (of good and evil) is an 
important topic in it just like in wisdom texts; the serpent was shrewd (Gen. 3:1; cf. Prov. 1:4; 
8:12; 12:16; 27:12); the tree of life appears at crucial points (Gen. 2:9; 3:22; cf. Prov. 3:18; 
11:30; 13:12; 15:4); and it was even suggested that Adam was depicted as the first sage 
(mainly based on the parallels with Job 15:6‒7 and Ez. 28, especially verses 12b‒15).634 
So, wisdom seems to play an important role at the primordial times of creating the world and 
human beings. It is, however, more surprising to the modern reader that wisdom was also 
closely related to building the Tabernacle/Temple. Not only was Solomon, the builder of the 
Temple, a the wise king par excellence (1 Kings 3‒11) but Hiram, the craftsman working on the 
furnishing of the Temple, and Bezalel, who worked on the Tabernacle, were also especially 
wise people. Hiram was filled with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge (1 Kings 7:14׃  אלמיו
תא תאו המכחה תאו הנובתה תעדה ) just like Bezalel who even had the Spirit of God (Ex. 31:3:  אלמאו
תעדבו הנובתבו המכחב םיהלא חור ותא), which recalls Gen. 1:2. Indeed, it is noteworthy that 16 
occurrences of the word המכח in Exodus are connected to the making of the Tabernacle or its 
holy equipment.635 
Modern people tend to connect wisdom to the existential decisions of everyday life. It is also 
understandable that creating the world requires some wisdom. We would, furthermore, 
understand that the decision of whether to build a temple or not might require wisdom, but 
that the actual building activity itself might require wisdom could sound a bit unusual for 
modern readers. It seems that in the ancient Near East, and the Old Testament is not an 
exception, wisdom was connected to everyday life, creation, and (especially temple-) 
building.636 This becomes more understandable if we consider the close connection between 
temple-building and creating the world in biblical thinking. 
In Israel the same macrocosm‒microcosm relationship can be observed between the Universe 
and the Temple as throughout the ancient Near East. The Tabernacle and the Temple were 
decorated with motifs of the cosmos (bronze sea as sea, blue curtains as sky, altar as earth, 
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seven branched lamp-stand as five planets plus moon and sun, etc.). As Josephus remarked 
writing about the Tabernacle, ‘every one of these objects is intended to recall and represent 
the universe’637 and in this case modern scholarship agrees with him.638 
The major biblical creation stories are told in a way that they echo the Tabernacle/Temple 
texts. There are many resemblances between Gen. 1:1‒2:4a and the Tabernacle narratives. 
The two most striking ones are probably the sentences about finishing the work639 and the 
usage of number seven. As for the work-finishing formula, in Ex. 39:43 we read about how 
Moses inspected the work on the Tabernacle: 
ותא השמ ארי לכ הוהי הוצ רשאכ התא ושע הנהו הכאלמה  
And Moses saw all the work, and behold, they had done it as the Lord had 
commanded. 
In Gen. 1:31 we read similarly about God:  
ותא םיהלא ארי לכ הנהו השע רשא דאמ בוט  
And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.640  
A similar parallel can be found between 1 Kings 7:40b (cf. 7:51) and Gen. 2:2: 
ותא תושעל םריח לכי לכ הוהי תיב המלש ךלמל השע רשא הכאלמה  
And Hiram finished all the work he was doing, what he did for king Solomon on 
the house of the Lord. 
ו השע רשא ותכאלמ יעיבשה םויב םיהלא לכי  
And God finished [all] the work he had been doing on the seventh day. 
Hurowitz argues that it was the creation-language which borrowed these and similar formulas 
and expressions from the building-language and not vice versa. This might be so, but for our 
purpose it is more important to recognize that whatever the direction of the influence was 
between creation-language and temple-building language, this close relationship between the 
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two types of texts in the Bible mirrors the same homology between world and temple that we 
have observed in the non-biblical ancient near eastern literature. 
As for the number seven, just as creation was accomplished in seven days and many other 
details of the story are organized around the same number (for example the first verse 
contains 7 words, the second contains 14, key expressions like היח,  יכבוט , ארב occur seven 
times, etc.) so the temple was built for seven years, it was dedicated during Tabernacles, the 
seven-day feast of the seventh month (1 Kings 8:2), and Solomon’s Temple-dedication speech 
is structured in seven specific petitions (1 Kings 8:31‒32, 33‒34, 35‒37a, 37b‒40, 41‒43, 
44‒45, 46‒53).641 
At this point we should also note that although Ps. 104, which might have influenced the first 
creation story,642 does not parallel the temple texts so nicely, it also uses the language of 
building: the heaven is stretched out like a tent (verse 2), the beams of the upper chambers 
are laid in waters (verse 3), the Earth is set on foundation (verse 5), a boundary was put to the 
waters (verse 9), furthermore, cedars were planted (verse 16) just as in ancient near eastern 
temple districts and probably in the Jerusalem Temple (cf. Ps. 92:13‒14). 643 
The second creation story has even more parallels with the temple than the first one. The 
cherubim, gold, trees, tree of life, Gihon, precious stones and many more motifs have their 
cultic equivalents in the temple.644 It is interesting that the language of Lev. 26:9‒12 echoes 
both creation stories of Genesis at the same time when it writes in connection with God’s 
Tabernacle: ‘I will… make you fruitful and multiply you (םכתא יתיברהו םכתא יתירפהו cf. Gen. 1:28: 
וברו ורפ)… I will place my dwelling among you… I will walk among you (יתכלהתהו, cf. Gen. 3:8: 
 ךלהתמ םיהלאןגב ).’645 
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The world‒temple connection not only characterises the first two creation stories of Genesis, 
Ps. 104, and the temple-texts but, as several studies argue, it permeates the whole Bible.646 As 
Levenson delineates, writing about two (so far not yet mentioned) examples, 
If the double directionality of the homology of temple and world sometimes yields texts 
such as Psalm 78:69, in which the Temple is described as a world, it also yields texts in 
which the world is described as a temple: 
Thus said the Lord: 
The heaven is My throne 
And the earth is My footstool: 
Where could you build a house for Me, 
What place could serve as My abode? 
All this was made by My hand, 
And thus it all came into being 
—declares the Lord. 
Yet to such a one I look: 
To the poor and broken-hearted, 
Who is concerned about My word. (Isa. 66:1‒2)
647
 
Or as he writes in an earlier article: 
YHWH is building a new Temple, therefore creating a new world, and vice versa... Perhaps 
it is not coincidence that the Hebrew Bible begins with an account of the creation of 
heaven and earth by the command of God (Gen. 1:1) and ends with the command of the 
God of heaven “to build him a Temple in Jerusalem” (2Chron. 35:23). It goes from creation 
(Temple) to Temple (creation) in twenty-four books.
648
 
We can conclude that in the Bible we see the temple―universe―wisdom topos familiar from 
other ancient near eastern literature. Wisdom is closely connected to the construction of both 
the Temple and the world, which is understandable since the Temple and the world form a 
homology. 
It has to be realised, however, that the relationship between the temple and the world is a bit 
more complex than this brief summary so far would suggest. Namely, the temple represents 
the world in two different senses. On the one hand, it stands for the whole universe. On the 
other hand, it represents the original, idyllic state of the Creation, the Edenic garden, and as 
such it is radically different from the ‘profane’ or ‘secular’ world, the world outside the 
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sanctuary. The temple is the world but not simply the world. It is the world where the tree of 
life flourishes and where the Lord is present. This is the world/temple which one can enter by 
following the directions of Proverbs, as I will argue now. 
The Temple—Universe—Wisdom topos in Proverbs 
It was Patrick Skehan who argued most extensively not only for the unity of the book of 
Proverbs but that its structure represents the architecture of Solomon’s temple.649 He claimed 
that the number of columns into which the book was organized on the ‘original’ scroll and the 
number of lines in those columns reflect the measurements and proportions of the temple. 
However, there are two interrelated problems concerning Skehan’s thoughts. First, enough 
questions have come up about his theory to justify not taking it for granted.650 For example, he 
had to do some re-organisations of the text, even if not too much, to fit it to his theory. Also, 
we do not know about any examples of Jewish manuscripts from the Persian or Hellenistic 
period which displayed those picture-like organisational characteristics which Skehan 
suspected for Proverbs. The second problem is connected to the first one. Despite these 
general doubts, no one has yet undertaken a thoroughgoing evaluation of his arguments, no 
doubt partly because of the enormous work this would require, since ‘Skehan’s argument is 
detailed to the point of esotericism,’ as Camp writes. Camp herself seems to have adapted the 
approach that ‘Skehan’s theory almost sounds too good to be true; if it was true it would 
support my arguments immensely but it sounds suspicious enough not to build too much on 
it.’651 This is the approach I am going to follow too, so in the followings I am consciously 
avoiding Skehan’s arguments despite their alluring attractiveness. 
Let us start with Prov. 9:1 which has fascinated the imagination of the interpreters (not least 
that of Skehan) for long: 
חהעבש הידומע הבצח התיב התנב תומכ  
Wisdom has built her house, hewn out652 her seven pillars. 
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What pillars and what house is this verse about? The Midrash Mishle from the (probably) 9th 
century understood Wisdom’s house in Prov. 9:1 as referring to the universe: 
Wisdom has built her house, she has hewn her seven pillars (Prov. 9:1): This refers to the 
Torah, which built the entire universe through her wisdom. She has hewn her seven 
pillars―she was hewn from the seven firmaments and was given to humanity. Another 
interpretation: Wisdom has built her house―God said: If one has earned the merit of 
teaching Torah to others, [I will account it to him] as though he had erected the entire 
universe. She has hewn her seven pillars―these refer to the seven lands. If one has earned 
the merit of upholding the Torah, he will inherit the seven lands; if not, he will be expelled 
from the seven lands.
653
 
These medieval Jewish interpretations presumably follow from the assumption that chapter 
nine is connected with the previous one, and they understand the creation of the universe 
there as referring to building the house of wisdom. This medieval understanding is actually in 
harmony with the opinion of many contemporary scholars. Proverbs 8 uses architectural 
language (חתפ, תזוזמ, תתלד, דסומ, ןוכ). The universe is like a house, so 
the pillars are most likely a reference to the ‘pillars of the earth’ (Ps 75:3; cf. 1Sam 2:8; Job 
9:6; 26:11)… But the seven pillars may also be a case of inner-biblical allusion to Gen 
1:1‒2:3… the text of Proverbs 8‒9 appears to be playing with the pattern six plus one… In 
[9:]1‒6, the preparation of the house and its feast takes six actions (past tense verbs), and 
the invitation to celebrate in the completed house takes one action, ‘she calls’… In the 
preceding chapter, the account of creation falls into two connected sections. The first 
(8:22‒26) has six verbs of creation; the second (8:27‒29) has six infinitives of creation. 
These sections are followed by two identical verbs (‘I was’, 8:30)… In 9:7‒12, the root for 




Building was a source of delight throughout the ancient Near East and usually was followed by 
a banquet. For example Solomon and the people celebrated ‘before Yahweh’ (הוהי ינפל) for 7 + 
7 days and went home joyfully after finishing the Temple in 1 Kings 8:62‒66. In a similar 
fashion Wisdom delights in front of Yahweh (8:30b:  תקחשמוינפל ) and organizes a banquet in 
Prov. 9:1‒6.655 
There might be a direct hint at the temple in Prov. 8:34 which speaks about the doors, 
doorposts, and doorways (תלד, הזוזמ, חתפ) ֹof Wisdom. These three words occur together only 
twice outside Proverbs (1 Kings 6:31; Ez. 46:2‒3), both times referring to the doors of the 
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Temple.656 As Baumann writes, ‘in an analogous way to the temple doors of Yahweh’s house, 
Wisdom would possess an—imaginative—Temple in 8:34.’657 
This interpretation is supported furthermore by understanding ןומא in 8:30 as ‘artisan,’658 
emending it to ןָמָא on the basis of Cant. 7:2 and Accadian ummanu which meant ‘sage’ with the 
connotations of scholar, scribe, royal counselor (cf. 8:15‒16) and also craftsman.659 In Prov. 
3:19‒20 God built the universe (see the building vocabulary, דסי and ןוכ in 3:19) using wisdom 
(המכח), knowledge (הנובת), and understanding (תעד), the very same ‘tools’ used by Bezalel and 
Hiram for building the Tabernacle and the Temple. Here, in chapter 8, the same three words 
are used 7 times all together (המכח—verses 1, 11, 12; הנובת—verse 1; תעד—verses 9, 10, 12) 
and Wisdom herself helps God to build the universe, that is, her house, as a 
sage/masterworker. 
The motif of building a house and providing for it660 appears several times in the whole book of 
Proverbs. Some of these occurrences might refer back to the house of Wisdom in 9:1. In 14:1 
we read 
חונסרהת הידיב תלואו התיב התנב םישנ תומכ  
The wise among women (each one) builds her house but a foolish one tears it 
down with her own hands. 
If םישנ is deleted from the text than 14:1a is identical with 9:1a: ‘Wisdom has built her house.’ 
Whether םישנ was part of the original text661 or it is a corruption which should be deleted662 or 
we should understand it as an editorial addition,663 the verse in its present context echoes 
both the house building of Lady Wisdom from chapters 1‒9 and that of flesh and blood women 
from later chapters, thereby building a bridge between the two parts of the book. 24:3‒4 can 
fulfill a similar bridge-building role with its similarities to 3:19‒20: 
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כתי הנובתבו תיב הנבי המכחבןןו  
םיענו רקי ןוה לכ ואלמי םירדח תעדבו 
By wisdom a house is built by knowledge it is established, 
by understanding its rooms are filled with all precious and pleasant treasures. 
Again, we can see here the typical house-building ‘tools’ (wisdom [המכח], knowledge [הנובת], 
and understanding [תעד]) in the same order as in 3:19‒20.664 Finally, at the end of Proverbs we 
meet the valiant woman whose figure echoes Lady Wisdom and who provides for her house 
abundantly (31:15, 21, 27), just as Wisdom fills the treasure-houses of her lovers (8:21).665 So, 
Prov. 9 is not only about the house (universe) building of Lady Wisdom, which we can see in 
chapter 8, but it also connects chapter nine to the following chapters as there are some echoes 
of this building activity in the later chapters which suggest that human beings can join in in the 
house-building activities. 
Certain verses modulate this house-building motif and suggest that the picture is not only of an 
ordinary house but of the Temple itself. As we have noted, besides the creation stories, the 
wisdom―knowledge―understanding triad of 24:3‒4 occurs only in context of the 
Temple/Tabernacle building. Lady Wisdom seems to have built her house on a high point of 
the city (cf. 9:1 in parallel with 9:3 and 14) just as temples used to be built on high points of 
cities in ancient Near East.666 We have also seen that the Temple, just like creation, was 
associated with number seven in the biblical tradition which might be the background for the 
seven pillars of 9:1. In 31:21‒22 we read that the valiant Woman makes scarlet (ינש), linen 
(שש), and purple (ןמגרא) clothes and coverings for her house. These three expressions occur 
together only in connection with making the Tabernacle and the clothes of the high priest but 
there they occur often.667 
So, we can conclude that the house-building motif goes through the whole book of Proverbs 
hand in hand with allusions to the Tabernacle/Temple. The interpretation towards which all 
these point is that the whole creation is Wisdom’s house (  תיבתומכח ) and this house is at the 
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same time God’s temple (הוהי תיב). Human beings can join Wisdom in her house (i.e. the Lord in 
his temple) by being wise in the world. Building one’s own earthly household and human 
relationships through being wise equals building the temple of the Lord, so to speak. 
This interpretation can be translated into theological language by saying that living wisely is 
the way to the presence of God. As Lundquist writes,  
One must not be dealing with an actual building in order to be in what I would call a 
‘temple’ setting in the ancient Near East… Basic to temple ideology is the act of appearing 
‘before the Lord.’ As Menahem Haran states it: ‘In general, any cultic activity to which the 
biblical text applies the formula ‘before the Lord’ can be considered an indication of a 
temple at the site, since this expression stems from the basic conception of the temple as 
a divine dwelling-place and actually belongs to the temple’s technical terminology.
668
 
Lady Wisdom is ‘before the Lord’ (וינפל) in 8:30, a phrase most often used to describe the 
priests’ place and role in the temple, especially in Leviticus669 but also in other parts of the Old 
Testament.670 So those who come to her come into the presence of the Lord, i.e. come to the 
temple. This ‘coming to the temple’ picture of chapters 8 and 9 is occasionally recalled and 
reinforced in the following chapters by allusions to 9:1, to the clothes of the high priest, and to 
the ‘tools’ of temple building. 
Proverbs’ Temple―Universe―Wisdom topos in the light of the book’s canonical 
context 
However, not everything is so neat and clear as I have implied so far. The above understanding 
is an arguable interpretation of the text but not one explicitly stated by it. It is far from being 
an irrefutable interpretation. Some of the arguments I have listed are hotly debated. The 
prime example is, of course, the ןומא in 8:30. It is a crux interpretatum, and there are many 
rivaling theories about its meaning. The ‘craftsman/sage’ interpretation is only one option 
(other major candidates are: ‘growing up,’ ‘child,’ ‘faithfully’).671 Similarly, though it is indeed 
possible that the seven pillars of 9:1 allude to the Temple, the number seven is so widely used 
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that it can allude to many other things, too.672 Also, though the language of construction is 
clearly there in chapter 8, it is not emphasised very much, so it might be only a ‘dead’ literary 
convention, the way people wrote about creation in the ancient Near East anyway, without 
giving much thought to the picture of building behind some words. All in all, I find the ‘1. God’s 
creation is Wisdom’s house, 2. this house is the Temple where God is present, 3. we can enter 
this temple by being wise’ interpretation theologically promising, even defendable. However, 
it is not necessarily more compelling than some other possible construals of the text’s meaning 
and theological significance, at least not on the basis of the arguments delineated so far. 
However, this interpretation becomes more persuasive if we read Proverbs in its canonical 
context. The idea of the temple as a hermeneutical key for the book of Proverbs becomes 
especially attractive if we read the text together with the Solomon narrative (1 Kings 3‒11) and 
some psalms. 
The canonical context of 1 Kings 3‒11 
It has been a well known fact for long that Prov. 10:1‒22:16 contains 375 single-line proverbs, 
the numerical value of the name Solomon.673 Of course, we do not have to rely only on such 
‘secret hints’ if we search for Solomon in the book. He is explicitly mentioned in some headings 
(1:1; 10:1; 25:1). If one is willing to follow this Solomonic connection and read Proverbs 
together with 1 Kings 3‒11 he or she can find numerous parallels between the two texts. Just 
to list some of them briefly: 
 As we have noted above, the wisdom (המכח), knowledge (הנובת), and understanding 
(תעד) triad appears in both texts in the same order (1 Kings 7:14 cf. Prov. 3:19‒20; 
24:3‒4). 
 Solomon, of course, was the wise king par excellence in Hebrew tradition (1 Kings 
3:4‒15; 5:9‒14). 
                                                          
672
 See the wide array of explanations that has been offered for the number seven in Prov. 9:1 
throughout the history of its interpretation in Fuhs 2001:164‒165. The explanation which I find at least 
as persuasive as the one which understands the seven pillared building to refer to ‘creation’ is the one 
that understands it as referring to the book of Proverbs, which contains seven major units (Baumann 
1996:205‒207; Hurowitz 2001:209‒218). However, we also have to note that these two explanations 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
673
 Skehan 1948:117. 
226 
 
 Nothing could be compared to wise Solomon (1 Kings 3:12‒13)—as nothing compares 
to wisdom in Proverbs (Prov. 3:15).674 
 Together with the gift of wisdom Solomon also gains the promise of riches and long 
life (1 Kings 3:12‒14)—the most typical gifts of wisdom in Proverbs (Prov. 3:2, 16; 8:18; 
22:4; 28:16; etc.). 
 As the queen of Sheba remarked, happy was the one who listened to Solomon (1 Kings 
10:8)—just like the one who listens to Wisdom (Prov. 8:34).675 
 Solomon had an interesting story with foreign women (daughter of pharaoh, queen of 
Sheba, foreign wives; 1 Kings 3:1; 10:1‒13; 11:1‒13)—the relationship with foreign 
women is a major topic in Proverbs, especially, though not exclusively, in the first nine 
chapters (2:16; 5:20; 6:24; 7:5; 23:27). The ‘foreign woman’ (  השאהירכנ ) as an 
important type appears only in Proverbs, 1 Kings, Nehemiah, and Ezra, so the parallel 
is probably more significant than it might appear at the first sight.676 
 The strange woman has a house in both of the texts (1 Kings 9:24—Prov. 2:16; 5:8; 
7:27; 9:14).677 
 At the beginning of his royal career Solomon had to choose between two women (1 
Kings 3)—just like the reader has to choose between woman Wisdom and woman Folly 
in Prov. 9.678 
 Right after choosing between the women, Solomon’s wisdom is demonstrated through 
effective governance (1 Kings 4:1‒19)—which is one of Wisdom’s main territories, too, 
in Proverbs (Prov. 8:15‒21).679 
 Solomon established (ןוכ) David’s throne ( סכא ) (1 Kings 2:45)—establishing the throne 
is also an important topic in Proverbs (cf. Prov. 16:12; 25:5; 29:14).680 
 In his government Solomon maintained justice (טפשמ) and righteousness (הקדצ) (1 
Kings 10:9)—the social categories Wisdom moves in (Prov. 8:20).681 
 Solomon provides food for Hiram (1 Kings 5:23, 26)—just like the valiant woman 
(personified Wisdom?) provides food for her house in Proverbs (Prov. 31:14‒15, 27).682 
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 As Solomon’s words make Hiram rejoice (חמש)—so the good son (and good words) 
make a father rejoice (חמש) in Proverbs (10:1; 12:25; 15:20; 22:11).683 
Not all of these parallels are equally persuasive and significant but they have a strong 
cumulative effect and if one allows for their influence they create a ‘Solomonic atmosphere’ 
for the reading of Proverbs. Indeed, ‘it is hard to imagine ancient readers interpreting these 
two texts independently of each other,’ as Claudia Camp remarked.684 This must have been 
true at least for those who were aware of both texts, and this should be true for those modern 
readers, too, who wish to read Proverbs in a canonical context. 
The major topic of 1 Kings 1‒11, which I did not mention explicitly in the above list is, of 
course, the building of the temple. This topic is presented in close connection with the other 
themes of the Solomon narrative. Solomon’s wisdom, which made Hiram rejoice (1 Kings 5:21; 
the last point in the above list), was in fact his intention to build the temple (1 Kings 5:15‒20). 
Wisdom and temple-building are woven together from the beginning: we read a eulogy about 
Solomon’s wisdom (1 Kings 5:9‒14), then we learn about his intention to build the temple (1 
Kings 5:15‒20), then Hiram rejoices over Solomon’s wisdom (1 Kings 5:21) then the two of 
them agree about some details of the work of temple-building and payment (1 Kings 5:22‒25) 
then we read again that God gave wisdom to Solomon and about his treaty with Hiram (1 Kings 
5:26). 
If someone reads Proverbs in the context of the Solomon-narrative then the question ‘How 
does the wisdom of Proverbs relate to the temple?’ does not seem artificial. One can maybe 
even suggest, based on the intermingling of the themes of temple and wisdom, that the 
answer ‘living wisely is like building a temple’ also receives some affirmation from 1 Kings 
1‒11. 
The canonical context of Psalms 
Besides 1 Kings 3‒11, my other suggestion for providing a canonical context for the 
interpretation of Proverbs would be to read the book in the light of some psalms. 
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My prime example is Ps. 15. The table below contains the NRSV translation of the psalm and its 
semantic and lexical parallels with Proverbs. 
TABLE 10: PSALM 15 AND PROVERBS 
Psalm 15 Comments 
1 (A Psalm of David.) Oh Lord, who sojourns 
( ימ רוגי ) in your tent? Who dwells on your 
holy hill? 
 
2 The one who walks blamelessly ( תםימ  ךלוה), 
 
 






and speaks the truth from their heart; 
The expression םימת ךלוה occurs twice in the 
Bible, here and in Prov. 28:18. The word 
םת/םימת is proportionately the most common 
in Proverbs (see Table 11). 
The expression קדצ לעפ is unique but in its 
present form and place the psalm seems to 
be deliberately contrasting Ps. 14, 685 which 
speaks about ןוא ילעפ in verse 4; ןוא לעפ is 
rare outside psalms (occurs 16 times in 
Psalms, 10 times outside of it) but it does 
occur three times in Proverbs (10:29; 21:15; 
30:20). 
Speaking is the most common topic in 
Proverbs.686 
3 no slander on his lips, The topic of slander is also one of the main 
                                                          
685
 Hossfeld 1993a:166‒182. 
686
 2:12; 4:24; 6:12; 8:13; 10:8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 31, 32; 11:9, 11, 12, 13; 12:6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 22, 23, 25; 13:2, 3, 5; 14:3, 5, 23, 25; 15:1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 23, 26, 28; 16:1, 13, 23, 24, 27; 17:4, 7, 15, 
20, 27, 28; 18:4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 20, 21; 19:1, 5, 9, 22, 28; 20:15, 17, 19; 21:6, 23; 24:2, 7, 28; 25:11, 12, 15, 




and does no evil to his friend  (הער והער), 
 
nor shames (הפרח) his neighbour; 
themes of Proverbs.687  
The ‘הער ער’ sequence of words occurs only 
here and in Prov. 3:29. 
Although the exact word הפרח occurs only 
twice in Proverbs (6:33; 18:3), the topic of 
shame is quite common in it.688 
4 in whose eyes the despising (הזבנ) is 
rejected (סאמנ), but who honours those who 
fear the Lord; 
 
 
who stands by his oath even to his hurt;689 
Despising is also condemned in Proverbs 
(14:2; 15:20; 19:16). A similar cluster of 
words is used in Prov. 15:32‒33: the fear of 
the Lord and honour are mentioned together 
in Prov. 15:33 and the previous verse uses 
the word סאמ. 
5 who does not lend money at interest, and 
does not take a bribe against the innocent. 
The one who does these things shall never 
be moved (םלועל טומי אל). 
For lending money at interest and bribing 
see the parallels in Prov. 28:8 and 6:35. 
Verse 5b is parallel to Prov. 10:30 ( םלועל קידצ
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TABLE 11: FREQUENCY OF THE WORD םת IN THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT (NUMBER OF םת/NUMBER OF WORDS IN THE 
BOOK) 
Despite its similarities to Proverbs’ world of thought, Ps. 15 is usually not listed among the 
wisdom psalms.690 Even where its similarity to Proverbs is mentioned, it is not utilized for a 
theological discussion. Most commentaries only highlight that ethical behaviour is indeed very 
important, even in cultic contexts.691 The reason for the reluctance to highlight too strongly its 
resemblance to Proverbs can be the psalm’s close connection to the cult as it speaks about the 
requirements for dwelling in the Temple. So, most commentators try to explain it in a cultic 
and not in a wisdom context. Some argue that it is an ‘entrance liturgy,’ which formed a part of 
ceremonies in which priests at the entrance of the Temple questioned for the prerequisites for 
admission.692 However, as Terrien observed, 
Psalm 15 is not merely a request for entrance: the double question does not ask, “Who is 
permitted to come in?” The two verbs, “to sojourn” and “to dwell,” clearly ask the 
conditions for residence in the sanctuary side chambers (1Kgs 6:5), or the subsidiary 
edifices erected on the holy hill.
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Others argue that it might have been carved on the doorposts of the Temple as similar texts 
were carved on pillars next to the doors of Egyptian sanctuaries.694 Hossfeld cuts the Gordian 
knot bound by ‘wisdom-‘ and ‘cultic ropes’ by understanding the psalm as an entrance liturgy 
which was modified (especially in verses 4 and 5) later on by wisdom circles. 695 
At this point maybe I should clarify that I am not arguing that this psalm should be understood 
as a wisdom psalm. I am rather arguing that whatever label we attach to the psalm, its 
similarities to Proverbs can be utilised in our theological interpretation. It is precisely the cultic 
connection of the Psalm which can be fertile to our reading of Proverbs. Can we not 
understand the book of Proverbs in the light of this psalm as presenting ethical life as the 
‘continuation’ or the ‘representation’ of the Temple? After all, according to the psalm, those 
who ‘walk blamelessly,’ dwell in the temple. 
Ps. 15 is the first one in a series of psalms which probably forms a sub-collection in the first 
book of Psalms.696 The last psalm in this series is Ps. 24, which is parallel with Ps. 15 in its 
content. It also says that it is the blameless person (though does not use the actual word 
‘blameless’) who ascends the hill of the Lord and stands in his holy place (Ps. 24:3‒6). Just 
before saying this, however, it proclaims that  
הב יבשיו לבת האולמו ץראה הוהיל 
יכ לע אוה לעו הדסי םימי הננוכי תורהנ  
The earth and everything in it, the world and whoever lives in it are the Lord’s, 
since he founded it on waters and established it on rivers. 
(Ps. 24:1-2) 
The sequence of themes (the world is the Lord’s; who behaves ethically (in the world) stands in 
the temple) seems to express the same idea which we have already discussed: speaking about 
the world and speaking about the temple flows into each other seamlessly. World and temple 
form a ’homology.’ However, psalm 24 is not only an expression of the homology of the world 
and temple but also of the homology of the ‘worldly behaviour’ and the ‘temple worship’ of 
the believer, just like Ps. 15. This is the same homology which is visible in Proverbs if it is 
interpreted in the context of the Jerusalem Temple. 
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There are other psalms outside of Ps. 15‒24 which might support an interpretation of Proverbs 
which tries to understand the book’s teaching in the light of the temple. Ps. 84:11‒12 [English 
10‒11] also speaks side by side about walking blamelessly and being in the temple. Ps. 
92:13‒14 says too that the righteous are in the Lord’s house: ‘the righteous flourish like the 
palm tree, and grow like a cedar in Lebanon. They are planted in the house of the Lord; they 
flourish in the court of our God.’ The psalmist of Ps. 73 understood that evil people will have a 
bad end even if they seem to flourish now only when he entered the Temple.697 This is exactly 
what Proverbs wants the reader to understand, too (cf. Prov. 1:8‒19; 2:22; 10:25, 27; 13:9; 
14:32; 24:20; etc.), so again, being in the temple (Ps. 73) and being wise (Proverbs) have the 
same effects. 
Psalms’ parallels with Proverbs would deserve a more thorough and systematic investigation 
but that would go beyond the constraints of this dissertation. Nevertheless, the above 
examples provide enough basis for the conclusion that at least some psalms, just as 1 Kings 
1‒11, make it a justifiable canonical reading to see the wise, ethical behaviour of Proverbs as 
tantamount to entering and residing in the temple, that is, in the presence of Yahweh. 
Summary 
Jon Levenson writes about biblical temple-oriented devotion as follows: 
The familiar Christian use of Genesis 3 is temporal: the opportunity for immortality lay in 
the past and is unavailable now. Psalm 133 and its kindred literature offer a paradigm that 
is spatial: death is the norm outside Zion and cannot be reversed, but within the temple 
city, death is unknown, for there God has ordained the blessing of eternal life. To journey 
to the Temple is to move toward redemption, to leave the parched land of wasting and 
death for the fountain of life and the revival and rejuvenation it dispenses. This 
conception of the Temple as paradise, the place rendered inviolable by the pervasive 
presence of God, explains one of the more striking features of Temple-oriented devotion 
in the Hebrew Bible.
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Though Levenson wrote about the Temple, his lines make sense just as well if we refer them to 
Proverbs. If one follows the instructions of Proverbs she enters the realm of life here and now 
(see Table 12). It is like entering into the Temple. 
TABLE 12: FREQUENCY OF THE WORD םייח IN THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT (NUMBER OF םייח/NUMBER OF WORDS IN 
THE BOOK) 
The concept of ‘wisdom’ was closely connected to the Solomonic temple, and, as I have argued 
above, similarly to the Temple, Proverbs offers the presence of God, life, and abundance to 
those who listen to its instructions. It often does this through language used elsewhere for 
describing temple-oriented devotion or temple-building activity. 
Based on these observations I suggest that seeing wise life as tantamount to being in the 
temple and experiencing the presence of God, eternal life, and abundance is a fitting 
theological vision for interpreting Proverbs, which does justice to the text and gives a 
theological perspective for its practical admonitions. 
I am more or less agnostic about whether the temple as a ‘theological key’ is offered by 
Proverbs itself. Maybe there are enough hints in the text to say that it presents acting wisely as 
being in the temple but this is far from explicit. The main impetus for this reading, in my 
opinion, comes from outside of Proverbs and not from its text. It comes from its canonical 
context, mainly 1 Kings 3‒11, some psalms, and some creation- and Eden narratives. 
Nonetheless, there are enough motives in the text (temple-building language, Eden and 
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Solomonic allusions, etc.) which welcome this extra-textual suggestion. So, I would cautiously 
conclude that the temple as a ‘theological key’ for Proverbs is provided mainly by the canonical 
context and the language and conceptuality of Proverbs resonates with this canonical 
context.699 If this is so, then this interpretation is not a strait-jacket, which is forced on 
Proverbs but, even if it is not emphasised explicitly in the text, it does justice to it, what is 
more, highlights some important features of the text’s world of thought. Not least it points to 
the same direction as Prov. 2 and Prov. 8: acting wisely is experiencing God, being in his 
presence. 
Conclusions 
Let us go back to the original question of this section. Is Proverbs secular in the sense of 
presenting a common ground which is experienced and understood equally by everyone 
regardless of race, nationality, gender, and religion? 
My answer to this question is ‘yes and no.’ Yes, it speaks about everyday life and utilizes 
international wisdom-language. Nevertheless, I would suggest that something more is going on 
than presenting a universal common ground in experience and language: Proverbs not only 
presents the secular but at the same time sanctifies it. 
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 Seeing Proverbs in the light of temple-devotion is in accordance with some strands of the later 
tradition, too. In Sir. 24 the role of Wisdom is explained through the language of the Temple and the 
Garden of Eden (Beale 2004:160; Hayward 1996:7, 71, 98, 123; Winston 1979:204). Hayward argues that 
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Philo writes: 
When God willed to send down the image of divine excellence from heaven to earth in 
pity for our race, that it should not lose its share in the better lot, he constructs as a 
symbol of the truth the holy Tabernacle and its contents to be a representation and copy 
of wisdom. 
(De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia, the translation is taken from Philo 1932b:336‒339.) 
And again: 
And further on he [Moses] will speak of God’s dwelling-place, the Tabernacle, as being 
“ten curtains” (Ex. xxvi. 1), for to the structure which includes the whole of wisdom the 
perfect number ten belongs, and wisdom is the court and palace of the All-ruler, the sole 
Monarch, the Sovereign Lord. This dwelling is a house perceived by the mind, yet it is also 
the world or our senses, since he makes the curtains to be woven from such materials as 
are symbolical of the four elements; for they are wrought of fine linen, of dark red, of 
purple and of scarlet, four in number as I said. The linen is a symbol of earth, since it grows 
out of earth; the dark red of air, which is naturally black; the purple of water, since the 
means by which the dye is produced, the shell-fish which bears the same name comes 
from the sea; and the scarlet of fire, since it closely resembles flame. 
(Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit?, the translation is taken from Philo 1932a:516‒519.) 
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I have offered two parallel, canonical readings of Proverbs. The first one was canonical in the 
sense that it was seeking to understand the book as a whole, paying attention to the 
theological framework provided in the first nine chapters, especially in chapter 8. The second 
was canonical in the sense that it was seeking to understand the book in its canonical context. 
In the first one I argued that Prov. 8 depicts Wisdom as a ‘hypostasis’ of Yahweh suggesting 
that through listening to the rest of the book and through acting wisely one can experience 
Yahweh. My second canonical reading led to a similar conclusion: explicit and implicit allusions 
to the Jerusalem Temple provide a parallel between temple worship and everyday behaviour. 
Contrasting this reading with a quotation from Jürgen Habermas might help to clarify the 
statement that Proverbs seeks to sanctify the secular. Though Habermas’ text is apparently 
about something completely different, namely the history of secularisation, the connection 
with my interpretation of Proverbs will be clear shortly. Habermas is arguing that the history of 
secularisation can be usefully understood as the increasing level of self-reflexion of 
humankind: 
The progress in morality and law... [is] the decentering of our ego- or group-centered 
perspectives, when the point is to non-violently end conflicts of action. These social-
cognitive kinds of progress already refer to the further dimension of the increase in 
reflection, that is, the ability to step back behind oneself. This is what Max Weber meant 
when he spoke of “disenchantment.”... 
In early modernity, the instrumental attitude of state bureaucracy toward a political 
power largely free of moral norms signifies such a reflexive step... 
It is also in connection with this widespread push toward reflection that we have to view 
the progressive disintegration of traditional, popular piety. Two specifically modern forms 
of religious consciousness emerged from this: on the one hand, a fundamentalism that 
either withdraws from the modern world or turns aggressively toward it; on the other, a 
reflective faith that relates itself to other religions and respects the fallible insights of the 
institutionalized sciences as well as human rights.
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If I understand Habermas correctly, he argues that the morally (and religiously) free secular 
space which developed in the last few hundred years enabled us ‘to step behind ourselves’ and 
realise that there are other players on the field. This space potentially enables us to view our 
motives and actions in a less biased way and those of the others in a more understanding way. 
These are certainly developments which must be welcomed in many respects. However, my 
claim is that Proverbs is not so much about ‘stepping behind ourselves’ as about realising that 
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it is impossible to step behind God. It is not so much about reflection on the self with the help 
of the neutral secular horizon but about reflection on the secular in the light of God. A second 
step of reflection, if you like: first one might step behind oneself through the ‘secular space’ 
but then she might also step behind the ‘secular space’ itself and reflect on it in the light of the 
divine. This ‘second step’ enables one to realise that though the ‘neutral space’ might seem to 
be outside of the temple, in reality this ‘neutral space’ is the sacral temple itself where God 
can be met. 
All of these mean that ‘everyday life is understood as a liturgy.’ I am borrowing this sentence 
(altering some words) from Charles Mathewes’ A Theology of Public Life. It is worth quoting a 
bit more from the wider context of Mathewes’ statement: 
[I attempt] to offer a theological interpretation of the world as a form of participation in 
the divine perichōrēsis... it is a participation necessarily mediated through the world, 
through our condition as existing in God’s Creation. Creation is not the “background” to 
our redemption, it plays an essential role within it... Given this, citizenship is usefully 
understood as a liturgy... because, by engaging in apparently political activities, we are 
participating in properly theological activities as well.
 701
 
Mathewes’ text contains two ideas I tried to delineate through my two canonical readings: 
participation and liturgy. The vision of Prov. 8 can be understood as about participating in the 
divine through wise living. The temple parallel envisions life in the world as liturgy in the 
temple. In other words by ‘sanctification’ I mean that Proverbs provides a vision for everyday 
life, in which mundane ‘worldly’ acts gain a new significance. They become the means for 
glorifying God, being in contact with him and enjoying his presence.  
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A ‘post-secular’ interpretation of Proverbs: the 
hiddenness of God 
So far I have discussed the understanding of ‘secular’ in terms of ‘universalistic, not national 
and particularistic thinking’ (my earlier category A). I have already noted that the other two 
main understandings of ‘secular’ (human autonomy (category B), disenchanted thinking 
(category C)) seem to be less applicable to Proverbs. Nevertheless, these categories have also 
played a significant role in Proverbs interpretation. 
Space does not allow a thorough discussion of these secular interpretations. This is maybe not 
a serious problem in itself as they are less popular nowadays. Instead of discussing them 
directly in detail, I am going to investigate an interpretation which I consider their 
contemporary offspring. So, the following brief discussion will be an indirect evaluation of the 
usefulness of these understandings of ‘secular’ for the theological interpretation of Proverbs, 
not discussing them explicitly but evaluating their more recent theological ‘fruits.’ 
Walter Brueggemann’s interpretation of Proverbs in his 
Theology of the Old Testament 
Walter Brueggemann in his Theology of the Old Testament describes two different accounts of 
Yahweh in Israel’s testimony. The ‘core testimony’ speaks about a reliable, benevolent God, 
who acts out of righteousness and steadfast love. However, there is a ‘countertestimony,’ 
claims Brueggemann, which depicts Yahweh as a God who can be quite difficult to live with, 
and whose acts are rather arbitrary if not deliberately abusive. Brueggemann builds his 
argument mainly on texts like Ecclesiastes, Job, lament psalms and some passages from the 
prophets.702 
There is one other biblical book which plays a key role in Brueggemann’s argument for the 
existence of ‘Israel’s countertestimony’: the book of Proverbs. In fact, Proverbs is the key text 
with which Brueggemann starts his discussion of the ‘countertestimony.’703 This might be 
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somewhat surprising since Proverbs does seem to affirm the positive characteristics of 
Yahweh. Why does Brueggemann consider it to be a part of the ‘countertestimony’? 
First, he thinks that Proverbs is quite different from the majority of biblical books. As he 
argues, he builds on von Rad’s evaluation: 
In his Old Testament Theology 1, von Rad presented wisdom, along with the Psalms, as 
response to Israel’s credo theology… 
Von Rad, in his final book, revised this assessment to argue that wisdom is simply an 
alternative way of doing theology, one that represents a different context of faith and 
offers very different intellectual, cultural, and sociological options… I advance the notion 
of wisdom as alternative in order to suggest that wisdom is not simply an unrelated, 
second effort, but is an attempt to speak of Yahweh in all of those contexts of Israel’s lived 
experience wherein the main claims of the core testimony are not persuasive.
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Second, this alternative theology speaks about a hidden God as opposed to the God who is 
visible through his dramatic interventions in history: ‘a Yahweh who is not direct and not 
visible.’705 Israel’s core testimony about the deliverance from Egypt, the Sinai covenant, about 
God who performs ‘mighty acts’706 was simply not applicable in the intricacies of everyday 
struggles. 
In Israel’s primary testimony, as we have seen, Yahweh is known by Israel to be the 
subject of active verbs of transformation, whereby Yahweh dramatically and identifiably 
intervenes and intrudes into the life of Israel in order to work Yahweh’s righteousness, 
which is marked by justice, equity, and reliability.
707
 
Israel had to learn to live (and testify) in contexts where the intense engagement of 




Besides mentioning the above two points, Brueggemann also emphasises right at the 
beginning of his discussion that actually the theology of hiddenness of God has a quite 
venerable history. It is well attested in the Hebrew Bible: 
The core testimony of active verbs speaks of Yahweh with the claim that Yahweh was 
known and seen directly in the ongoing life of Israel. A strong and crucial counterclaim, 
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however, maintains that the God of Israel is hidden: ‘Truly, you are a God who hides 
himself, O God of Israel, the Savior’ (Isa 45:15).
709 
Furthermore, hiddenness-theology is also part of the spiritual heritage of the Christian Church 
and other religions. Besides other works he refers to Luther’s use of the term ‘hidden God’ and 
Buber’s discussion of the topic from a Jewish perspective.
710
 
In this alternative theology Yahweh does not act directly in the world. He just sustains the 
order of the universe. 
Yahweh is the hidden guarantor of an order that makes life in the world possible.
711
 
Human deeds have automatic and inescapable consequences… the deed carries within it 




This articulation of the hidden God permits Israel to affirm about Yahweh what the 
dominant ‘mighty deeds’ testimony did not permit, or at least what scholarly attention did 
not entertain. The wisdom tradition is able to affirm that blessing, Yahweh’s power and 
will for life, is intrinsic in the life process itself.
713
 
This alternative theology required a new mode of speech. 
Israel learned, living in the absence of Yahweh’s great interventions, to speak of Yahweh in 
yet another way. This way of speaking assigns very few active verbs of transformation to 
Yahweh… Rather, as Israel pondered the regularities of its daily life, Yahweh is assigned 
functions that concern especially governance, order, maintenance, and sustenance.
714
 
This new way of speaking is striking where Israel speaks about the freedom of Yahweh. As 
Brueggemann argues, the fact the Israel emphasised the deed‒consequence relation did not 
mean that she abandoned her faith in Yahweh’s freedom. There were verses (16:1‒2, 9; 19:14, 
21; 20:24; 21:30‒31) in which the authors of Proverbs reasserted this freedom. But even in 
these verses, 
…the way in which this ultimate affirmation of Yahweh is articulated… is odd. These 
sayings seem reluctant to grant to Yahweh any active verbs. Of the eight verses from 
Proverbs noted above, five assign Yahweh no verb at all, but only a preposition. Thus in 
16:1, 19:14, and 20:24, what is decisive is ‘from Yahweh.’ In 21:30‒31, the two 
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prepositions are ‘against’ (ngd) and ‘to’ (l). In 19:21, moreover, the verb is passive, ‘will be 
established’ (taqûm). Only in two of these passages is a direct, active verb assigned to 
Yahweh. In 16:9, the verb translated ‘direct’ is kûn; this, as we shall see, is a preferred 
word with which to speak about Yahweh’s hidden, long-term providential care. The other 
verb, in 16:2, rendered ‘weigh,’ is tōkēn, which may be linked to kûn. This word is used in 
Job 28:25, Isa 40:12, and Ps 75:3, in order to assert Yahweh’s majestic power as the 
orderer and governor of all of creation. But it is not a verb that witnesses to any direct, 
visible act on Yahweh’s part.715 
To summarise Brueggemann’s account of the theology of the book of Proverbs, we can say 
that this biblical book stemmed from the negative experience of Yahweh’s perceived absence 
in everyday life, from his hiddenness behind the ordinary processes, rules, and regularities of 
daily happenings. More positively, the authors of Proverbs celebrated the order of Creation 
and its hidden sustenance by Yahweh. 
God’s hiddenness had been mentioned occasionally in connection with Proverbs already 
before Brueggemann’s utilisation of the notion.716 Maybe he got the inspiration from one of 
these earlier applications of the term. However, it is undeniably Brueggemann’s distinctive 
contribution that he put such a strong emphasis on the ‘hiddenness’ of God and built his 
Proverbs interpretation around this suggestive theological theme. 
The place of Theology of the Old Testament among 
Brueggemann’s interpretations of Proverbs 
It has to be noted that the discussion of Proverbs in the Theology of the Old Testament is not 
Brueggemann’s last word on the subject. One of the main differences between this and his 
later interpretations717 is that the category of ‘hiddenness’ ceased to play such a significant 
role in them. It is not always clear whether he wishes to modify, downplay, or even contradict 
his hiddenness-theology in these more recent writings, or if he still maintains its main 
statements, and just simply wants to emphasise other, complementary aspects of Proverbs. 
This last option seems to be the more likely as he does refer to God’s hidden work in his later 
writings occasionally.718 Whatever the case might be, the focus of the following investigation 
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will be Brueggemann’s treatment of God’s hiddenness in Proverbs in his Theology of the Old 
Testament and not a comprehensive study of his changing (or not changing) views on 
Proverbs. 
It might be worthwhile, however, to note some similarities and differences between his 
hiddenness-interpretation in the Theology of the Old Testament and his earlier discussion of 
Proverbs. In his In Man we Trust (1972) one of Brueggemann’s main interpretative categories 
was the ‘secular.’ He understood Proverbs’ secularity both as non-sacral thinking and as 
emphasis on human autonomy. Consider, for example, the following quotation: 
I believe it is… plausible to suggest that in the wisdom traditions of Israel we have a visible 
expression of secularization as it has been characterised in the current discussions. 
Wisdom teaching is profoundly secular in that it presents life and history as a human 
enterprise… Retribution theology as found in the wisdom teachings is a warning that one 
cannot flee to the sacral for escape from the result of foolish actions and choices.
719
 
In the Theology of the Old Testament Brueggemann continued speaking about human freedom 
and autonomy in Proverbs:720 
Israel’s imagination is shaped in this venue by an awareness of givens, limits, and payouts 




Human life is lived in a well-ordered, reliable world… from that wisdom tradition may 
derive a large zone of human freedom and responsibility (as in Proverbs)…
722
 
Concerning the sacral/secular dichotomy, Brueggemann abandoned this vocabulary already 
before his Theology of the Old Testament. He suggested instead the usage of sociological 
categories like ‘priestly’ and ‘bureaucratic groups’ or ‘religious’ and ‘ideological 
legitimation.’723 Despite the changes in vocabulary, however, he kept the dichotomy and his 
description of the ‘bureaucratic,’ ‘intellectual,’ ‘ideological’ wisdom circles still kept many 
characteristics of his earlier description of secular wisdom. This can be observed in his 
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Theology of the Old Testament, too. He referred to divine wisdom as Yahweh’s ‘rationality’724 
which is built ‘into the very fabric of creation,’725 and also referred to Israel’s wisdom as 
investigating the world’s ‘predictability that is almost scientific in its precision,’726 and to the 
valuing of the ‘ordinariness of daily life’727 instead of relying on the narrative of Yahweh’s 
‘intrusive’ mighty acts.728 In his earlier In Man We Trust he contrasted secular thinking with the 
‘sacral view of reality in which the intrusion... of the holy... causes the decisive turn.’729 In his 
Theology of the Old Testament he argues that Yahweh in Proverbs does not ‘intervene[s] and 
intrude[s] into the life of Israel.’730 
One of the main developments that can be noted in Brueggemann’s discussion in Theology of 
the Old Testament is that there he did not replace the category of ‘secular’ by sociological 
categories but by the theological category of ‘hiddenness.’ Nevertheless, given the similarities 
to his earlier interpretation of Proverbs, the overlap between the two categories is also visible. 
In Brueggemann’s later treatment of Proverbs Yahweh’s ‘hiddenness’ is in a way a theological 
outworking of his earlier ‘secular’ interpretation. 
I suspect that one of Brueggemann’s motivations in his more recent (1997) interpretation is 
the same as in his earlier (1972) one: to offer, with the help of a ‘secular-looking’ Proverbs, a 
useful model of theological thinking for modern people in a disenchanted world. The 
‘…Yahweh who is not direct and not visible, but who in fact is hidden in the ongoing daily 
processes of life’731 seems to be more in line with the modern, ‘secular’ people’s experience 
and thinking than the God of the Heilsgeschichte. 
Preliminary evaluation of Brueggemann’s interpretation 
There is much that is of value in Brueggemann’s discussion. The important place he gives to 
wisdom in his account of Old Testament theology and the imaginative introduction of the 
theological category of ‘hiddenness’ into the discussion of ‘wisdom-theology’ are innovations 
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for which scholars working on wisdom literature should be grateful. His emphasis on the 
importance of everyday life in wisdom can hardly be contested. Furthermore, though the 
above introduction hardly does justice to this, his discussion is characterised by theological 
richness: he touches on issues of ethics and aesthetics, follows wisdom trajectories into the 
New Testament, mentions issues of liberation, providence, etc. 
However, there are two interrelated issues where, in my judgment, his account deserves 
nuancing. The first is his understanding of wisdom (and Proverbs) as ‘counter testimony.’ 
There is obviously much in Proverbs in which it differs from other parts of the Bible. Not least 
its special focus on ‘everyday life.’ So, in a sense, the word ‘alternative’ is justified. However, I 
wonder if Proverbs’ thought really does not leave space for God’s dramatic intrusions at all. 
The category ‘counter testimony’ surely represents an overstatement of Proverbs’ 
‘alternativeness.’ 
The second issue is Brueggemann’s understanding of ‘hiddenness.’ The words Brueggemann 
most often uses together with the word ‘hiddenness’ are ‘indirect’ and ‘invisible’: ‘Yahweh… is, 
on many occasions, hidden—indirect and not visible,’732 ‘…Yahweh who is not direct and not 
visible, but who in fact is hidden…,’733 ‘...Yahweh’s indirection and hiddenness,’734 ‘...hidden, 
indirect way of its [Yahweh’s governance] working,’735 ‘...Yahweh’s hidden, inscrutable, 
indirect, invisible ways...’736 ‘Yahweh was “taken underground” into hiddenness... in 
indirectness and invisibility...,’737 etc. This vocabulary seems to represent Brueggemann’s 
understanding of God’s hiddenness, namely that God’s activity (and, consequently, God 
himself) is not visible in everyday life, not least because he does not intervene into history in 
direct, dramatic, miraculous ways. 
God’s ‘hiddenness’ has been understood in many ways in the last few thousand years of 
theological discussion. Brueggemann’s understanding of ‘hiddenness’ as ‘invisibility in 
everyday life’ sounds most natural to contemporary, ‘secular’ readers and it certainly has some 
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pedigree during the rich history of hiddenness-theology.738 However, in Christian theology 
there is another, more dominant understanding of this concept which differs from 
Brueggemann’s usage in at least two aspects. First, it takes as the subject of hiddenness not 
God in general but God’s ‘essence’; second, it explains hiddenness mainly as 
incomprehensibility and not primarily as invisibility. 
The Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition differentiates between God’s ‘energies’ and God’s 
essence.739 The Western tradition speaks about God’s ‘effects’ and God’s essence. As Thomas 
says, ‘God’s effects, therefore, can serve to demonstrate that God exists, even though they 
cannot help us to know him comprehensively for what he is (suam essentiam).’ 740 God’s 
energies/effects are visible, well perceivable. These energies/effects can include dramatic and 
non-dramatic, supernatural and non-supernatural things equally. It does not really matter if 
the visible energy/effect is dramatic or not. It can be the growth of grass, the love between 
two persons, turning water into wine, or the cross of Christ. The invisible God is completely 
visible through the (extraordinary and ordinary) visible phenomena of the world. Yet, God’s 
essence is incomprehensible. It is a dark abyss, vastness, otherness which is completely 
beyond human beings. This is what is called God’s ‘hiddenness’ in many patristic, medieval, 
and even modern theological discussions and not that God‘s activity is not visible in mundane 
everyday reality.741 
I am going to argue in the following that although Brueggemann’s understanding of 
hiddenness offers itself most readily to modern, ‘disenchanted’ readers and that it can be 
easily seen in the text of Proverbs, it is actually not something which is claimed explicitly by the 
text. I will also suggest that the other, ‘classical’ understanding of hiddenness not only fits the 
explicit statements of the text better but also that it is at least as useful a category for a 
theological interpretation of Proverbs as Brueggemann’s understanding of hiddenness. 
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Evaluation of Brueggemann’s interpretation 
Hiddenness in Proverbs 
Nowhere does Proverbs explicitly claim that God is hidden. The vocabulary of hiddenness 
(verbs such as דחכ, רתס, אבח/הבח, ןפצ, ןמט, םלע) is almost entirely missing from the book.742 This 
in itself does not prove anything, since the idea can be present in the text without using the 
specific vocabulary, but as we are speaking about a supposed implicit meaning and not about 
an explicit statement, we need extra care in circumscribing its existence and role in Proverbs’ 
thought. 
In order to establish his understanding of hiddenness in relation to Proverbs, Brueggemann 
refers to Yahweh’s governing role in the book as a fairly passive one. According to 
Brueggemann, ‘human deeds have automatic and inescapable consequences… the deed 
carries within it the seed of its own consequence, punishment or reward, which is not imposed 
by an outside agent (Yahweh).’743 Here Brueggemann follows the argument of Klaus Koch.744 
However, as was noted in the first chapter, Koch’s theory is debatable.745 Furthermore, besides 
the numerous linguistic and historical problems, the theological problem that such a 
mechanistic order would restrict the freedom of God was also recognized by some.746 
Brueggemann recognised this theological problem, too. We have seen above that he tried to 
evade it by saying that although Israel did recognise the freedom of Yahweh, in those verses in 
which she spoke about his omnipotent governance she either did not use verbs at all, or used 
verbs which referred to a passive kind of governance rather than to active ‘intrusions’747 into 
the world. 
At this point Brueggemann explicitly builds on von Rad’s work, but also goes beyond it. The 
eight verses which Brueggemann refers to (16:1‒2, 9; 19:14, 21; 20:24; 21:30‒31) were 
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mentioned together by von Rad in his book about Israelite wisdom.748 He referred to them as 
examples of the ‘remarkable dialectic’ of the book of Proverbs: a considerable part of the book 
seems to teach that it is possible to understand the ‘automatic’ rules of life; however, there 
are a lot of verses (like these eight) which teach Yahweh’s sovereignty and freedom: 
Reduced to its bare essentials, these regulations of theirs [the sages’] for a fruitful life 
seem determined by a remarkable dialectic. Do not hesitate to summon up all your 
powers in order to familiarize yourself with all the rules which might somehow be 
effective in life. Ignorance in any form will be detrimental to you; only the ‘fool’ thinks he 
can shut his eyes to this. Experience, on the other hand, teaches that you can never be 
certain. You must always remain open for a completely new experience. You will never 




Unlike Brueggemann, however, von Rad did not say that these verses depict a rather passive 
Yahweh. He speaks about the ‘intervention of the divine mystery’750 or, giving an example for 
this activity of Yahweh from the historical books, he says that ‘Yahweh had “broken”, in 
dramatic fashion, the counsel of the wise man Ahithophel’ in Absalom’s council of war (2 Sam. 
17).751 So, from his vocabulary, it seems to me that von Rad understood Yahweh’s interaction 
with the world—at least in the case of these particular verses—as fairly active. At this point 
Brueggemann goes beyond von Rad. 
According to von Rad, the appeal and pedagogical usability of Proverbs’ take on the issue is 
precisely that it does not try to dilute the ‘dialectic’ between ‘automatic’ rules and divine 
freedom with a sophisticated theological synthesis: 
The statements of the teachers move in a dialectic which is fundamentally incapable of 
resolution, speaking on the one hand of valid rules and, on the other, of ad hoc divine 
actions...  
Their [the sages’] task was a predominantly practical one; they endeavoured to place their 
pupils within the sphere of influence of varied and partly contradictory experiences of life. 
...by means of their teachings, derived from experience, they set the pupil in the midst of 
the constant oscillation between grasp of meaning and loss of meaning, and in this way 
they induced him to make his own contribution in this exciting arena of knowledge of life. 
In this way they probably achieved more than if they had trained their pupils to find a 
better solution for theological problems.
752
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It seems to me that Brueggemann tries to do what, according to von Rad, the sages tried to 
avoid: he tries to construe a theological synthesis and the means for this is to downplay to 
some extent one side of the tension, namely Yahweh’s free activity. 
Does this mean that Brueggemann’s description of those eight verses is incorrect? Not 
necessarily. They do not refer unambiguously to divine activity. However, many of these verses 
are in close proximity to verses with very similar content, which do use active verbs and this 
weakens Brueggemann’s argument. Verses 16:1‒2 and 16:9 are at both ends of a verse chain 
in which almost all of the verses, except verse 8, mention the Tetragrammaton. Not all of 
these verses use passive verbs for describing Yahweh’s activity. Verse 7 says that ‘when the 
Lord likes someone’s way he makes even his enemies peaceful (םִלְַשי) towards him.’ 
Brueggemann mentions 19:14 as a verse which does not use a verb at all and 19:21 as using a 
passive verb in connection with Yahweh. However, just between these verses we read 19:17 
which uses an active verb (םֶלְַשי), and which asserts in accordance with these verses that 
‘[Yahweh] will reward him.’753 He also mentions 20:24 as a verse speaking about Yahweh 
without a verb, but again, two verses earlier we can read ‘wait for the Lord and he will save 
you’ (or ‘he will give you victory’754—עַֹשי). 
In general we can say that it is not rare that Proverbs uses active verbs in connection with 
Yahweh. There are 87 verses which mention the Tetragrammaton, in which we can read 36 
different active verbs altogether 40 times in connection with Yahweh.755 This means that only 
four verbs occur twice (בהא, וכן , ןכת, םלש). Yahweh gives wisdom: ‘For the Lord gives (ןתי) 
wisdom, knowledge and understanding are from his mouth’ (2:6); thwarts the desires of the 
wicked: ‘The Lord does not let the righteous hunger ( אל ביערי ), but thwarts (ףדהי) the desire of 
the wicked’ (10:3); tears down the house of the proud: ‘The Lord tears down (חסי) the house of 
proud people, but protects (בצי) the boundary of the widow’ (15:25); etc. 
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Brueggemann could argue that all of these verbs refer to the invisible governing activity of 
Yahweh (as he does in the case of ןוכ and ןכת) and these verbs just prove his case. This might 
be so. However, it is not easier to defend this claim than to prove the opposite of it. The fact is 
that Proverbs does not specify how Yahweh saves, tears down houses, rewards, etc. Usually 
the book just does not make it clear if these activities are visible or not, ‘supernatural’ or not, 
dramatic or not—hence the impression of some scholars that Proverbs is ‘secular’ in the sense 
of ‘disenchanted,’ i.e. does not count on the active presence of transcendent powers in the 
world. However, it seems that all of these verses only express the general rule without giving 
concrete examples. We are simply not told how ‘intrusive’ or ‘miraculous’ the concrete 
manifestations of these general rules are. The book speaks about a quite active Yahweh, it just 
does not specify his activity. So, if we recognize that Brueggemann’s argument is one based on 
silence, it does not look so persuasive any more.  
However, regardless of whether Yahweh ‘intervenes’ or not, is not the concept of ‘hiddenness’ 
still a fruitful interpretative category? It can be, but it is also not without its question marks. A 
large percentage of those verses which speak about Yahweh’s activity refer to his seeing, 
perceiving, examining, paying attention, like in 15:3 (‘The eyes of the Lord are in every place, 
keeping watch on the evil and the good’) or 24:18 (‘…or the Lord will see it and it will be bad in 
his eyes and he will turn away his anger from them’).756 This group of verses is significant 
because, as Perlitt—a scholar to whom Brueggemann refers as one who investigated God’s 
hiddenness in the Bible from an exegetical point of view—argues, in Psalms and in other 
ancient near eastern texts God’s seeing or not seeing, listening or not listening express his 
presence or absence/hiddenness.757 Proverbs consistently speaks about God as the one who is 
close, who listens and watches. In Proverbs God gives what some psalmists seem to miss: his 
close attention. So, if Proverbs speaks about God’s ‘hiddenness’ then this is accompanied by a 
strong emphasis on his closeness—an issue which would deserve a closer investigation than it 
gets in Brueggemann’s discussion. At any rate, Psalms’ and Perlitt’s understanding of 
hiddenness is different from how Brueggemann understood it in relation to Proverbs. 
These issues are not the only ones that could be relevant for Brueggemann’s subject, yet he 
fails to address them. The main question of Proverbs is not ‘How to see God?’ but rather ‘How 
to find Wisdom?’ The latter question seems to be neglected almost completely in 
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Brueggemann’s treatment. Similarly, he does not write about the ‘fear of the Lord,’ which is 
not only a key concept in the whole Old Testament but also in Proverbs, which in fact teaches 
that the ‘fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom’ (9:10). One wonders whether it would 
have led to a more persuasive account of God’s ‘hiddenness’ in Proverbs if Brueggemann had 
been able to incorporate these key proverbial themes into his argument. 
One can sum up this brief evaluation of Brueggemann’s exegesis in four points. First, 
Brueggemann’s insistence on the automatic relationship between deed and reward does not 
pay attention to the severe criticism of Koch’s theory. Second, although his statement that 
Proverbs does not refer to big, dramatic interventions of Yahweh seems to be true, after a 
closer look it turns out to be an argument based on silence. The ‘tension’ between Proverbs 
and the ‘core testimony’ is that when Proverbs speaks about God’s activity in the world it does 
not specify whether it is a dramatic, visible activity (as it often is in the ‘core testimony’) or a 
less visible one (for which we also find several examples in the ‘core testimony’).758 This silence 
is hardly enough ground for speaking about a ‘counter testimony.’ Third, the understanding of 
hiddenness which Brueggemann uses for interpreting Proverbs seems to differ from how other 
parts of the Old Testament understand God’s hiddenness. At least, when Proverbs speaks 
about God’s activity, its language is different from when the Psalms speaks about the hiding 
God. Fourth, Brueggemann fails to interact with some key themes of Proverbs which might be 
important for the theological interpretation of the book. 
Despite this relatively critical evaluation of Brueggemann’s discussion, I still find ‘hiddenness’ a 
potentially useful category for interpreting Proverbs, even if its definition and the argument 
for finding it in the book requires some modifications. For clarifying how I would like to modify 
Brueggemann’s understanding of ‘hiddenness,’ it will be useful to interact not only with what 
he wrote about it on the basis of Proverbs, but also with parts of his argument which are based 
on other Old Testament passages. 
                                                          
758
 A classic example could be when someone draws his bow ‘at random’ and hits the king of Israel (1  
Kings 22:34‒36). And was it just a pure accident that Moses killed an Egyptian and as a result had to flee 
and live in the wilderness for many years, changing from the man of initiative of Ex. 2 into the man of 
reluctance (or ‘humbleness’ ― Num. 12:3) of Ex. 3? Or was it only the good mood of Artaxerxes that 
made him react positively to Nehemiah’s request (Neh. 2:1‒8)? The historical books and the ‘core 
testimony’ are full of examples which explicitly teach or implicitly suggest Yahweh’s invisible 
governance. It is however not evident, whether the implied reader of the biblical books sees such a huge 
difference between God’s ‘dramatic intrusions’ and his ‘invisible governance’ as Brueggemann does. 
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Hiddenness in the Old Testament 
Brueggemann introduces his discussion of the hidden God in Proverbs by quoting Isa 45:15: 
‘Truly, you are a God who hides himself, O God of Israel, the Savior’ (Isa. 45:15).759 However, a 
look at the verse in its context puts question marks behind Brueggemann’s use of it. 
14 Thus says the Lord: the product of Egypt and the 
profit of Ethiopia, and Sabeans, tall men, will come to 
you and will be yours. They will walk behind you, in 
chains they will come, to you they will bow down, you 
they will beg: God is only with you, and there is no 
other, there is no [other] God. 
15 Indeed, you are a God who hides himself,760 God of 
Israel, Saviour. 
16 All of them are ashamed and humiliated at once,761 
the makers of idols walk in disgrace. 
17 Israel will be saved by the Lord, everlasting 
deliverance. You will not be ashamed and humiliated to 
everlasting ages. 
18 For thus says the Lord, the creator of heavens, he is 
the God, the shaper of earth and its maker, he is its 
establisher. He did not create it chaotic,762 he shaped it 
to be inhabited; I am the Lord, there is no other. 
19 I did not speak in hiddenness, somewhere in a dark 
land; I did not say to the seed of Jacob ‘seek me in 
chaos.’ I am the Lord, speaking right, declaring equity. 
הוהי רמא הכ 
רחסו םירצמ עיגי  הדמ ישנא םיאבסו שוכ
 םיקזב וכלי ךירחא ויהי ךלו ורבעי ךילע
 לא ךב ךא וללפתי ךילא ווחתשי ךילאו ורבעי
  םיהלא ספא דוע ןיאו 
 
עישומ לארשי יהלא רתתסמ לא התא ןכא 
  
םגו ושוב  המלכב וכלה ודחי םלכ ומלכנ
 םיריצ ישרח 
 
 ע תעושת הוהיב עשונ לארשיאל םימלו 
אלו ושבת דע ומלכת  דע ימלוע  
 
רמא הכ יכ  םיהלאה אוה םימשה ארוב הוהי
אל הננוכ אוה השעו ץראה רצי  הארב והת
 דוע ןיאו הוהי ינא הרצי תבשל  
 
 אל ךשח ץרא םוקמב יתרבד רתסב אל
 רבד הוהי ינא ינושקב והת בקעי ערזל יתרמא
םירשימ דיגמ קדצ 
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It is debated how Isa. 45:15 relates to its context: is verse 15 the nations’ confession of a God 
who was not visible to them but was visible to Israel,
763
 or it is Israel’s confession?
764
 Some 
argue that it is a speech of Cyrus.765 Maybe it is an interjected speech766 or prayer767 of the 
prophet himself. Or shall we ‘only’ see it as a gloss in the text, a theological comment by the 
author or a later scribe?
768
 Speaking about the cause of this hiddenness, is it caused by sin,
769
 
or does it belong to the character of Yahweh?770 Does God’s ‘hiding’ in 45:15a refer to the 
exile and ‘savior’ in 45:15b to the deliverance of Israel from the exile?771 Or does it mean 
rather that the God of Israel cannot be seen in cult images?772 
Whatever the answer for some of the above questions are, the wider context suggests that the 
reason for God’s hiddenness lies not in the hidden nature of God but in the lack of human 
perception. After all, just a few verses later God reminds Israel that he spoke clearly and 
openly, so no one can blame him that he hid himself: ‘I did not speak in hiddenness (רתסב), 
somewhere in a dark land.’ (Isa. 45:19a) 773  
Indeed, some have argued that seeing a reference to God’s hidden nature in Isa. 45:15 or in 
any other Old Testament passage is probably a misreading of the text influenced by a post-
biblical theological tradition of Deus absconditus: 
The ‘hidden God’… has little to do with the phrase’s meaning in the context [of Isa. 45:15], 
nor with any broader First Testament theme. ‘The prophets do not speak of the hidden 
God but of the hiding God. His hiding is… an act not a permanent state.’ It is not the case 
that ‘for Israel’s faith, God is essentially hidden,’ though it is no doubt the case that God 
would be hidden were it not for the fact that God wills to be known, as is the case with 
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any person… The acknowledgment of Yhwh as one who hides recognizes that God 
sometimes hides from Israel but then returns.
774
 
What exegetical foundation is Brueggemann building on then, except Isa. 45:15, when he 
refers to the idea of ‘hidden God’ in the Old Testament? He mentions Samuel E. Balentine’s 
The Hidden God as a work which lays the ‘exegetical ground’ for the notion of a ‘hidden God’ in 
the Bible.775 However, Balentine’s understanding of hiddenness is in fact more in line with 
Goldingay’s opinion. 
Balentine differentiates between two distinct lines in the Old Testament: 1. in the majority of 
the OT, especially in the prophets, God’s hiddenness is caused by human guilt; 2. in Psalms 
(and in Job) it is often not specified why God withdrew and the psalmist protests and asks God 
to reveal himself.776 At first sight, the second point is parallel with Brueggemann’s notion of 
the hidden God, since Balentine also argues that it is not always human sin that causes God’s 
hiddenness. However, we do not read about protest in the book of Proverbs comparable to 
that of the Psalms. Brueggemann, in fact, does not write about the ‘withdrawal’ of God. The 
God of Proverbs, according to Brueggemann, did not withdraw, he is simply not visible and this 
invisibility belongs to his nature: ‘The countertestimony of wisdom is that in much of life, if 
Yahweh is to be spoken of meaningfully, it must be a Yahweh who is not direct and not visible, 
but who in fact is hidden in the ongoing daily processes of life.’777 
This invisibility of the deity is different from what we can read about in Psalms, according to 
Balentine. According to Brueggemann, Proverbs speaks about the (sometimes) frustrating 
invisibility of God, but not about his terrifying and devastating withdrawal. As Perlitt, in 
accordance with Balentine but in contrast with Brueggemann’s hiddenness definition, put it, in 
the Psalms we never read ‘about the in principle unknowability of Yahweh but about the 
existential misery which stems from his temporary concealment.’778 
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To summarise our argument so far, though Brueggemann refers to Balentine and Perlitt, their 
understanding of ‘hiddenness,’ together with that of Goldingay, is different from his 
understanding. They see it as a response to human sin, or an inexplicable but painful 
withdrawal, but not as something which belongs to God’s nature, or which is in any ways 
connected to the everyday, mundane human experience. 
At this point we should note that neither Brueggemann nor Balentine mentions all of the 
biblical passages which could have some bearing on the theme of God’s hiddenness. For 
example in Ex. 33:20 the Lord tells Moses that ‘you cannot see my face, for no one [can] see 
me and live.’ Then Moses, from the shelter of a rock, is allowed to see God’s glory passing by 
(Ex. 33:21‒23; 34:6‒7). Another unmentioned, but potentially related text on hiddenness is 2 
Kings 6:17, in which Elisha prays for his servant boy that he may see, and then ‘the Lord 
opened the boy’s eyes and he saw and behold the mountain was full of horses and chariots of 
fire surrounding Elisha.’779 
In some respects these texts provide better support for Brueggemann’s understanding of 
hiddenness than Balentine’s discussion of the topic. They do suggest that a perfect vision of 
God is inaccessible for human beings (Ex. 33:20) and that even seeing the divine presence and 
action is not always an easy matter (2 Kings 6:16‒17). Nevertheless, their understanding of 
divine hiddenness still does not match perfectly the concept of ‘hiddenness’ applied by 
Brueggemann for interpreting Proverbs. Their hiddenness is not connected to a differentiation 
between the mundane and ordinary life vs. dramatic divine interaction. They suggest that 
different human beings have different capacity to perceive divine presence and at least 
implicitly they suggest that divine visibility or invisibility is not solely dependent on the hidden 
nature of God but also on human capacity to see and on human readiness to receive divine 
revelation.780 
Turning back to Brueggemann’s discussion of the topic in his Theology of the Old Testament, 
he refers to one more theologian, whose thoughts about God’s hiddenness in biblical wisdom 
literature do seem to be more in line with those of Brueggemann than with the ‘hiddenness’ 
definitions of Balentine, Perlitt, or the just mentioned biblical passages. 
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The scholar in question is Samuel Terrien. Brueggemann refers to his The Elusive Presence as a 
book which ‘has made much of the notion of the hiddenness of God.’781 My impression is that, 
besides von Rad’s work, Terrien’s book may have been the most influential for Brueggemann’s 
views. Terrien writes about biblical wisdom, that 
There were no Magnalia Dei at the Babylonian seizure of Zion in 587 B.C., but the first 
Jews saw a new form of the Opus Dei in their own lives. God was absent from history 
although he had been present for the fathers at the Sea of Reeds. The sages espoused the 
theological rigor of the prophets, but they went further. Although Amos and his 
successors had hailed Yahweh as the creator of heaven and earth, the sages shifted their 
attention from history—a stage now empty of God—to the theater of the universe, where 
they detected his presence.
782
 
One should note, however, that the prophetic view and the view of many post exilic writings 
was not that history was empty of the Magnalia Dei. Quite the opposite, for Jeremiah and 
Isaiah 40‒66, for Ezra and Nehemiah, it was precisely the exile and the return from exile that 
represented Magnalia Dei. God was not hidden, he was revealed and present in judgment and 
deliverance. So, if the sages did not mention history because they thought that it was empty of 
God‘s deeds, then it is not that they ‘went further’ than the prophets, as Terrien writes, but 
that they went against them. We have seen, however, that the fact that history is not 
mentioned in wisdom writings can be explained in many other ways783 and, unfortunately, 
Terrien did not back up his claims by extensive exegetical and theological investigations of 
many wisdom texts. 
However, regardless of the above reservations about Terrien’s interpretation, one has to see 
the similarities between Terrien’s thoughts about biblical wisdom and those of Brueggemann: 
the God of wisdom is not a God who intervenes in dramatic ways but a Deus absconditus. 
One has to recognize however, that although Terrien used ‘elusive’ in the sense of ‘not 
visible,’784 he also offered many alternative understandings of God’s ‘elusiveness,’ if not in 
connection with Proverbs but in connection with the rest of the Old Testament. He defined it 
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as referring to a God who is surprising and unpredictable,785 whose self-disclosure is limited to 
short instants of visitations,786 who is constantly on the move and whose absence and 
presence alternate,787 who is completely free from human manipulation,788 who is known as 
unknown,789 whose essence is not graspable and can be hidden either behind blinding light or 
darkness,790 who sometimes abases himself,791 who is untamable,792 who is inaccessible to 
empirical verification.793 Some of these can be clearly understood not only as elusiveness but 
also as ‘hiddenness’ and in fact Terrien uses the word ‘hiddenness’ rather often. To 
foreshadow my later discussion, some of these definitions of ‘elusiveness’ seem to me better 
descriptions of Proverbs’ vision of God than the one used by Brueggemann (and Terrien 
himself) to describe it. 
As a conclusion for this brief investigation into the notion of God’s hiddenness in the Bible, we 
should say that Brueggemann’s references to Isa. 45:15 and to the works of Balentine and 
Perlitt do not provide clear biblical basis for his definition of ‘hiddenness.’ They do use the 
word ‘hiddenness’ but in a different sense: mainly as divine withdrawal from humans because 
of human sin or because of unknown reasons, but not in the sense of invisibility in everyday 
life. This definition does not fit other relevant biblical texts either, like Ex. 33:20ff and 2 Kings 
6:8‒23. Terrien did use ‘elusive’ in the sense of a ‘not visible’ God but he did not offer 
exegetical proofs for why one should understand God this way in Proverbs, and he also offered 
many alternative understandings of God’s ‘elusiveness,’ some of which might be more fitting 
to Proverbs. 
As some of Terrien’s descriptions of ‘elusiveness’ are widely discussed in philosophical 
theology, it is worth having a brief look at those discussions before I move on. This might help 
to clarify ‘hiddenness’ more precisely.  
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Hiddenness in theology 
Brueggemann refers to Buber as the one who investigated God’s hiddenness from a Jewish 
perspective.794 However, Buber in his Eclipse of God places the main responsibility of this 
eclipse on humans and not on God’s invisibility. Discussing the philosophical tradition (mainly 
from Kant and Hegel) he describes how we made an idol out of the notion of God and 
terminated the real relationship with him. Or, using the language of his famous book, I and 
Thou, the thought of which he clearly follows in the Eclipse of God, we made an ‘It’ out of the 
‘Thou.’ Two typical quotations from I and Thou and the Eclipse of God respectively: 
Man desires to possess God; he desires a continuity in space and time of possession of 
God. He is not content with the inexpressible confirmation of meaning, but wants to see 
this confirmation stretched out as something that can be continually taken up and 
handled, a continuum unbroken in space and time that insures his life at every point and 
every moment. Man’s thirst for continuity is unsatisfied by the life-rhythm of pure 
relation, the interchange of actual being and of a potential being in which only our power 
to enter into relation, as hence the presentness (but not the primal Presence) decreases. 
He longs for extension in time, for duration. Thus God becomes an object of faith. At first 
faith, set in time, completes the acts of relation; but gradually it replaces them.
795
 
Understandably, the thinking of the era, in its effort to make God unreal, has not 
contented itself with reducing Him to a moral principle. The philosophers who followed 
Kant have tried essentially to reinstate the absolute, conceived of as existing not “within 
us,” or at least not only within us. The traditional term “God” is to be preserved for the 
sake of its profound overtones, but in such a way that any connection it may have with 
our concrete life, as a life exposed to the manifestations of God, must become 
meaningless. The reality of a vision or a contact that directly determines our existence, 
which was a fundamental certainty to thinkers such as Plato and Plotinus, Descartes and 
Leibniz, is no longer found in the world of Hegel… The radical abstraction, with which 
philosophizing begins for Hegel, ignores the existential reality of the I and of the Thou, 
together with that of everything else.’
796
 
It is worth comparing Buber’s thought with that of Heschel, another Jewish thinker. The full 
paragraph from which Goldingay quoted parts above goes like this: 
The prophets do not speak of the hidden God but of the hiding God. His hiding is a 
function not His essence, an act not a permanent state. It is when the people forsake Him, 
breaking the Covenant which He has made with them, that He forsakes them and hides 
His face from them. It is not God who is obscure. It is man who conceals Him. His hiding 
from us is not in His essence: “Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself, O God of Israel, 
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the Saviour!” (Isaiah 45:15). A hiding God, not a hidden God. He is waiting to be disclosed, 
to be admitted into our lives.
797
 
Both Heschel and Buber place the main responsibility of God’s hiddenness on humans and not 
on God. However, Heschel speaks about the guilt of humans, whereas the guilt dimension is 
less clear in Buber. It is probably a matter of definition whether we should call mistaken 
(philosophical) thinking, stemming from obsession with security and possession, ‘sin.’ Probably 
many would argue that it would be too strong language. Be that as it may, the cause of God’s 
hiddenness in Buber is not God’s character but human blindness. 
Turning from Jewish to Christian philosophical theology, Brueggemann refers the reader to 
John Dillenberger’s God Hidden and Revealed as an introduction to Luther’s understanding of 
the hiddenness of God. Dillenberger analyses the notion of the hidden God of several 
commentators of Luther and that of Luther himself. It would go beyond our interests to list all 
the different views delineated in Dillenberger’s book, but it is worth mentioning one of the 
main questions along which the various opinions can be classified: how the revelation and 
hiddenness of God relate to each other. The two main options seem to be: 
1. God has a revealed and a hidden side 
2. God reveals himself through hiding himself (and vice versa). 
The former view can be exemplified by the words of Luther himself: 
While a differentiation must be made between the revealed and the hidden will of God, 
God in the latter sense does not concern us… God does much which he does not make 
known to us in his Word. He also desires many things which he does not in his Word 
reveal to us that he wants… We must let ourselves be led by the Word of God and not by 




As a later interpreter explains it, 
The implication of hiddenness is that that which lies behind revelation is not caprice or 
arbitrariness, but can be trusted to the same extent as revelation even though one does 
not understand it… The hidden God, though one is not able to understand him, is not 
different from the revealed God.
799
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The second view is based on a different line of Luther’s thought in which he does not 
differentiate revelation from hiddenness but equates the two. This is clearly more sympathetic 
to Dillenberger himself. As he writes ‘God is not simply apparent in the cross as other things 
are apparent to human beings… God gives himself but the content of that gift is still 
surrounded by mystery… God is most hidden at the moment of fullest disclosure.’800 
Dillenberger introduces several theologians who understood Luther’s thoughts along similar 
lines. One of them is Ferdinand Kattenbusch: 
Revelation introduces mysteries and depths too great for man’s comprehension. This, 
Kattenbusch believes, was the most distinctive meaning of the hidden God for Luther… 
God’s revelation overwhelms man and appears so differently than expected that a new 
riddle or enigma of its own emerges… What Luther had in mind, suggests Kattenbusch, is 
that love cannot be measured by human findings, standards, or thoughts. The mystery of 
God is that in him person and love are so closely connected.
801
 
Similarly, Karl Barth believed that it is revelation itself that defines God as hidden.802 That God 
revealed himself and his power through the weakness of the cross means that he unveiled 
himself in veiling.803 Furthermore, the fact that we only know God through Christ and that we 
do not have access to him without his revelation in Christ (that is, he is completely hidden from 
us), and the fact that revelation (unveiling) is hiding (veiling) at the same time, also means that 
his revelation comes from divine freedom, we cannot possess him. Let us note here that, 
despite Dillenberger’s and Barth’s seeming neglect of the Old Testament and Jewish 
perspectives, there are significant overlaps in their and Buber’s discussion of God’s 
hiddenness, not least an emphasis on the fact that one cannot possess God: 
It is… this freedom which constitutes the hiddenness of God in the sense of his 
inconceivability and mystery. In his revelation, God does not give himself to man to 




Although Brueggemann notes Dillenberger’s work, he seems to utilize it little. He does not 
speak about a hidden characteristic of God, or the hidden will of God as opposed to the 
revealed one (as the first, though for Dillenberger less attractive, option of interpreting the 
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notion of Deus absconditus), he rather speaks about the wholeness of God as hidden and 
invisible. Neither does he connect revelation with hiddenness. He sees Proverbs as the 
wrestling with the unpleasant fact of the invisibility of God in the ‘ordinary,’ or at maximum as 
the proclamation of the invisible presence of God, but does not see God’s invisibility in 
Proverbs as intrinsically connected to God’s self-revelation the way Kattenbusch, Barth, or 
Dillenberger understood it. 
This is a good place to take notice of Karl Rahner’s work, who wrote about the hidden God 
extensively from a Catholic perspective and whose idea of God’s hiddenness is not dissimilar to 
that of Barth and Dillenberger. The most characteristic point of Rahner’s opinion is that we 
should not really speak about God’s ‘hiddenness’ but about God’s ‘incomprehensibility.’ God is 
not someone who tries to hide some characteristics of himself. No, quite the opposite, he 
reveals himself. However, we are not able to comprehend his being, he always remains 
‘hidden,’ but not because we cannot see him. In a sense we are able to see him in his fullness: 
The concept ‘hiddenness’ is less frequently used in Catholic theology than that of 
‘incomprehensibility’… this does not mean, however, that in God some things are 
known…, while others simply remain unknown. Rather one and the same God is known 
and is at the same time fundamentally incomprehensible… it is not true that the ‘deus 
absconditus’ is the sort of God who desires that we should not recognize him at all. He 
does not share one part of himself with us and conceal the other; rather he bestows his 
whole being upon us. In communicating himself as ‘deus revelatus’ he becomes radically 
open to man as the ‘deus absconditus.’
805
 
Rahner was not an inventor. Rahner, Luther, and Dillenberger only follow the patristic tradition 
of connecting the Deus revelatus with the Deus absconditus. As the orthodox theologian 
Olivier Clément summarises the teaching of numerous patristic texts about human beings’ 
experience of God: ‘the more it is hidden the more it is given; the more it is given the more 
hidden it is.’806 
One important difference between this approach to the hidden God (represented by the 
Catholic Rahner, the protestant Dillenberger, and the Orthodox Clément) and the approach of 
Brueggemann is that whereas Brueggemann defined the hiddenness of God as a lack of 
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supernatural interventions, they do not differentiate between ‘ordinary’ and ‘non-ordinary,’ 
between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’—just as, it seems to me, such a differentiation is missing 
from Proverbs, too. According to this ‘classical’ understanding of hiddenness, God’s revelation 
can take ‘ordinary’ and ‘supernatural’ forms, but whatever form revelation takes, it, besides 
revealing him, also hides the inexpressible, incomprehensible Being of God because that Being 
is beyond every beings, be those beings extraordinary or ordinary. 
Wisdom is ungraspable in its fullness 
We have seen so far that although Brueggemann’s application of the category ‘hiddenness’ in 
the interpretation of Proverbs is creative and theologically promising, there are problems with 
his actual exposition of Proverbs. His exegesis depends on Koch’s debated theory of 
deed‒consequence relationship and his argument is mainly built on the silence of the text 
about how God acts. We could also see that although he refers to numerous theologians, his 
description of God’s hiddenness usually differs from their description of it. Maybe 
Brueggemann’s understanding of ‘hiddenness’ was influenced by his earlier ‘secular’ 
interpretation of Proverbs. ‘Hiddenness’ to him meant God’s indirect governance (compare the 
understanding of ‘secular’ as leaving (some) autonomy to human beings) and God’s ‘invisible’ 
governance (compare the understanding of ‘secular’ as disenchantment and lack of ‘intrusion’ 
of the sacred). 
However, even if the category of ‘hiddenness’ in relation to contemporary Proverbs 
interpretation sprouted from the soil of an unpersuasive secular understanding of Proverbs, it 
might be used fruitfully for interpreting Proverbs if one goes back to its classical 
understanding. In the following I am going to argue briefly that there are some features of 
Proverbs which can be correlated with an understanding of ‘hiddenness’ as 
‘incomprehensibility.’ 
One of the paradoxes about wisdom is that she is crying out at the most frequented, most 
visible places of the world (1:20‒21; 8:1‒2; 9:1‒6), yet Proverbs speaks as if it was not the 
easiest task to find her: ‘if to insight you call out, to understanding you raise your voice, if you 
seek it like silver, and like treasure you search for it, then you will understand...’ (2:3‒5a). The 
task obviously requires determination from the student and many fail in their search. (On the 
determination required for the search for wisdom and the possibility of failure see also 1:28; 
3:13; 4:1‒8; 8:9, 17, 35; 24:14; 31:10; etc.) Why is it so difficult to find something which is so 
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visibly there? Maybe one can see in this phenomenon a parallel to the hiddenness of God, not 
to the hiddenness in the sense of not being visible, but to the hiddenness in the sense of being 
fully visible yet somehow hard to grasp: only those who have the eyes can see it. 
Another, related paradox about wisdom is that she is there, visible, graspable, indeed Proverbs 
constantly urges the student to grasp her—yet, one should not consider oneself wise. That it is 
possible to find her is suggested by the fact that Proverbs constantly speaks about wise people 
who obviously have already grasped her. Still, people should not consider themselves wise. In 
fact there is more hope for fools than for those who think they are wise: ‘Have you seen a man 
wise (םכח) in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool (ליסכ) than for him’ (26:12; see also 
3:5, 7; 27:1; 28:11). Maybe, again, one can see here a parallel to divine hiddenness, not to the 
hiddenness in the sense of not being visible behind everyday life, but to hiddenness à la Buber: 
being in relationship but resisting complete comprehension and possession by others. 
Let us have a closer look at these issues: why is it so difficult to find wisdom, when, on the 
other hand, she is so close and visible; and why cannot one consider him- or herself wise when 
finding wisdom is not only possible but the aim of the whole enterprise? 
In fact, Proverbs does provide explanation for how one can miss Lady Wisdom even when she 
is clearly visible. Possible causes for failure are the tempting presence of Lady Folly (Prov. 9) or 
the alluring prospect of gaining riches through unwise means (Prov. 1:11‒14). However, there 
is a further difficulty807 which is especially relevant for our questions: pride and unwillingness 
to listen to advice and instruction prevent people from becoming wise. 
The idea seems to be that one should always remain open for correction, for the wisdom of 
others, and no one should think that he or she possesses wisdom in its entirety. This attitude is 
not only appropriate for the ‘not yet wise’ but also for the wise: ‘Give [instruction]808 to a wise 
                                                          
807
 Of course, I do not claim that these temptations are not interrelated or even that occasionally these 
different pictures cannot be metaphors for the same phenomenon. 
808




person (םכח) and he will become even wiser’ (9:9a); ‘The wise of heart ( םכח בל ) takes in 
precepts (תוצמ) while a babbling fool will go astray (טבלי)’809 (10:8; see also 1:5; 13:1; 18:15). 
It is apparently one of the key characteristics of wise people that they can listen to instruction. 
This explains why listening to instruction is one of the most emphasized topics in Proverbs. 
רסומ (instruction) occurs 30 times in the book out of the 50 occurrences in the whole Old 
Testament.810 The meaning of ‘instruction’ (רסומ) is broad and its content is diverse. It can 
mean punishment (16:22), even physical punishment (13:24), but usually it would be hard to 
decide whether it refers to teaching or reproach. Fox suggests that in most cases the best 
translation is ‘correction.’811 However diverse though its semantic range was or whatever 
development its meaning went through during the time of Proverbs’ birth, it was always used 
to emphasise the importance of being open towards some kind of correction. 
One should note, however, that it is not so much the content of the instruction which interests 
the authors of Proverbs. As Stuart Weeks writes,  
When an instructional work lays as much emphasis as does Proverbs 1‒9 on the 
importance of instruction, we might expect it to tell us what that instruction is. Instead… 
most of the work is devoted to asserting the need for the uneducated to receive teaching, 
and not to providing teaching itself.
812
 
This neglect of giving precise instructions supports Weeks’ thesis that instruction in Prov. 1‒9 
was probably closely associated with the Law. However, if we understand the first nine 
chapters not as an independent work but as an introduction to the later chapters, then Weeks’ 
argument is weakened somewhat, since one could say that the introductory chapters did not 
give detailed instructions because they presupposed the later chapters. Nevertheless, even in 
the later chapters, ‘instruction’ is never identified explicitly with the teaching of the sayings of 
Proverbs. Those verses which mention the word ‘instruction’ almost always speak about the 
required attitude (that is, they urge the reader to ‘listen to instruction’)813 and not about its 
content. 
                                                          
809
 The meaning of טבל in this verse is uncertain. Fox concludes at the end of a thorough lexical note on 
the word that ‘In Prov 10:8, either “go astray” (in sin) or “be cast aside” (in punishment) seems possible.’ 
(Fox 2009:516.) 
810
 Merrill 1997:479‒482. 
811
 Fox 2000:34‒35. 
812
 Weeks 2007:96. 
813
 Like 10:17; 12:1; 13:1, 18; 15:5, 10, 32; 19:20, 27; 23:12. 
263 
 
The surprising phenomenon of not specifying instruction in chapters 1‒9 can not only be 
understood as suggesting that the content is given somewhere else (law, or later chapters), 
but also as suggesting that the attitude of humble listening is not less important than the 
content of the instruction itself. Maybe, if they had met, the different authors of Proverbs 
would have had a debate about what the best source of correction is but they would have 
definitely agreed that the way towards wisdom is being open for correction.814 
Opposed to the wise, the scoffers are not willing to listen: ‘The scoffer you strike but the 
simple will learn prudence; but rebuke the discerning person (ןובנ)815 and he will understand 
(ןיבי) knowledge’ (19:25; see also 1:5; 9:7‒9; 10:8; 13:1; 15:12; 21:11). The characteristics of 
humility and pride are probably partly responsible for this difference in teachability. No 
wonder, the categories of ‘wise’ and ‘scoffer’ are closely associated with these characteristics: 
‘The proud (דז), arrogant (ריהי) person: scoffer (ץל) is his name’ (21:24a); ‘He scoffs (ץילי) at 
scoffers (םיצל); but to the humble he shows favour’ (3:34). 
The humility―listening to instruction―wisdom cluster is also expressed by the fact that the 
fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of wisdom (1:7; 9:10), is not only associated with the 
ability to listen to instruction as we have seen earlier (see the discussion on page 164), but it is 
also associated with humility: ‘The fear of the Lord [is?] the instruction (רסומ)816 of wisdom, and 
before honour, humility (הונע)’ (15:33). This verse prompts several exegetical questions, but it 
seems to be likely that it is ‘humility’ which is in parallel with ‘fear of the Lord.’817 This 
parallelism is reinforced by 22:4: ‘The reward of humility (הונע) is fear of the Lord; riches, and 
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honour, and life.’818 It is also reinforced by 8:13 where fear of the Lord is contrasted with pride: 
‘Fear of the Lord [is] to hate evil: pride, and arrogance, and an evil way and a mouth of 
perversion [that] I [i.e. המכח] hate’. 
To summarise the foregoing discussion, it seems that one of the key characteristics which 
enable one to become and remain wise is the ability to listen attentively to instruction and 
advice.819 This ability is supported by fear of the Lord and humility, whereas it is hindered if 
one is proud and has a mocking attitude. 
After this brief investigation of the theme of listening to instruction it is more understandable 
why it is perceived to be so dangerous in Proverbs if someone considers him or herself wise. 
Wisdom is not something one can possess forever without losing it any more. No one can say 
that ‘I am wise’ in the sense of having comprehended and possessing wisdom. Being wise is at 
least as much a character trait as possessing a sharp mind and experience. Being wise is being 
humble, ‘denying our knowledge’ in the sense of leaving behind our knowledge constantly and 
listening to instruction, being ready to change. It is more about having an attentive 
relationship with wisdom than having wisdom herself. 
If this reconstruction of Proverb’s thought world is correct then ‘hiddenness’ in it is not so 
much about being invisible, but about human inability to see and comprehend wisdom fully. 
This inability can be caused by false (i.e. proud) thinking and by human limitations, not being 
able to comprehend and possess wisdom in its fullness. As a consequence, Provebs is not so 
much about human autonomy as about attentive, humble listening and constant willingness to 
change and leave behind one’s own ‘precious’ wisdom. We can see the same dynamic here 
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that we have already seen in Proverbs several time. One has to let go his or her wisdom if he 
or she wants to remain wise. As Lash writes, 
The self-acceptance to which basic experience invites us is always a matter of ‘decentring,’ 
of surrendering what we took to be autonomy; a matter of that conversion which entails 
the surrender of the ‘false drive for self-affirmation which impels man to flee from the 





By introducing the category ‘hiddenness,’ Brueggemann developed his earlier ‘secular’ 
interpretation of Proverbs in which ‘secular’ meant an emphasis on human autonomy and a 
lack of sacral thinking. I appreciated his initiative to interpret Proverbs in the light of the 
theologically fertile category of the hidden God. However, I argued that contrary to 
Brueggemann’s claim, Proverbs does not depict a passive deity. It usually does not specify 
whether his activity is done through grand, intrusive deeds or through invisible work in the 
background, and so basing a whole theory on this silence is risky. Furthermore, Brueggemann 
fails to address topics which are key issues in Proverbs, like ‘how to find wisdom,’ and ‘fear of 
the Lord.’ 
Turning from his exegesis to his theological category, ‘hiddenness,’ we had to recognize that 
Brueggemann’s understanding of ‘hiddenness’ was probably influenced by his earlier ‘secular’ 
interpretation of Proverbs and it does not agree with the most decisive thoughts of those 
theologians he is referring to. This, actually, gives us the opportunity to ‘save’ his idea of 
interpreting Proverbs in the light of the theological tradition of the hidden God. I have 
suggested that we should utilise the ‘classical’ concept of divine hiddenness, as defined by 
Rahner, Buber, and others. This ‘classical hiddenness’ describes God as incomprehensible and 
as someone who cannot be possessed. 
Finally, I noted that Proverbs teaches about a radical openness towards instruction. One’s 
character plays a crucial role in enabling one to have an (at least partial) vision of Wisdom. 
Being wise, in this sense, is not a conceptual mastery, possession of knowledge and sharp 
mind, but the state of being open towards wisdom. Though wisdom fully presents herself to 
us, still, one cannot grasp her fully. 
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Understood this way, ‘hiddenness’ is not so much about the invisibility of the other but, to use 
Buber’s expression, it is ‘the life-rhythm of pure relation’ with the absolute Being, experiencing 
its freedom, uncontrollability and incomprehensible depth. This way hiddenness-theology 
becomes a theology of relation instead of a theology of autonomy. 
One could make, however, a serious objection to the above argument: it is unfair to compare 
Proverbs’ understanding of wisdom with the interpretation of Brueggemann since he wrote 
about the hiddenness of God and not that of wisdom. This criticism is partly valid, of course. 
However, as we saw in the previous chapters, one can argue that in Proverbs, especially in its 
framework (i.e. Prov. 1‒9), and most clearly in Proverbs 8, wisdom and God are so closely 
associated that one’s relationship to one of them is intrinsically related to one’s relationship to 




19th century interpreters saw almost all of those special features of wisdom writings that were 
recognised by their 20th century colleagues. However, their theological interpretation differed 
in some important points. Most of them saw more continuity with the rest of the Bible than 
many 20th century scholars. Instead of seeing its universal character as theologically 
challenging, they saw its ‘self-interest’ as more problematic. Instead of explaining Proverbs in 
the framework of creation theology, they taught that its peculiarity is simply the result of being 
written on a different, ‘philosophical’ level.  
Some features of my argument can be seen as parallel to 19th century interpretation. Similarly 
to many 19th century scholars, I have also seen the continuities between Proverbs and the rest 
of the Bible as more significant than wisdom’s ‘alternativeness.’ I have also considered it 
important to try to handle the emphasis on self-interest in the book from a theological point of 
view. Furthermore, I have also not used the category of ‘creation theology’ for explaining 
Proverbs’ ‘universalism’ and silence about national history. Instead, I have explained these 
features of the book by different factors: first, by the special literary form of (some parts of) 
Proverbs (i.e. sentence literature); second, by its interest in everyday life; and, third, by it being 
written on a ‘more abstract, theoretical level’—an understanding which has some parallels 
with the 19th century understanding of wisdom as ‘philosophical.’ 
The idea of creation is, of course, present. However, it is just as much present in other parts of 
the Bible. I argued that it should be classified as a ‘worldview’ instead of presenting it as a 
characteristic theology which can be opposed to Heilsgeschichte. I suspect that its status is 
rather similar to the modern European ‘scientific worldview.’ According to this analogy, saying 
that the theology of Proverbs is ‘creation theology’ which is an alternative to Heilsgeschichte is 
a similar statement to ‘I am not religious because I rather accept the scientific worldview.’ 
Such a statement would rightly provoke the disapproval of many theologians as these 
categories function on different levels and they are not alternatives to each other. Of course, 
just like science, the theme of creation becomes theologically significant sometimes. It 
happens in Proverbs 8, for example, and I have also made use of it in my interpretation. 
However, in my utilization of this theme I have understood it as connecting Proverbs with the 
rest of the Bible (through the picture of the temple) and not as presenting an alternative 
theology. I have not seen it as a teaching about a world-order which is in any sense 
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independent from God. Furthermore, instead of seeing the creation-theme as the theology of 
Proverbs I have seen it as only one of the many important themes in Proverbs which can be 
utilized theologically.  
From these many themes I chose two as the foci of my theological investigation, both of them 
once popular but less extensively discussed nowadays. The first one is the seemingly self-
interested nature of Proverbs, which was a major problem for 19th century scholarship. The 
second one is the seemingly secular nature of Proverbs which was a popular theme not much 
after the middle of the 20th century. 
As for self-interest, some recent commentators offer an explanation which contains only a 
brief reference to the creation-order. I did not find this explanation satisfying. The reasons for 
my dissatisfaction were twofold. First, seeing an automatic act‒consequence relationship in 
Proverbs is not persuasive. Second, Proverbs not only states that because of the good order of 
creation a righteous act is also beneficial for the actor, but it explicitly motivates the reader 
through appealing to his or her self-interest. For handling such a strong emphasis on self-
interest I found a eudaemonistic frame of reference the most promising because that gives a 
central role to human, individual flourishing. 
A comparison with the Thomistic version of eudaemonism has shown that despite the 
differences Proverbs can be interpreted along Thomistic lines. Thomas both accepts self-
interest as good and valuable and differentiates between selfishness and legitimate self-
interest. I have found most of his criteria for a legitimate self-interest present in Proverbs to a 
greater or lesser extent. These criteria comprise a stronger emphasis on self-preservation than 
on success; an emphasis on justice and community; a greater emphasis on spiritual than on 
material success; and a hierarchy of human ends with ‘knowledge of God’ being the highest 
end. 
Thomas taught that care for oneself in a proper, wise way means participation in divine 
providence, that is, participation in the divine mind. I have argued that some sections of 
Proverbs which provide a theological context for the whole book can be understood in this 
way. Discussing this question my concrete example was Prov. 2, but my later discussion of 
Prov. 8 could also supports the same argument. According to this argument, Proverbs is not 
only eudaemonistic but it is relationally eudaemonistic: it puts an emphasis on the relationship 
with the divine. That relationship is what it considers as the greatest human good, or at least 
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its teaching can be read like this.821 According to this reading, Proverbs attracts the reader to 
self-interested wise behaviour not only because it is beneficial for him or her but also because 
it connects him or her to divine care, presence, and activity in the world. This interpretation of 
self-interest in Proverbs puts a stronger emphasis on a ‘direct’ participation in the divine than 
the creation-order explanation does. 
‘Relational/participational theology’ is, if it is possible, an even better description of my 
interpretation of the apparent ‘secular’ nature of Proverbs. 
I have ordered the different understandings of ‘secular’ into three major groups. The one that 
seemed to be most applicable to Proverbs is the one which sees ‘secular’ as a neutral space in 
which people from different backgrounds can meet, communicate, and negotiate. This 
understanding of secular seems to fit Proverbs because the book does not mention typical 
Israelite religious institutions and as such most of it would probably be understandable and 
acceptable for many readers coming from outside of a Jewish or Christian context. However, I 
argued that reading it canonically, i.e. taking its literary framework and biblical context 
seriously, Proverbs is more about the ‘sanctification’ of the secular space than simply a 
description of it. Placing side by side the divine Wisdom of the first nine chapters and the 
practical wisdom of the later chapters suggests continuity between the two. This, in turn, 
suggests that one can participate in the divine presence through wise action. Reading Proverbs 
in the context of some Psalms and 1 Kings 3‒11 can have the same effect: it can suggest that 
wisdom leads one into the presence of the Lord rather as if it might lead one into the Temple. 
So, this canonical reading has led to a very similar conclusion to the one we have reached at 
the end of the previous section about self-interest: being wise connects one to God, makes 
one participate in divine presence. 
Other definitions of ‘secular,’ like disenchantment or human-centredness, seemed to be less 
applicable to Proverbs because the support for them is mainly based on an argument from 
silence; and, in fact, there are a few verses in Proverbs which do not fit these categories so 
smoothly. However, I have found a more recent offspring of these secular interpretations very 
imaginative and worth further consideration. This is Brueggemann’s reading of Proverbs, 
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which promotes ‘hiddenness theology.’ I suggested that if we alter Brueggemann’s 
‘hiddenness’ definition (i.e. non-visible) to another definition which is more represented in 
classical theological discussions (i.e. incomprehensible, something that cannot be ultimately 
possessed by human beings) then we might find some support for it in Proverbs. Wisdom in 
Proverbs seems to be someone who is easily accessible in one sense yet not that easy to gain 
in another. No one can claim that he or she grasped her fully, but everyone has to be 
constantly open towards her. To revise slightly one of the important statements of Proverbs: 
wisdom only has a beginning (the fear of the Lord) but not an end. As there is a certain 
continuity between the Lord and wisdom, maybe it is arguable that these characteristics of 
wisdom in Proverbs tell something of Proverbs’ view of God, too. This understanding of divine 
hiddenness is not so much connected to a feeling of divine passivity or invisibility in the 
(secular) life, but, to an ever deepening relationship, even to participation in (but not 
possession of) the divine. 
So, again, my interpretation has put a strong emphasis on the relationship with the divine 
through wisdom. 
One could object, however, that this ‘relational/participational theology’ is only deducible 
from Proverbs if the book is read canonically. This objection is, of course, valid to a certain 
extent. Nevertheless, as I have argued in my chapter on methodology, it is a legitimate reading 
strategy to pay serious attention to the book’s canonical context. 
Besides utilizing intertextual resonances, the canonical approach also pays attention to the 
book as a whole. In the case of Proverbs this involves interpreting the framework of the book 
as framework and not as an (originally) independent work. As understanding the theological 
vision of the framework is crucial for understanding Proverbs as a book, I have been focusing 
mainly on the theological/literary framework of Proverbs, though I have tried not to neglect 
the sentence literature completely. Regrettably, even this limited task could not be 
accomplished entirely within the limits of the dissertation. Important sections would deserve 
much further discussion. For example, how does Prov. 1:20‒33, through resonances with 
prophetic material, emphasise that Wisdom speaks with the authority of Yahweh? How does 
Prov. 16:1‒9, a structurally crucial part of Proverbs, emphasise humble listening and reliance 
on Yahweh instead of human autonomy? How does Prov. 31:10‒31, through the picture of a 
marriage to a wise woman/Wisdom combine self-interest and being in true, mutual, loving 
relationship in real eudaemonistic way? Nevertheless, hopefully even the selective discussion 
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of the literary/theological framework which could be accomplished here has shown that taking 
the framework of the book seriously and reading it in its canonical context opens up 
interesting theological possibilities in understanding the book. 
The canonical reading I have advocated not only pays attention to the literary framework of 
the book and to its biblical context, but also to the theological tradition of the community (or 
communities) which is (are) connected to the canon. This does not necessarily mean that 
reading Proverbs canonically should follow ancient readings in every detail (see, for example, 
the differences between my reading and that of Thomas Aqinas despite the appreciative 
utilization of Thomas’s categories and thoughts). Nevertheless, the reading of the community 
(or communities) which is (are) connected to the canon can inspire the modern interpreter 
through being a conversation partner, and, occasionally, it can provide vocabulary for 
contemporary theological interpretation (like the language of divine hiddenness). 
Sometimes old theological readings can gain confirmation from modern scholarly ones. For 
example, the recognition of the idea of participation in the divine through wisdom can be 
understood as a confirmation of ancient readings of the Bible. It was a typical understanding of 
the patristic age. Origen, for example, taught that ‘each of the sages, in proportion as he 
embraces wisdom, partakes to that extent of Christ…’822 Evagrius also taught that through 
paideia the divine wisdom of God comes to dwell in man and incorporates him into the life of 
God.823 Maximus the Confessor taught too that ‘there is nothing interposed between wisdom 
and God.’824 
However, the fact that this understanding of wisdom is ancient does not necessarily mean that 
interpreting Proverbs along these lines is not relevant to modern people any more. This is 
another disagreement between my reading of Proverbs and some who emphatically support a 
non-canonical reading. McKane and Westermann, for example, not only claimed that one has 
to make a distinction between an earlier secular and a later ‘pietistic’ layer in Proverbs but 
they also claimed that the later layer is conceptually shallower and it exhibits ‘extreme 
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tidiness’ and ‘sterility,’825 it is ‘only morality’ which is characterised by ‘abstract, didactic 
discourse’ and has ‘lost its connection to real life.’826 
In contrast, I found in the above delineated canonical reading of Proverbs a fascinating vision 
of God in everyday life, and a vision of life in God through everyday activities. It is morality, 
yes, but a morality which stems from the incomprehensible mystery of God. 
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